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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the nature of public budget-making through a study of the interplay 
between formal political institutions and informal practices within Indonesia’s budgetary 
arena after the 2014 elections. It draws on a body of theory that deals with the role of political 
institutions in budget-making and engages with key theoretical debates in area studies about 
the role of politicians and parties within Indonesia’s political system since the advent of 
democracy. 
Based on data collected through participant observation, in-depth interviews and a 
study of primary source documents, the thesis examines the legislature’s behaviour in the 
budget-making process. Drawing on three case studies, it argues that the legislature’s 
relationship to political parties and the executive arm of government behaviour is influenced 
not only by the President’s constitutional budgetary powers, but also by electoral rules that 
encourage legislators to prioritise access to patronage resources over party affiliation. In other 
words, the budget-making process is driven by a combination of the executive’s need to 
advance its budgetary agenda in a multiparty presidential setting, the absence of party 
direction and discipline and legislators’ need to secure patronage resources. 
These findings offer new insights not only into the budgetary process but also into the 
workings of Indonesia’s legislature. First, the case studies show that the presence or absence 
of a governing coalition is not a key determining factor in providing stability in the budget 
decision-making process. Second, they demonstrate that—in the absence of effective 
coalitions—the use of constitutional budget-making powers to maintain the support of the 
legislature comes at a particularly high political cost. Third, they reveal a form of cartel-like 
behaviour among individuals, rather than parties, which challenges the applicability of cartel 
party theory in the Indonesian context. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has been transformed from a system 
of authoritarian rule to a democratic polity. During this period, a series of institutional 
reforms has accompanied the process of political reform. These include reforms to the 
relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government, reforms to the 
electoral process, decentralisation, and the establishment of a Constitutional Court and 
several national commissions (Crouch, 2010). Some scholars assert that the transition that 
commenced in 1998 had effectively ended by 2004, as evidenced by popular acceptance of 
the democratic system, the absence of any significant political force threatening to overthrow 
democracy, and the existence of a consensus among political actors that conflict should be 
resolved through the constitutional framework (Liddle & Mujani, 2013). However, 
democratic consolidation in post-Suharto Indonesia is far from complete. As McLeod (2005, 
p. 368) has argued, the Indonesian people now have the opportunity to elect their 
governments, but those governments are hostage to an extortive legislature and an 
uncontrollable judiciary; at the same time, decentralisation has given rise to a raft of new 
political players engaging in rent-seeking activity at the local level.  
The opening up of Indonesia’s polity has been accompanied by the opening up of a 
previously closed budgetary system (Juwono & Eckardt, 2008, p. 298). Despite the national 
legislature’s low level of institutional capacity, it now has virtually unlimited power to amend 
the executive’s budget proposals (Hawkesworth, Blöndal, & Choi, 2009; Juwono & Eckardt, 
2008). There has also been a significant increase in the number of players involved in the 
budgeting process, not only as a result of the decline in the level of executive control over the 
legislative arm of government, but also because of the increased number of political parties 
now represented in the legislature. However, these developments have not stemmed the 
misuse of public funding by government officials and politicians. According to the Supreme 
Audit Body (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK), over Rp 285.23 trillion in public funds was 
misused between 2005 and 2017 (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 2017, p. 214). Between 2004 
and 2017, the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) 
arrested 127 legislators at the national and local levels, as well as 25 ministers and 17 heads 
of local government (Katadata, 2017). Significantly, these budget-related corruption cases 
involved politicians from a wide range of political parties.  
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As these examples suggest, there is an ambiguous relationship between the 
governance reforms that have been introduced as part of the democratisation process and 
budget-related corruption. On the one hand, the governance reforms—especially the 
separation of power between the executive and the legislature—have strengthened the 
legislature’s ability to exercise budget oversight in relation to the role of the executive 
(Lienert, 2005, p. 6). On the other hand, as Kramer (forthcoming) argues, the twin processes 
of democracy and decentralisation have created opportunities for new forms of corrupt 
activity. For example, the emergence of greater political competition as a consequence of the 
introduction of an open-list proportional system can increase levels of corruption. This is 
because the system encourages politicians to seek illegal resources through the budget-
making process in order to cover the costs of their re-election campaigns (Chang, 2005). Yet, 
two decades on from the advent of Reformasi, we still have little understanding of the 
mechanisms through which power relations between political institutions and actors influence 
the legislature’s role in budget decision-making, the institutional incentives that drive parties 
and individual legislators, or of the informal practices that drive the budget-making process. 
This thesis addresses this gap by analysing the interplay between the formal and 
informal political institutions that govern the interactions among budget actors, with a focus 
on how legislators behave towards political parties and the executive. It does this by studying 
the distribution of power and resources among these budget actors through three case studies, 
namely capital injections into state-owned enterprises, the optimisation fund and the 
aspiration fund. By analysing the constraints imposed on the process by the political 
environment, the interplay between the executive and the legislature, and the incentives 
available to different budget actors, it contributes to our understanding of how political 
fragmentation and the open-list proportional electoral system affect the workings of the 
legislature in the budget-making process and, indeed, the political system more generally.  
Research Question 
There is a growing consensus in the international literature on public budgeting that the 
distribution of resources between different actors and interest groups is a political process 
rather than merely a technocratic one. As Rubin (2010, p. 31) argues, budget decision-making 
is influenced by the environment, the budget process, and the individual strategies of 
different actors, who have individual motivations and strategies to achieve their own 
objectives. The outcomes of this process reflect the relative power of budget players within 
and between the different branches of government (Rubin, 2010, p. 2).  
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By contrast, the literature on budget-making in Indonesia, which is still in its infancy, 
is dominated by studies that adopt a technical approach (Siallagan, 2013; World Bank, 2007). 
The very few studies that discuss the politics of budgeting have dealt primarily with the role 
of the legislature in the budgetary process and political budget cycles at the district level 
(Hawkesworth et al., 2009; Juwono & Eckardt, 2008; Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2013). 
These studies conclude that the legislature’s powers in the budgetary domain are too wide-
ranging, and that legislators focus on line items rather than budget policy and strategic 
considerations (Hawkesworth et al., 2009; Juwono & Eckardt, 2008). They do not address the 
question of how the interplay between political institutions and informal mechanisms for the 
exercise of political power shape the behaviour of the legislature in the budget-making 
process.  
This thesis places particular emphasis on the formal political institutions that govern 
the budget-making process and the patterns of behaviour and strategies of state budget actors 
in the decision-making arenas associated with them—budget committees, standing 
committees, political parties and less formal political groupings within the legislature—many 
of which act as informal institutions. This thesis does not examine the politics of budget 
formulation within in the executive. Rather, it concentrates on the budget decision making 
within the legisulature, since that is the arena in which budget players with different political 
background and interests interact. It asks how power is distributed and influence is exercised 
by budget players within the institutional framework of budget-making—in other words, who 
gets what? In seeking to answer this question, it addresses three further questions, namely: 
 
1) What are the decision-making mechanisms within the budget process, both formal and 
informal? 
2) In what ways do these formal and informal institutions influence the distribution of 
power among budget actors? 
3) What are the incentives (explicit and implicit) available to different budget actors, and 
how do these incentives affect their behaviour in the budget-making process? 
 
In addition to enhancing our understanding of the budget-making process, the thesis 
contributes to broader debates about the nature of Indonesia’s formal political institutions and 
the ways they are affected by the informal institutions that continue to influence its 
democratic polity. The thesis tests this understanding of how parliamentary cartels work in 
the budgetary process. It argues that the dynamics of the budgetary process are driven by a 
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combination of the executive’s need to win support for its budgetary agenda, the absence of a 
dominant political party, and the legislature’s need to capture patronage resources – resulting 
in a form of cartelisation within the legislature based on individual interest. 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis adopts an institutionalist approach, which posits that that formal rules and 
informal constraints govern interactions between budget players (North, 2005). As such, it 
examines the multiple institutions and political dimensions that influence the interplay 
between formal and informal political institutions in the budget decision-making process. 
This approach makes it possible to contribute new insights to the literature on Indonesian 
politics by testing some key assumptions of its main schools of thought. These concern the 
ways in which formal political institutions, such as the separation of powers, electoral rules 
and constitutional budgetary powers, interact with informal institutions like oligarchy, 
clientelism and political cartels in the pursuit of access to state resources. 
 
 
Institutions  Formal  Informal 
 
 
 
Political 
 
  
 
 
 
Budgetary 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.1. Formal and Informal Institutions in the Budget-making Process 
 
 
 
Multiparty	Presidentialism	 Cartelism	
Laws	and	Procedures	 Clientelism,	Patronage,	Rent-Seeking	&	Corruption	
The	Politics	of	
Budget-making	
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The thesis engages with the four main approaches to the study of politics in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia, namely oligarchy theory (Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Winters, 2013), cartelism 
(Ambardi, 2008; Slater, 2011) multiparty presidentialism (for example, Hanan, 2012; Liddle 
& Mujani, 2006; Sherlock, 2015), and approaches that focus on clientelism, corruption, rent-
seeking and patronage (for example, Allen, 2015; Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 
2016). Drawing on a critical reading of these approaches as they apply to budget-making, it 
constructs an analytical framework that synthesises elements of multiparty presidentialism, 
cartelism and approaches that focus on clientelism, patronage, rent-seeking and corruption 
(Figure 1.1). In deploying this analytical framework, the study underscores the importance of 
systematic investigation of both the formal rules that govern the budget-making process and 
the informal political institutions that shape the political dynamics of resource allocation at 
the national level. 
As Figure 1.1 suggests, at the political level, this framework draws on (1) multiparty 
presidentialism, which explains the constraints and incentives that shape interactions between 
the executive and the legislature; and (2) cartelism, which provides a foundation for 
investigating the informal institutions that influence the ways in which legislators pursue their 
personal and political interests through the budget-making process. At the level of budgetary 
practice, these political institutions facilitate the ways in which constraints are imposed, and 
opportunities provided, by the formal institutions (laws and procedures) that shape individual 
legislators’ capacity to engage in clientelist exchanges, as well as patronage, rent-seeking and 
corruption. At the same time, they also affect the ways in which individual legislators relate 
to each other and to their parties. 
Approach and Methodology 
In its analysis of the power relationships between the executive and the legislature in the 
budget decision-making process, this thesis employs a case study approach. This type of 
approach is appropriate for the purposes of this study because it allows for in-depth study of 
processes, actors and organisations using different sources of data collection as the need 
arises (Creswell, 2013, p. 104). As Yin (2014, p. 14) argues, resources of this type enable us 
to answer the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions informing the research. Case studies have been 
widely used in research by political economists because they have benefits for theory 
construction (Levy, 2008, p. 5). They provide stronger evidence for hypotheses and report 
more information (Odell, 2001, pp. 170-171).  
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To identify appropriate cases for investigation, I made use of purposive case selection. 
According to Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 296), purposive case selection involves putting 
together a representative sample that reflects variations on relevant dimensions of theoretical 
interest. Informed by questions of how the political environment shapes the interaction 
between budget players and what incentives (both explicit and implicit) are available to 
different actors involved in the budget-making process, I initially considered a wide range of 
potential cases before finally selecting three cases for detailed study. These were capital 
injections into state-owned enterprises, the optimisation fund, and the aspiration fund.  
The case of state-owned enterprises was selected because it provides insight into the 
way political fragmentation and political groupings in the legislature affect the interactions 
among different actors in the budget decision-making process. The second case, the 
optimisation fund, was selected because it reveals the ways in which the decision-making 
mechanisms within the budget process, both formal and informal, and the distribution of 
power among key actors generate opportunities for transactions between those actors. The 
final case, the aspiration fund, was selected because it exposes the incentives (both explicit 
and implicit) available to different groups, and the ways in which those incentives influence 
decision-making by different budget actors.  
Primary data on each of these cases was collected during three rounds of observation 
of the budget discussions (the 2015 budget, the 2015 budget revisions and the 2016 budget). 
During these field observations, I took detailed notes on the way the political dynamics of the 
post-2014 election period shaped budget decision-making within the legislature. Field 
observations were complemented by analysis of the transcripts of budget discussions, both 
for this period and for a number of preceding years, in order to trace the interactions between 
different players from the 2009 election to the passing of the 2016 Budget Bill. I used these 
documents to examine the ways in which the executive and legislative branches of 
government exert power in their attempts to influence budgeting outcomes. These documents 
also helped me to develop a map of party ideology and party fragmentation and to trace the 
impact of the parties’ political standpoints on the budget-making process. 
I also conducted 39 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in order to gain an insight 
into the strategy and behaviour of budget players. These consisted of 13 interviews with 
members of the legislature’s budget committee from different political parties, six interviews 
with support staff working in the legislature’s secretariat and for political parties, and 10 
interviews with high-ranking bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of State 
Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan National, Bappenas) and the Office of 
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Presidential Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden, KSP), including a former Minister of Finance and a 
former Minister responsible for the State Planning Agency. These informants were chosen 
due to their direct involvement in the budget-making process. My interviews with the 
legislators focused on political fragmentation, coordination between legislators and parties, 
relationships between the executive and the legislature and between parties, and relationships 
between legislators and their constituents that might influence their behaviour in the budget-
making process. Interviews with ministers and bureaucrats focused on the budget discussion 
process and their interactions with the legislature. In addition, I interviewed three persons 
from BPK and KPK, and seven activists from civil society organisations (CSOs) whose work 
focuses on budget research and advocacy, the legislature and business associations.  
I triangulated my findings by collecting data from multiple sources to develop an in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon and as an alternative to data validation (Denzin, 
2012). For example, during interviews, I confirmed and clarified the data I had collected 
during field observations in order to better understand the reasons behind the outcomes of 
particular budget discussions. In addition, to examine implications for budget allocation 
policy arising from relationships among the various players, I conducted an analysis of 
budget and finance data, to identify trends within budget allocations over the period 
examined in the study. I also used secondary sources, including articles published in 
newspapers and in online media, to chronicle events related to the political dynamics of the 
budget decision-making process.  
Qualitative data was processed through content analysis which systematically 
compared budget players and their connections to the budgetary process in different fiscal 
years. This analysis assessed the interests of budget players, as evidenced during budget 
discussions, and the methods they used to influence budget allocation policies. I 
supplemented my analysis of the qualitative data with an analysis of the quantitative data I 
collected, in order to assess the historical connections between budget allocation policy and 
the actors/interest groups involved in the budget-making process. I then used my findings to 
examine how the separation of power between executive and legislature plays out in terms of 
the number of seats held by individual political parties and the presence or absence of a 
majority government coalition. 
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Thesis Outline 
The chapters that follow set out the theoretical framework and the political context in which 
budget-making takes place, before attention turns to the three case studies that form the core 
of the thesis. Chapter Two begins with a discussion of different scholarly approaches to the 
politics of budgeting, namely the technocratic, incrementalist and public choice approaches. 
Building on this discussion, the chapter highlights the role of the multiple institutions 
involved in the budget-making process and the political dimensions of that process. Since the 
political dynamics of budget-making involve the broader political system and the informal 
power play among budget actors, the chapter then critically examines the applicability of the 
four main approaches to the study of Indonesian politics post–1998—oligarchy, cartelism, 
multiparty presidentialism, and clientelism—to the study of budget-making. Finally, it sets 
out the different elements of the analytical framework used in the thesis. 
Chapter Three explains the context of the study. The first part of the chapter shows 
how changes in Indonesia’s political institutions from the authoritarian period (1967–98) to 
the democratic period (1998–) have shaped the political dynamics of the contestation over 
state resources. The first part of the chapter focuses on Suharto’s use of formal political 
power (constitutional power) and informal political power (material and coercive power) to 
maintain the stability of his regime. It then compares these power structures with the more 
proportional distribution of power between the executive and legislature in the post-Suharto 
period. The second part of the chapter analyses the ways in which changes in both formal and 
informal political institutions have affected the budgetary process. As this section 
demonstrates, the centralisation of power under Suharto undermined budgetary institutions 
through the use of state resources to support the patronage networks that underpinned his 
government. By contrast, since Reformasi, the President no longer plays a dominant role in 
the budget-making process. Although the Budget Bill is the only bill that must be initiated by 
the President, the legislature has the authority to reject and modify it, which means that the 
executive must engage in negotiation before the bill can be passed.  
Chapter Four examines the impact of the post-2014 political constellation on the 
budgetary process. It first describes the impact of the legislative and presidential elections on 
the composition of the legislature in President Jokowi’s first year in office. To show how the 
broader political dynamic translated into the budgetary arena, the second part of the chapter 
compares the political dynamics of the 2015 budget, which was formulated in the final year 
of Yudhoyono’s tenure as president, with the revisions to that budget and the 2016 budget 
proposed in the first year of Jokowi’s presidency. This chapter identifies important 
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contradictions between the 2015 budget revisions and the formulation of the 2016 budget, 
which it argues did not reflect the broader political constellations within the political system 
at that time. Rather, it revealed the extent to which the interests of individual legislators affect 
the distribution of budget resources.  
The next three chapters present the case studies. Chapter Five investigates the extent 
to which party standpoint and affiliation influence the political dynamics of budget-making in 
the case of capital injections into state-owned enterprises. After first describing the political 
economic context, it traces the interactions between the executive arm of government and the 
legislature and, within the latter, between the Sectoral Commissions, the Budget Committee, 
and individual legislators from both coalitions in two rounds of budget discussions. This case 
provides evidence that the approval of budget proposals is not related to party platform, the 
size of the ruling coalition or the level of political fragmentation in the legislature. Rather, the 
standpoint of the parties on capital injections into state-owned enterprises is influenced by the 
interests of individual legislators.  
Chapter Six offers an explanation for the disconnect between the President’s partisan 
power (coalition size) in the legislature and the political dynamics of budgeting, through a 
case study of what is known as the ‘optimisation fund’ (Dana Optimalisasi). The first section 
explores the way the legislature’s constitutional power to amend budgets can be leveraged as 
a source of rent-seeking. It then shows how optimisation funds generated by the legislature’s 
power to amend the budget in the 2015 and 2016 budget rounds were not only used to serve 
legislators’ interests but also formed part of the ‘executive toolbox’ deployed by the 
executive arm of government to win the legislature’s support. The chapter argues that, on the 
one hand, the optimisation fund provides incentives for all legislators, regardless their party 
affiliation, to advance their individual interests. On the other, while it makes it possible for 
the executive to garner support for its Budget Bill, the use of this element of the ‘executive 
toolbox’ comes at a high political cost, since this incentive cannot be used selectively to shore 
up coalitional support. 
To understand the individualistic behaviour of legislators, Chapter Seven examines 
the case of the ‘aspiration fund’ (Dana Aspirasi). The first section of the chapter traces the 
emergence of the aspiration fund as an informal institution in conjunction with the 
introduction of an open-list system of proportional representation, which shifted the focus of 
election campaigns away from parties to an emphasis on personal votes. The chapter then 
identifies the drivers of demands for the formalisation of the fund, the most important of 
which were the impetus to seek patronage resources and legislators’ unequal access to budget 
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resources as a consequence of the legislature’s committee structures. It then documents the 
ways in which legislators maintained the covert distribution of the aspiration fund when 
formalisation measures initially failed. As the chapter reveals, these drivers pushed legislators 
toward individualistic rather than party- or coalition-oriented behaviour. 
The concluding chapter reflects on the contribution of this thesis to the study of 
politics and budgeting through its focus on the relationship between formal political 
institutions and informal practices and their impact on interactions between the executive and 
the legislature in multiparty presidential democracies. This chapter underscores the empirical 
and theoretical implications of the study’s findings in regard to the decreasing role of political 
parties within the legislature and the emergence of a new form of cartelism in the budget-
making process based on individual, rather than party, interests. The diminishing role of 
political parties and the rise of pragmatism among legislators are the guiding narratives in this 
analysis of legislature behaviour in the politics of budgeting in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
The political life of the nation is writ large in its national budgets. The President, political 
parties, individual legislators, interest groups and other social actors compete with each other 
to have their interests reflected in budget allocations (Caiden & Wildavsky, 1996, p. 6). The 
budget thus reflects the relative power of budget players within and between the branches of 
government (Rubin, 2010, p. 2). The budget provides insights into the ways in which elected 
officials mobilise resources to address society’s problems and the outcomes of policy 
struggles. As such, the budget-making process is perhaps the second-most important political 
arena after the elections. The study of budgeting, thus, must pay attention to the political 
dimensions that shape how political actors interact and compete for state resources.  
The framework of this study draws on a body of theory dealing with the relationship 
between politics and budgeting, the role of politics in the budgetary process and the types of 
political institutions that affect the budget decision-making process. It also engages with key 
theoretical debates in area studies about the nature of Indonesia’s political system since the 
advent of democracy and the role of politicians and parties within it. The first section of the 
chapter provides an overview of scholarly approaches to the politics of budgeting, with a 
focus on how political institutions affect the budget decision-making process. It argues that 
this process can only be understood by taking into account its political dimensions and the 
role of the multiple institutions that play a part in it. The second section situates the budget-
making process within a review of the literature on Indonesian politics in order to gain insight 
into the interactions between developments in the Indonesian political system and the 
dynamics of the budget decision-making process. The final section synthesises the insights 
from this literature and outlines the framework used in this thesis. 
The chapter argues that the political dynamics of the budgetary process are shaped by 
the interaction of formal political institutions—the form of government, electoral rules, and 
the rules that influence relations between the executive and legislature—and informal 
institutions, such as power networks, the provision of incentives, and dominant norms and 
values. This discussion provides the theoretical context for the study as a whole. 
The Politics of Budgeting  
The budget process is a political process in which multiple political actors with different 
interests meet to determine the distribution of resources through institutionalised and repeated 
interactions. As such the budget process offers an insight into the role of, and incentives for, 
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political actors and their contribution to the process within a set of political institutions. 
Nevertheless, we have little understanding of the extent to which the political environment 
affects resource allocation decisions. Indeed, while some scholars agree that ‘the study of 
budgeting is just another expression for the study of politics’ (Wildavsky, 1974, p. 126), there 
is no comprehensive theory of budgeting as a political process (Fozzard, 2001; Neuby, 1997; 
Rubin, 2010; Sekwat & Gibran, 2009). 
As Norton and Elson (2002, p. 22) assert, the fundamental question when studying the 
politics of budget-making concerns the way in which power is distributed within the budget-
making process. A key point here is that budgets are not technocratic products; they are the 
result of complex negotiations among budget players. For the government, almost all policies 
have consequences for the budget and, by extension, implications for budget negotiations. 
Through the budget process, the state is able to aggregate diverse preferences, address 
distributive conflicts, and protect the most vulnerable (Mejía Acosta & De Renzio, 2008, p. 
8). The budget also can be used as a ‘token of exchange’, in the sense that it provides 
resources for policies that can help the government build coalitions or compensate potential 
losers who may otherwise block particular policy proposals (Hallerberg, Scartascini, & Stein, 
2009, p. 7). This means that the budget process cannot be examined solely in technical terms. 
Instead, it must be positioned as a fundamental element of the broader policy-making process 
and the broader political dynamics that shape it. For individual politicians, meanwhile, the 
budget is a resource deployed to enhance political support. A politician can attempt to 
influence the budget allocation in order to gain political support from particular groups. Thus, 
from this perspective also, budget-making is necessarily a political process. 
Approaches to the Study of Budget-making 
There is a substantial body of literature examining the impact of political institutions on 
resource allocation decisions. For instance, Rubin (2010, p. 26) identifies five approaches to 
budgeting: reformism, incrementalist negotiation, the role of interest groups, the budget 
process itself and policy debates. In a similar vein, Fozzard (2001) describes five major 
perspectives on the resources allocation process, namely administrative, rationalist, 
incrementalist, public choice and principal agent. The three most relevant of these five 
perspectives to the Indonesian case are discussed below. These are the technocratic approach, 
the incrementalist approach and the public choice approach.  
The technocratic approach to budgeting assumes resource allocation decisions are 
technical and rational. This approach was introduced in the United States in the 1960s, and 
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was subsequently applied to developing countries by development agencies (Fozzard, 2001, 
p. 26). It sees politics as a form of interference that makes budgetary decisions less rational 
and reduces efficiency (Rubin, 2010) and it emphasises the need for budgets to link resource 
allocation to policy outcomes (Fozzard, 2001, p. 26). According to this view, the most 
significant tool in budget allocation decisions is the use of quantitative techniques such as 
cost-benefit analysis, logical frameworks to support resource allocation decisions and 
monitoring tools (Fozzard, 2001). This approach is useful in the sense that it focuses attention 
on formal roles and structures within the budget-making process, and on the formal rules of 
budget decision-making. However, by identifying the political aspects of the process as an 
obstacle to good budget-making rather than an inherent part of the process, it fails to provide 
the tools necessary to analyse the way in which different political interests play into the 
budget process, or how compromises are negotiated between those political interests.  
The incrementalist approach assumes that the political component of the budget-
making process is stable and focused on budgetary institutions. This approach was introduced 
by Wildavsky (1974) in his seminal book The Politics of the Budgetary Process, a study of 
the dynamics of political behaviour and institutional arrangements in the budgetary process in 
the American Congressional budget system. Wildavsky (1974, p. 15) viewed budgeting as a 
product of political bargaining among a group of actors in the legislature and the executive, 
who meet each year to decide on budget allocations using the previous budget as their 
baseline. Within those constraints, the budget process itself is governed by formal and 
informal rules of behaviour and interaction, through which political interest groups bargain 
over conflicting goals, make side-payments and try to motivate one another to accomplish 
their objectives (Wildavsky, 1974, p. 130). From the incrementalist point of view, the 
strategies and behaviour of budget players are determined by the relationship between 
spending agencies (which have a role as ‘advocates’) and the role of the Treasury or Ministry 
of Finance as ‘guardian’ (Caiden & Wildavsky, 1996, p. 102; Wildavsky, 1974, pp. 11-13; 
1986). The incrementalist approach has provided a framework for the analysis of institutional 
role-play and institutional politics in determining resource allocations, but by assuming that 
changes in the budget are gradual and always informed by a stable political and economic 
context, it ignores the complexity of the political environment that influences the budget 
process.  
The third major approach in the field of budget studies is derived from public choice 
theory. Public choice theory assumes the individuals are motivated by self-interest and, since 
budget-making involves elected officials, it is influenced by their self-interest in securing 
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election or re-election. As a consequence, self-interest determines that politicians will 
promise budget allocations to particular groups in their constituencies (Fozzard, 2001, pp. 33-
34). Public choice theory adopts the concepts of concentrated benefit and dispersed cost, in 
which the benefit of a particular resource allocation is concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of specific groups or a particular geographic location, while the cost of those 
allocations are spread through taxation, producing what is known as a ‘common pool’ 
problem (Von Hagen, 2005, p. 2). The common pool problem arises when particular groups, 
and the politicians who represent them, engage in rent-seeking behaviour, and their demands 
for higher resource allocations lead to increased expenditure, deficit and debt. To overcome 
rent-seeking and the common pool problem, the public choice approach attempts to centralise 
budget processes in the hands of the Ministry of Finance (Von Hagen, 2005). In this way, it 
aims to represent the average taxpayer in limiting the ability of politicians to promote 
particular interests and overrule the interests of minorities (Fozzard, 2001, p. 37). In essence, 
public choice theory rightly suggests that budgets are a product of negotiation among 
political players who act according to incentives they face and the institutions that govern 
their interaction.  
More recently, studies using the public choice approach have paid closer attention to 
the relationship between political institutions and budget policy. Since this approach assumes 
the budget process is dominated by the self–interest of government officials seeking re-
election, the fiscal outcomes are likely to be different in different political institutions. Some 
scholars agree that variations in the common pool problem are generated by variance in 
political institutions like electoral rules, a fragmented party system, the role of the legislature 
and government coalitions (Bräuninger, 2005; Falcó-Gimeno & Jurado, 2011; Martin & 
Vanberg, 2013; Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 2007; Wehner, 2010). For example Persson et 
al. (2007) reveal that proportional elections result in a more fragmented party system and that 
coalition governments generate higher spending than majoritarian electoral systems. 
Coalition governments face a ‘common pool resource’ problem because party members 
concerned with re-election allocate budgets based on their constituents’ preferences. A higher 
number of parties involved in a government coalition is thus likely to lead to a higher deficit 
than in the case of single party or minority government (Martin & Vanberg, 2013; Persson et 
al., 2007). The common pool problem also arises when incumbents run deficits in order to 
fund particular items to attract voters and tie the hands of their successors, forcing them to cut 
future spending or increase taxes (Eslava, 2011). Wehner (2010) also found the association 
between partisan fragmentation in the legislature leads to higher deficits when there is no 
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limit to the budgetary amendments that can be made by the legislature. In short, these studies 
suggest that budget deficits tend to be higher in proportional representation systems, 
fragmented party systems and situations where political power is distributed through a 
coalition.  
The relationship between politicians’ motives to stay in office and budget-making can 
be investigated by examining the changes in the pattern of resource allocation in election 
years, or what is known as the political budget cycle. It is widely accepted that incumbents 
attempt to use public budgets as campaign instruments to help them stay in office. Empirical 
studies of this phenomenon offer a means by which to examine patterns in the changes made 
in budget allocations during election years that can be attributed to electoral rules and 
countries’ experience of democracy. Some scholars examine this phenomenon in developed 
and developing countries (Shi & Svensson, 2006) and in different political systems (Persson 
& Tabellini, 2003). Shi and Svensson (2006) identify significant changes in the pattern of 
budget allocation in newer democracies, in which expenditure increases and revenues fall, 
leading to a larger deficit in election years. In addition, different patterns of fiscal policy 
during election years are found in different electoral systems, whereby taxes tend to decrease 
in majoritarian electoral systems and the allocation for spending tends to increase in 
proportional electoral systems (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).  
Together, these approaches in the literature on the politics of budgeting provide a 
useful starting point in the analysis of the way power relations play out in resource allocation 
through national budgets, as summarised in Table 2.1. In summary, these approaches 
acknowledge the importance of the political environment in shaping fiscal outcomes. Those 
using the public choice approach have identified the influence of political institutions as well 
as technocratic ones. However, the public choice approach does not focus on informal 
institutions in the budgetary process. 
As some authors have argued, the politics of public budgeting not only involves 
formal rules of behaviour and interaction such as laws that govern deadlines and rules that 
govern, and set limits on, the distribution of power between the executive and legislature, but 
also informal political institutions and practices of interaction within and between the 
executive and legislative branches (Hallerberg et al., 2009; Hildreth & Lewis, 2011; Rakner, 
Mukubvu, Ngwira, Smiddy, & Schneider, 2004; Von Hagen & Harden, 1995). 
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Table 2.1. Approaches to the Study of Budget-making 
Dimension Technocratic 
Approach 
Incrementalist 
Approach 
Public Choice 
Approach 
Who Bureaucrats, Ministry 
of Finance (limited 
power of the 
legislature) 
Policymakers, 
legislators, formal 
budget actors 
Politicians seeking to 
achieve their 
individual goals 
particularly for re-
election 
How Adherence to the 
formal roles and 
structures of budget-
making process 
Continuation of the 
previous budget with 
incremental decisions 
as a result of repeated 
negotiations between 
advocates and 
guardians 
Individuals come 
together in the budget 
process for their own 
mutual benefit and 
pursue personal 
incentives through the 
budget institutions that 
govern their 
interactions 
Assumptions/ 
implications 
Assumes that the 
society’s needs can be 
known and measured 
through rational 
decision-making 
Assumes that the 
previous program was 
legitimate and that 
there is minimal 
chance of radical 
change in budget 
allocations 
Assumes that each 
player has enough 
information to identify 
what is in their best 
interest 
 
 
As Rakner et al. (2004, p. 2) explain in their study of Malawi:  
 
No study of budgeting would be complete if it stopped only with formal institutions. 
Informal networks shape how actors interact. In fact, formal rules are often 
incomplete and budgets rarely operate without a thick array of informal mechanism 
that allow them to operate. 
 
This study revealed that the budget-making process in Malawi is determined to a greater 
extent by the informal process and political negotiations that respond to incentives in both 
formal and informal institutions (Rakner et al., 2004). In a similar vein, Rubin (2010) argues 
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that budgetary outcomes are not only determined by the budget process and the strategies of 
individuals but also by the environment. As these studies make clear, to understand the 
politics of budget decision-making, it is necessary to analyse informal environmental factors 
such as networks of power, informal actors, unofficial incentives, the discretion of budget 
players and the norms and values that are dominant within that process (Norton & Elson, 
2002). 
Bringing A Political Approach into Budgeting Studies 
The study of budgeting requires a comprehensive view that takes into account its multiple 
institutional and political dimensions, and the links between them. Forms of government, as 
well as electoral and party system rules, determine the distinctive arrangements under which 
budgets are made. For example, the role of the legislature in budget-making cannot be 
examined solely in relation to the electoral system; the power of the executive, the influence 
of political parties, and their relationships with their constituencies also need to be taken into 
account.  
Previous studies have provided an analytical framework through which to understand 
the roles and incentives of budget players and their involvement in the budget process within 
a set of formal institutions and constraints. This framework provides the analytical tools 
necessary to understand the extent to which changes in the pattern of resource allocation are 
influenced by different political systems—in Indonesia’s case, a multiparty presidential 
system with an open-list proportional electoral process. However, the application of this 
framework has typically relied on quantitative measures, which cannot account for the formal 
and informal dynamics that shape the budget process. For instance, the common pool 
problem that arises in government coalitions cannot be explained by the number of coalition 
parties alone; it also requires consideration of possible cartel arrangements serving as a sub-
set of the informal rules of the game. These theories of budgeting also fail to explain how the 
interactions between political players at the macro level influence the distribution of power 
between budget players and, in turn, their behaviour within the budget process.  
In order to address these weaknesses, it is necessary to analyse the interactions 
between the broader political system and the informal institutions that emerge in the 
legislature, as well as their interactions within the actual budgeting process. In the next 
section, I begin this task by examining four key analytical approaches to Indonesian politics, 
namely oligarchy, party cartelism, multiparty presidentialism, and clientelism.  
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Situating Budget-making within Approaches to Indonesian Politics 
Indonesia’s democratic system has been much-studied since its emergence in 1998. During 
that time, a number of distinct approaches have emerged. One group of scholars argue that 
Indonesian politics continues to be dominated by oligarchs who amassed great wealth during 
or after the Suharto years (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2011). A second group consists 
of proponents of cartel party theory, who emphasise the increasing level of collusion between 
political parties aiming to capture the resources of the state (Ambardi, 2008; Slater, 2004). A 
third group of scholars adopt a pluralist approach to the study of political institutions, arguing 
that despite its evident limitations, the post-Suharto period is an example of gradual 
democratic consolidation, which has provided an arena of ongoing contestation among 
political interests (Aspinall, 2013; Hanan, 2012; Liddle, 2013; Mietzner, 2009). Another 
group work examining the role of patronage, clientelism, and corruption within the 
Indonesian polity (Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Klinken, 2010; Tomsa & Ufen, 2013).  
 In this section, I evaluate the relevance of each of these schools of thought to the 
study of the dynamics of budget-making. Having outlined the approach taken by each group 
of scholars, I examine their insights and weaknesses in the context of the study of the politics 
of budget-making. I conclude that the combination of the multiparty presidential system, as a 
formal institution, and a variation of cartelism, as an informal institution, shape ‘rules of the 
game’ that govern interactions between budget players involved in the material exchange for 
political support.  
Oligarchy  
Oligarchy is a system of rule in which political power is concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of wealthy people who shape public policy to gain private benefit. The oligarchy 
thesis gained traction in the New Order period, when a small number of individuals accrued a 
massive amount of wealth and influence under the prevailing political system. Since 1998, 
however, Indonesia has achieved a relatively high level of democratic practice, as indicated 
by the conduct of free elections, freedom of the press and the lifting of many of the 
restrictions on civic participation (Liddle, 2013; Mietzner, 2009). Proponents of the oligarchy 
thesis claim, however, that these democratic institutions simply mask the enduring power of 
predatory elites carried over from the New Order period. Indeed, the primary claim of the 
oligarchy thesis, as it applies to contemporary Indonesian politics, is that the shift of 
Indonesian politics from authoritarianism to democracy has not diminished, let alone 
eliminated, the power of the oligarchs (Ford & Pepinsky, 2013). 
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The primary proponents of the oligarchy thesis are Winters (2011) and Robison and 
Hadiz (2004). While there are many similarities between the arguments made by these 
scholars, their approaches draw on different theoretical premises (Ford & Pepinsky, 2013). 
Principal among the similarities is the claim that oligarchs were able to reorganise themselves 
in order to protect their wealth and political position during the democratic transition (Hadiz 
& Robison, 2013). In other words, oligarchs have simply adapted their strategies to suit the 
new democratic climate (Winters, 2013, pp. 106-107). Similarly, both these analyses argue 
that counter-oligarchic forces have failed to overcome their fragmentation under the 
repressive power of Suharto, and so have insufficient power to challenge the power of the 
oligarchy (Winters, 2013, p. 110). As a consequence, ‘incremental demand for reform by 
individuals or groups can only be piecemeal’ (Hadiz & Robison, 2013, p. 54) and no 
substantial reform can emerge without approval from oligarchs. 
In terms of intellectual underpinnings, Hadiz and Robison (2013, p. 37) draw on neo-
Marxist thought, describing Indonesia’s political, social and economic infrastructure as ‘a 
system of power relations that enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its 
collective defense’ and examining the relationship between the politico-bureaucratic elite and 
the bourgeoisie that emerged during the New Order. By contrast, the approach to oligarchy 
introduced by Winters (2011) draws on power resource theory and takes a more actor-centred 
approach. Winters also describes oligarchy as a product of material inequality but focuses on 
the actions of individual oligarchs as they deploy their material resources ‘to defend or 
enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position’ (Winters, 2011, p. 6).  
Multiparty Presidentialism 
The second body of literature on Indonesian politics of relevance to this thesis deals with the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in multiparty presidential systems. As 
Mainwaring (1993, p. 198) has argued, multiparty legislatures and presidentialism are a 
‘difficult combination’. Because legislative and presidential elections are separate, the 
presidential system can produce legislatures with minority government party representation, 
leading to deadlocks between the executive and the legislature (Mainwaring, 1993, p. 214). 
As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, p. 429) argue, the likelihood of a crisis in a multiparty 
presidential system is greatest when the President has strong constitutional powers but faces a 
legislature in which he or she lacks partisan support. In situations where the President faces 
majority opposition in the legislature, his or her legislative agenda may be stalled, leading to 
deadlock. Moreover, the more fragmented the party system is, the harder it is for the 
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President to command a majority in the legislature, to assert party discipline and control the 
legislature (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 418). Later work on multiparty presidentialism 
focuses on the role that stable multiparty coalitions can play in helping to reproduce the 
features of systems in which majority parties elect the country’s leaders. This focus on 
‘coalitional presidentialism’ helps overcome ‘the institutional dilemmas posed by the 
coexistence of a presidential executive with a fragmented multiparty legislature’ (Chaisty, 
Cheeseman, & Power, 2014, p. 74).  
In an effort to understand the dynamics between presidents and the legislature, Raile, 
Pereira, and Power (2011, p. 323) identify an ‘executive toolbox’ available to presidents 
facing a fragmented legislature. Key elements in this toolbox are budgetary power and the 
distribution of cabinet seats or other ‘coalition goods’ to generate legislative support (Raile et 
al., 2011, p. 324) . In a case study of Brazil, Melo and Pereira (2013, p. 6) propose three 
conditions for a successful coalitional presidential system: the constitution must provide the 
President with the power to deliver coalition goods to coalition members; the President must 
be constrained by institutionalised control mechanisms; and s/he must use multiple tools 
including cabinet seats, budgetary power and policy concession to gain support from 
legislators. More recent empirical work by Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power (2015, p. 6), 
based on interviews with 350 legislators across nine countries on three continents, identifies 
five major instruments used by Presidents to establish and maintain a coalition, namely 
cabinet authority, budgetary power, partisan power, legislative power, and the ability to 
exchange favours (Chaisty et al., 2015) 
Other studies of how multiparty presidential systems can operate as a parliamentary 
system focus more closely on the budget-making process. Posner and Park (2007), for 
example, compare relations between the executive and the legislature in two-party 
parliamentary systems and multiparty presidential systems. In two-party parliamentary 
systems, the executive and the legislature have little incentive to engage in budget 
negotiations. Moreover, the legislature’s power to amend the budget is limited in the two-
party presidential system because major amendments could be considered as a vote of no 
confidence in the cabinet and the majority party in the legislature forms the government 
(Posner & Park, 2007, p. 11) . In multiparty presidential systems, the role of the legislature is 
much stronger because the executive must win majority support in order to pass its budget.  
There has also been analysis of the use of the power to amend budgets as a tool for 
winning legislative support. Individual legislators view the legislature’s power to amend the 
budget as an important means of providing tangible benefits to their constituents and thus 
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enhance their chances of re-election. Thus, presidents can use their budgetary power to 
reward or punish legislators for supporting or opposing executive policy. In this way, the 
President can provide incentives to individual legislators to advance his/her policy agenda 
(Pereira & Acosta, 2010, p. 651) . In a case study of the Brazilian political system, Pereira 
and Mueller (2004, p. 781) found that annual budget appropriations provide the executive 
with a low-cost tool for winning legislators’ support. In Brazil, presidents can use their partial 
veto to approve or reject individual amendments proposed by the legislators (Pereira & 
Orellana, 2009, p. 65). As this suggests, the ability of the legislature to amend the budget is a 
central part of the political exchange required to achieve support for the government’s agenda 
in a multiparty presidential system. The President’s budgetary power provides resources that 
can be allocated to the legislature for delivery to individual legislators’ constituencies. In 
other words, the ability of the legislature to amend the budget serves two functions: while the 
executive views it as a means of winning legislators’ support, legislators see it as a way of 
securing resources for their supporters. 
In the Indonesian context, several studies have been conducted on the adoption of a 
multiparty presidential system. For example, Liddle and Mujani (2006) identify three 
elements of Mainwaring’s ‘difficult combination’ that surfaced in the early stages of the 
Indonesian multiparty presidential system, namely deadlock between the executive and the 
legislature, ideological polarisation and fragility within the ruling coalition. Kawamura 
(2013, p. 186) examines the relationship between the executive and the legislature in the 
context of the legislative process, concluding Kawamura (2013, p. 186)Kawamura (2013, p. 
186)that the Indonesian President is weak not only because of the powers accorded to the 
legislature under the constitution and low levels of representation of government parties in 
the legislature, but also as a consequence of the very nature of coalition governments. 
Kawamura (2013, p. 182) also argues that delays in the legislative process are caused by the 
Indonesian tradition of ‘consensus’ (musyawarah/mufakat) in decision-making, according to 
which every fraction in the House has the power to extend the process of deliberation. A third 
study of note here is Haris' (2014) evaluation of multiparty presidentialism during 
Yudhoyono’s first term, which concludes that the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature tended to be ‘legislative-heavy’ following the constitutional amendments of 2002. 
In particular, the legislature’s authority to question presidential policy and its right to approve 
high-level officials, including the commander of the army, the police chief, and the directors 
of state banks led, he argues, to political conflict. Haris (2014) also identifies other 
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institutional factors embedded in the multiparty presidential system, such as the coalition 
model, party discipline and the electoral system, which may trigger political conflict.  
 Other studies have drawn different conclusions about the operation of Indonesia’s 
multiparty presidential system. For example, Sherlock (2015, p. 104) argues that, rather than 
holding a superior position in its relationship with the executive, during Yudhoyono’s two 
terms as President the legislature had insufficient capacity to use its power effectively to 
balance the powers of the executive. Sherlock also contends that the strategy of coalitional 
presidentialism only works when the President has an interventionist style that allows him/her 
‘to lead and discipline his cabinet’ (Sherlock, 2015, p. 94). A more optimistic view of the 
Indonesian multiparty presidential is proposed by Hanan (2012), who argues that the 
relationships between the executive and the legislature work in Indonesia because of the 
combination of formal and informal institutions. This allows for compromise to be reached 
through informal decision-making mechanisms such as lobbying and consultation between 
the President and leaders of the legislature. 
This literature on Indonesia’s multiparty presidential system draws attention to several 
significant aspects of its institutional design. First, it emphasises the importance of the formal 
distribution of power in the relationship between the executive and the legislature, including 
the powers granted by the constitution, and the partisan power of the President. Second, it 
shows that the disadvantages of the multiparty presidential system can be minimised when 
the President uses a range of tools to win support from the legislature, including his/her 
power over the budget. Third, it suggests that an analysis of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature should also consider other political institutions, formal and 
informal, that affect the behaviour of the legislature, such as the electoral system, party 
discipline and informal decision-making mechanisms. In sum, this approach provides a useful 
framework for examining the roles and incentives built into the executive–legislative 
relationship and the ways in which they affect the budget decision making process.  
Cartelism 
The third major approach in the literature on Indonesian democracy is based on the premise 
that Indonesia’s political system is driven by party cartels. Cartel theory was developed by 
Katz and Mair (1995) to describe the functioning of parties in Western Europe, where 
political parties tend to cooperate with each other rather than competing. In their view, 
political parties largely sacrifice their ideological and programmatic goals in order to 
maintain access to state resources: 
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In the cartel model … none of the major parties is ever definitively ‘out’. As a result, 
there is an increased sense in which electoral democracy may be seen as a means by 
which the rules control the ruled, rather than the other way around ... Moreover, as the 
distinction between parties in office and those out of office becomes more blurred, the 
degree to which voters can punish parties even by generalized dissatisfaction is 
reduced (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 22).  
 
In essence, according to this view, political parties collude to diminish political tensions that 
could disrupt stable government and, subsequently, their hold on political power. Key 
features of such systems are that party competition occurs only in the elections, ideology is 
not a determining factor in forming coalitions, and there is an absence of meaningful 
opposition in the legislature.  
Cartel theory was applied for the first time to Indonesia by Slater (2004, p. 68), who 
asserts that Indonesian democracy is in fact a collusive democracy. Based on a close study of 
the structure and operation of the legislature during Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidency 
(2001–04), Slater argued that the Indonesian political system had fallen into an 
‘accountability trap’ through the formation of a cartel that drew in potential oppositional 
parties by allocating all of them seats in cabinet. In subsequent analyses, Slater recognised 
that the cartel party system was disrupted with the introduction of direct presidential elections 
in 2004. However, he argued that the dynamics of power sharing within the legislature 
remained the same, as Yudhoyono included all significant political parties in his ruling 
coalition (Slater, 2011, p. 4). For Slater, the distribution of committee chair positions based 
on the number of seats a party held in the legislature confirmed the existence of a cartel 
system through which no party was left without a position. In order to describe this 
phenomenon, he introduced the term, ‘proportional presidentialism’ in his discussion of 
cabinet coalitions during Yudhoyono’s terms in office (Slater, 2011, p. 24). In the same vein 
as Slater, Ambardi (2008, p. 319) asserts that the formation of ‘oversized’ coalitions, which 
include parties with different ideologies, results in the absence of meaningful opposition. As 
Ambardi (2008, p. 325) observes, ideology is not a determining factor of party behaviour in 
Indonesia. This is because political parties tend to act as a group to secure their collective 
interests to collect rents from state resources. Ambardi (2008, p. 324) also emphasises the 
importance of examining party competition at a systemic level, focusing on interactions 
between the parties rather than their individual behaviour.  
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 A major difference between Indonesia and the European contexts about which Katz 
and Mair (1995) write is the nature of the resources available to parties. Katz and Mair (1995) 
defined cartelisation in a context where political parties had become dependent on state 
subsidies to meet their financial needs. By contrast, in Indonesia, as Slater (2004, p. 67) 
reminds us, political parties’ need for financial resources motivates them to exploit state 
resources by joining a presidential coalition, noting for example that ‘cabinet seats also 
provide ministers with direct access to patronage treasures’. Moreover, as Ambardi (2008, pp. 
301-303) adds, parties have access to an added resource in the form of opportunities to use 
the political power of the legislature to engage in rent-seeking activities through the budget 
decision-making process.  
Clientelism, Corruption, Rent-seeking and Patronage 
The final body of literature on Indonesian politics to be considered here is the literature on 
clientelism, corruption, rent-seeking and patronage, which tends to focus more closely on the 
role individual interest plays in the allocation of public resources. It is important to note at the 
outset that there is significant overlap between these concepts (Hilgers, 2011; Hutchcroft, 
1997; Khan & Sundaram, 2000; Lambsdorff, 2002). The term ‘clientelism’ is often used 
interchangeably with patronage, corruption, vote buying and pork barrelling (Hilgers, 2011, 
p. 571). Likewise, as Khan and Sundaram (2000, p. 23) assert, the cost of corruption and 
costs within patron-client networks are sometimes used to capture rents.  
A number of scholars have attempted to establish a clear definition of clientelism. 
Hicken (2011, p. 303), for example, argues that the key characteristic of a clientelist 
exchange ‘is that the chief criterion for receiving the targeted benefit is political support, 
typically voting’. Similarly Hilgers (2011, p. 573) identifies its main characteristic as ‘the 
interest-maximising exchange of resources for political support’ with elements of longevity, 
diffuseness, face-to-face contact and status inequality. Drawing on these key elements, I 
propose three factors that can be considered as central to a clientelistic exchange. First, the 
exchange must be repetitive and involve a series of transactions to ensure the loyalty of the 
client and his/her steady support for the patron. Second, there must be an element of 
hierarchy or inequality, such that the patron has a higher political, economic and social 
standing than the client. Third, the relationship must be one of mutual benefit in order to 
sustain the client-patron exchange.  
Having established the key features of clientelism, it is necessary to distinguish 
between clientelism and these related concepts. Hutchcroft (1997, p. 646) explains the 
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distinction between the concepts of rents, corruption and patron-client in terms of their focus 
of analysis: 
 
Rent literature focuses attention on what happens when state actions distort markets, 
corruption literature examines how public roles and private influences conflict within 
state agencies, and clientelism literature encourages clearer analysis of the 
relationships of power permeate states, societies and markets. 
 
When it comes to their practical manifestations, however, the distinction is not so clear. For 
some scholars, corruption is a possible form of rent-seeking, in which preferential treatment 
is restricted to specific interest groups (Lambsdorff, 2002, p. 107). Similarly, while clientelist 
exchanges do not necessarily involve corruption, as Hicken (2011, p. 303) points out, it 
becomes an element of such exchanges in cases where the resources that change hands are 
sourced illegally. Hutchcroft (1997, p. 645) also suggests that the patron–client relationship is 
not always corrupt, but ‘when the patron occupies a public position or extracts favours from 
those in public positions, patronage and corruption overlap’. 
The final concept to consider is that of patronage, which is closely related to 
clientelism (Hicken, 2011, p. 295; Hilgers, 2011, p. 575; Tomsa & Ufen, 2013, p. 5). Strictly 
speaking, clientelism is broader than patronage, since in cases of patronage, resources used in 
the clientelist exchange must be extracted from the state, thus the patron must be an office 
holder or have access to state resources (Hicken, 2011; Tomsa & Ufen, 2013). Aspinall and 
Sukmajati (2016, pp. 4-5) distinguish the two concepts by defining patronage as the material 
benefits exchanged for political support and clientelism as the relationship between politician 
and voter. 
In studies on clientelism and patronage in Indonesia there is a strong focus on the 
relationship between the clientelistic personal vote and legislators’ behaviour (Allen, 2015; 
Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). Allen (2015, p. 84) suggests that clientelism 
undermines party discipline, based on ‘evidence that clientelistic ties affect party switching 
and affiliation behaviour patterns of legislators’. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016, p. 14) note 
that the distribution of patronage to voters has grown alongside shifts in the electoral system 
towards ‘candidate-centred voting’. As a consequence, as Aspinall (2014, pp. 100,108) notes, 
legislators show more interest in budget-making than in law-making, since budget-making 
provides a means to access development projects that can benefit their supporters.  
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Studies of Indonesian clientelism and patronage underscore the importance of further 
study of the ways in which the desire to cultivate personal votes affects legislators’ behaviour 
in relation to state resources. Many scholars argue that the main motivation for pork 
barrelling is to cultivate personal votes in order to enhance chances of re-election (Baskin, 
Haibo, Samrat, & Ryan, 2010; Keefer & Khemani, 2009; Sutter, 1999), and that the degree to 
which this practice is adopted is influenced by the electoral structure (Ames, 1995; Cox & 
McCubbins, 1986; Lancaster, 1986). Lancaster argues that ‘the closer an incumbent’s identity 
is tied to a constituency region, the greater the incentives to allocate pork barrel projects in an 
attempt to secure re-election’ (Lancaster, 1986, p. 70). Hicken and Simmons (2008) also 
conclude that public resources tend to be directed to projects for which legislators can claim 
personal credit and control distribution in personal vote systems.  
The allocation of resources to attract personal votes incurs distribution costs in the 
form of ‘efficiency losses and losses due to corruption’ (Hicken & Simmons, 2008, p. 110). 
As Chang (2005, pp. 717-718) argues, the need to cultivate personal votes in open-list 
proportional systems can tempt incumbents to seek illegal resources to build their personal 
image among their constituents and to finance their re-election campaigns. A higher level of 
corruption has been identified in proportional representation systems that also elect a 
president (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 573). In some Asian and African countries, 
patronage spending has become institutionalised in the annual budgetary process. 
Internationally, this allocation is widely known as a Constituency Development Fund. A key 
characteristic of these funds is that legislators exert a degree of control over how they are 
allocated in their electoral regions (International Budget Partnership, 2010, p. 3). 
Constituency Development Funds thus act as a distributive mechanism in the annual budget 
process, and are widely used to compensate for the legislature’s relatively low capacity to 
amend budgets in Westminster-style democracies, which have majority electoral systems 
(Baskin et al., 2010, p. 2). Like pork barrelling, Constituency Development Funds are, then, a 
primarily political project.  
The implementation of Constituency Development Funds has been controversial, 
since they involve legislators in the utilisation of budget resources. The prime concern of 
scholars and civil society activists is that they violate the principle of separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature (International Budget Partnership, 2010; Tsubura, 
2013), since they position the legislature as an implementation agency rather than an agency 
for policy and oversight. In a study of six Asian and African countries, the International 
Budget Partnership (2010, pp. 5-16) identified three major weaknesses in the operation of 
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these funds. First, the presence of a Constituency Development Fund focuses the relationship 
between legislators and their constituents on what benefits, in the form of projects, can be 
made available in return for voter support. Second, it undermines the efficiency and 
effectivenes of the use of public resources, because legislators are more likely to select 
beneficiaries and support projects that are of lower priority in a technocratic sense if those 
beneficiaries and projects enhance their chances of re-election. Third, the absence of a 
comprehensive and long-term strategy means that there is a risk of duplication of 
development projects from other resources such as ministries and sub-national government 
projects, but also an increased risk of corruption (International Budget Partnership, 2010).  
Synthesising the Framework  
How, then, can we draw on these different approaches to elucidate the Indonesian budget-
making process? While oligarchy theory continues to have currency because it explains the 
vastly unequal distribution of material wealth in Indonesian society and its impact on 
electoral politics, it has little explanatory power in relation to budgeting. The very wealthy 
may support the election campaigns of some legislators and exert some influence on the 
executive but, as the earlier discussion of budgeting theory illustrates, budget-making is a 
complex process involving formal rules that govern that process and day-to-day interactions 
between the executive and legislature and between legislators. The oligarchy approach offers 
us little in the way of tools to help us analyse the dynamics of these interactions. 
With their focus on the system of government and the operation of the legislature, 
studies of Indonesia’s multiparty presidential system and of cartel-like behaviour among 
political parties are of more direct utility. The first group of studies lay the theoretical 
foundation for assessing how political institutions structure budget-making as a political 
arena, and in particular how power is distributed between the executive and the legislature in 
the budgetary process. With its emphasis on informal institutions within the legislature, 
cartelism provides useful insights into the behaviour of parties, their incentives and their 
interactions in the context of the budget-making process and, in particular, whether political 
parties collude or compete in their attempts to seek rents from the process of resource 
allocation. What it does not do, however, is sufficiently interrogate the role (or absence) of 
party discipline. Embedded in its focus on parties as its baseline unit of analysis is an 
assumption that parties can exert party discipline over legislators such that those legislators 
act in the parties’ interests. As a close study of the budget-making process reveals, however, 
the formal and informal structures of Indonesia’s legislature empower individual legislators 
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to form cartel-like alliances in order pursue their own interests rather than the interests of 
their parties in the allocation of state resources. And, of course, these dynamics cannot be 
divorced from the dynamics of clientelism and patronage. In particular, they are central to 
understanding individual legislators’ motivations for seeking to exploit institutional loopholes 
in an attempt to capture state resources for use in clientelist exchanges. 
When used together, theories of multiparty presidentialism—which explain the 
executive’s motivation for relinquishing a degree of power over resource allocation in 
exchange for support for the presidential policy agenda—and a modified form of cartel 
theory that takes into account individuals as well as parties, provide a broad analytical 
framework in which to understand the interplay between formal and informal political 
institutions in shaping the political dynamics of resource allocation at the national level. This 
study draws on these theoretical foundations to examine the ways in which legislators bargain 
with the executive and navigate the formal and informal institutions within the legislature to 
leverage state resources through the budget-making process. As the/my case studies 
demonstrate, the interplay between formal and informal institutions in the electoral system, 
within the legislature, and between the legislature and the executive, shape the political 
dynamics of the budgetary process in varied and nuanced ways and encourage cartelisation 
across party lines. Before turning attention to those case studies, however, it is first necessary 
to explain the changes in the political system, and in the dynamics of budget-making, since 
the advent of democracy. 
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Chapter 3: Politics and Budgeting from the New Order 
 
The process of budget-making is a political process that structures competition between 
agencies and programs and gives different budget actors power over the way funding is 
allocated, thus influencing broader policy outcomes (Hildreth & Lewis, 2011, pp. 11-14). As 
Rubin (2010, p. 2) argues, public budget-making not only constitutes an important political 
arena but one that has a unique relationship to policy, since policy decisions are made in the 
context of budgetary opportunities and constraints. Furthermore, the allocation of resources 
necessarily reflects the distribution of power ‘when a process involves power, authority, 
culture, consensus, and conflict, it captures a great deal of national political life’ (Wildavsky, 
1986, p. 2). 
As noted in Chapter Two, this thesis adopts an institutional approach, positioning the 
budget decision-making process within the formal and informal institutions through which 
budget players interact. A	comprehensive	understanding	of	public	budgeting	needs	to	take	its	multiple	institutional	and	political	dimensions	and	the	broad	political	environment	into	account.	For	instance,	legislators’	role	in	the	budgetary	process	cannot	be	understood	fully	by	focusing	on	the	written	rules	that	set	limits	and	govern	the	distribution	of	power	between	the	executive	and	legislative	arms	of	government.	It	is	also	vital	to	analyse	aspects	of	the	legislators’	role	that	lie	beyond	those	formal	rules. 
In order to achieve these aims, it is important to first examine the extent to which 
different political environments prevailing in Indonesia since the New Order have affected 
the dynamics of political interest groups in the budget-decision making process. This chapter 
describes the political environment and the political dynamics of the budget process, first 
under the New Order and then in the post-New Order period. It argues that the political 
dynamics of budget players’ interactions during the budget-making process has changed 
dramatically as a consequence of the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. The budget-
making process is no longer dominated by the executive. Political reforms adopted in the 
post-Suharto era have increased the power of legislature, and thus expanded the number of 
players involved in the budget process. 
The Politics of Budgeting during the New Order Period 
Prior to the political reforms of 1998, which marked Indonesia’s transformation from 
authoritarianism to democracy, political life was dominated by the state (Crouch, 1979; 
Emmerson, 1983; MacIntyre, 1992). Suharto’s New Order was characterised by a process of 
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depoliticisation, in which political parties were positioned as troublemakers (Cribb & Brown, 
1995, p. 114). Although the regime presided over rapid economic growth as a result of its 
ability to maintain macroeconomic stability, during the 1990s it adopted practices associated 
with a predatory state (Thee, 2012, pp. 80-84). The collapse of Suharto revealed the 
patronage networks embedded in the New Order political system, which had increased its 
economic system’s vulnerability to external shock.  
This section evaluates the ways in which President Suharto maintained power during 
his 32 years in office and the implications for the country’s fiscal institutions. It argues that 
by manipulating the constitutional framework, which served as the source of his formal 
political power, and developing an extensive patronage network, Suharto controlled not only 
the executive but also the legislature and the judiciary. Both strategies undermined 
Indonesia’s fiscal institutions and budgetary processes, and in particular, the legislature’s role 
in controlling and monitoring the budget. As the chapter demonstrates, the co-option of 
institutions such as the National Legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the BPK 
made it possible for Suharto to manipulate the process of budget-making in a way that served 
his own interests and those of his allies, to the detriment of the country’s economic position. 
The Political System 
Indonesia’s New Order (1966–98) was a centralised authoritarian regime (Crouch, 1979; 
Liddle, 1992 ; McLeod, 2005). As Liddle (1985, p. 184) has argued, the political structure of 
the New Order took the shape of a pyramid, with its apex occupied by the presidency and 
supported by the bureaucracy and military, which were used to systematically control every 
aspect of society in order to maintain the stability of the regime. Suharto drew on a 
combination of constitutional, coercive, and material power to shore up his regime, which 
had its legal basis in a letter of instruction signed by President Soekarno on 11 March 1966—
called the Order of March the Eleventh (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar). 
Supersemar delegated authority to Suharto, as Chief of the Army’s Strategic Reserve 
Command (Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat, Kostrad), to combat the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), which had been accused of the 
assassination of six senior generals on the night of 30 September the previous year (Liddle, 
1992, pp. 447-448).  
To maintain the backing of the armed forces, Suharto compensated his military 
supporters with positions in the bureaucracy that had the potential for rent-seeking (Crouch, 
1979, pp. 577-578). To justify military influence in the government, Suharto established the 
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doctrine of ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi), according to which the military had a role in political 
life as well as the responsibility for defence of the nation. Its security function was described 
with reference to the doctrine of ‘territorial management’ (Pembinaan Wilayah). The 
territorial command, known as the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kopkamtib), was structured 
in parallel with the makeup of the civilian government (Budiardjo, 1986, p. 1220). There is 
also evidence that the armed forces penetrated, and came to dominate, the government 
bureaucracy. As Emmerson (1983, pp. 1226-1227) asserts, the military’s domination of the 
bureaucracy was a ‘vital part’ of its strategy. The armed forces controlled the upper echelons 
of strategic departments such as Defence and Security and Home Affairs, more than 80 per 
cent of which was occupied by the armed forces. The armed forces also dominated the lower 
levels of government: in the early years of the New Order more than half of the country’s 
provinces had governors from military backgrounds (Crouch, 1972, p. 213).  
Material power was also used to maintain the regime. Suharto realised that economic 
development was important as a way of generating the resources needed for the distribution 
of patronage within the elites and to pacify potential opposition. He had come to power 
during a period of economic crisis (McLeod, 2000, pp. 100-101), and soon after the 
establishment of the New Order, a group of Western-trained economists was appointed to 
lead the economic recovery. Under their direction, the government liberalised foreign trade, 
stabilised the exchange rate, and built relationships with international donor agencies 
(Crouch, 1979; Resosudarmo & Kuncoro, 2006; Robison, 1988). In contrast to Soekarno, 
Suharto prioritised Indonesia’s economic development in his nation-building rhetoric. Called 
‘the Father of Development’ (Bapak Pembangunan), Suharto made constant references to 
‘the economy as the commanding officer’ (ekonomi sebagai panglima) during the New 
Order, and stability was framed as a key determinant of economic growth and a justification 
for the coercive power of the armed forces (Liddle, 1992, p. 449).  
While economic development provided the government with a form of legitimacy, it 
also generated the rent-seeking behaviour that underpinned the economic ascendency of 
Suharto’s inner circle (Cassing, 2000; MacIntyre, 2000). As McLeod (2005, p. 370) has 
explained, the achievement of economic growth was accompanied by the development of a 
‘franchise system’, under which the system jobs in public institutions are s for the 
opportunity to use these positions to seek rents. State authority over bank credit, licenses and 
funding for government projects became the basis for a patronage system that provided a 
source of income for the army and Suharto’s cronies. Suharto also used state–owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) to provide jobs for military officers, in order to ensure their loyalty or to 
tame his rivals (McLeod, 2000, p. 100). Over time, these systems gave rise to new oligarchs, 
as officials and military officers began to enter the private sector (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 
pp. 54-55).1 
At the same time, Suharto shored up his legitimacy by invoking his commitment to 
the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, UUD 1945), which he claimed 
Soekarno’s ‘Old Order’ had systematically violated. Suharto promised to implement the 1945 
Constitution in a pure and consistent way, through a system of government called Pancasila 
Democracy (Cribb & Brown, 1995, pp. 114-115).2 While not explicitly authoritarian, this 
system was open to authoritarian rule, as the Constitution stipulated that the President was the 
head of state as well as the head of the government. The President and Vice President were 
elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) a 
body made up of the 460 members of the national legislature and a further 460 government-
appointed representatives from the regions and various functional groups (Suryadinata, 1997, 
p. 191). The legislature, meanwhile, had no law-making authority, but simply acted as a 
rubber-stamp for laws generated by the executive arm of government. Under new laws issued 
by Suharto’s government, only 360 of the 460 legislators were elected, with a further 100 
members appointed from the military. It was thus obvious that pro-government forces would 
dominate parliamentary decision-making. It is unsurprising, then, that under the New Order, 
the legislature functioned as a rubber-stamp for the government, although formally it was 
responsible for legislation, oversight and budgeting (Haris, 2014, p. 54). 
To further bolster his political control, Suharto created a political vehicle known as 
Golkar (Golongan Karya) from the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat 
Bersama Golongan Karya, Sekber Golkar), which had been established under Soekarno 
                                                
1 The patronage system was not only an important source of funding for Suharto’s cronies and their 
families, the armed forces and government officials; it also encouraged the emergence of a domestic 
capitalist class (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 55). The emergence of this group was supported by state 
policies that strictly regulated foreign investment and gave domestic firms monopolies in certain areas 
of business (Robison, 1988). 
2 Pancasila is the five principles of Indonesian state ideology, namely; (1) belief in one God, (2) a just 
and civilised humanitarianism, (3) national unity, (4) democracy based on the wise guidance of 
representative consultation, and (5) social justice. As Cribb and Brown (1995) state, the Pancasila 
itself offered no program or guide to action. Suharto re-interpreted the Pancasila in 1970, when he 
made it the sole guiding principle (azas tunggal) to be adopted by all mass organisations in the 
country.  
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(Crouch, 1972, p. 213; Reeve, 1985, p. 241; Suryadinata, 1997, p. 191).3 Golkar was born 
during a crisis of parliamentary democracy, and existed alongside the Development Unity 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), themselves the result of the fusion of political parties that had 
survived the political transition. While all three competed in elections, the system operated in 
such a way that it was almost impossible for Golkar to lose. As a military vehicle, Golkar 
also had a similar structure to that of the territorial command, from the national level to the 
sub-national level, and many of its advisors were from the military. Local officials were 
required to be members. Unsurprisingly, Golkar never received less than 60 per cent of the 
vote (Suryadinata, 1997, p. 192). As a consequence, Suharto was able to ensure his re-
appointment as President in 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998.4 
Budgetary Dynamics during the New Order 
The institutional framework of the budget process under the New Order cannot be separated 
from the political and economic circumstances of that time. The New Order began at an 
economically fragile time, when the inflation rate stood at more than 600 per cent (McLeod, 
2000). Two years earlier, the deficit had been almost double the value of revenue, due to a 
lack of fiscal discipline (Hadiz, 2001; MacIntyre, 2000). Under the guidance of Suharto’s 
Berkeley-trained advisers, the economy	was	opened	up	to	foreign	trade,	investment	and	loans	backed	by	the	Inter-governmental	Group	on	Indonesia	(IGGI),	a	group	of	international	donors	(Hadiz,	2001,	p.	127),	which	contributed	to	economic	policy	and	reform	in	the	financial	sector	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	(Rosser,	2006b).	The	New	Order	government	subsequently	instituted	a	series	of	five-year	development	plans	(Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita), that	gave	form	to	the	Basic State Policy Guidelines 
(Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) issued by the People’s Consultative Assembly. 
These plans made it possible for the economy to recover in a relatively short time.  
                                                
3 As Reeve (1985) explains, Golkar was born during the period of Guided Democracy. Soekarno 
reinstated the 1945 Consitutions by decree to dissolve parliament and formed a new legislature that 
consisted of functional groups. These functional groups created a joint secretariat, which acted as a 
political force in opposition to the PKI between 1962 and 1965. In 1966–71 Sekber Golkar became 
Suharto’s instrument of electoral mobilisation. 
4 As Aspinall (2005b, p. 200) notes, however, the results of 1998 elections demonstrated the New 
Order’s loss of political credibility, as opposition forces were excluded rather than co-opted. As a 
consequence, the election results undermined Suharto’s legitimacy.  
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 Indonesia was blessed with plentiful natural resources, a large population and cheap 
labour, which made it attractive to foreign investors (McLeod, 2000, p. 100). The government 
succeeded in exploiting these abundant resources to promote its development agenda (Rosser, 
2006a, pp. 39-41), achieving an average growth of 8.56 per cent per annum in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) between 1968 and 1973 in all sectors including agriculture 
(Kuntjorojakti, 1988, p. 177). The successful stabilisation of food prices, and the 
government’s broad-based rural development policies and successful dissemination of new 
production techniques in food crops, were the mainstay of this remarkable achievement 
(Thee, 2012, p. 71). After the oil boom of 1973–78, the government shifted its economic 
policy towards capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing, modern services 
and physical infrastructure, resulting in the much faster growth of manufacturing sector. In 
the decade between 1980 and 1990, the country experienced an extraordinary growth rate of 
12 per cent per annum (Thee, 2012, p. 71).  
 From the time of the first five-year plan (1969–74), a budget cycle was scheduled 
every year (Kuntjorojakti, 1988, p. 176). However, under the New Order, the budgeting 
process was not supported by strong financial institutions. The legislature had the power to 
amend budget proposals under Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution, but it never scrutinised or 
rejected the executive’s budget proposals (Hanan, 2012, p. 121; Juwono & Eckardt, 2008, p. 
294; Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 70). Formally, the process of budget discussions between the 
executive branch of government and the legislature provided an opportunity for the 
legislature to influence the formulation of the budget. As stipulated in Article 138 of DPR 
Standing Orders 1987–1992, the annual process of budget-making involved a number of 
steps. The first of these was the preliminary budget discussions, in which the Budget Bill was 
discussed by parliamentary committees and their counterpart ministries, and in the Budget 
Committee. Following this step, the President officially introduced the Budget Bill into the 
legislature, where a further round of discussions took place between the Budget Committee 
and the government, followed by its approval in the Plenary Session. At the end of the first 
semester of the fiscal year, the President delivered an ‘in-year budget report’ and proposed 
any necessary revisions. At the end of the fiscal year, the legislature declared its approval 
(jointly with the executive) of the budget report as part of its oversight function.  
In practice, budget formulation was dominated by the executive (Hanan, 2012, p. 110) 
and the legislature exercised no form of budget control (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 70). An 
environment of corruption was fostered by the weaknesses in the institutional framework of 
budget policy, which was marked by a lack of transparency and accountability. This lack of 
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transparency and accountability allowed the budget to be used to serve the interests of 
Suharto and his cronies. For instance, under Presidential Regulation No.10/1980 on Team 
Monitoring on Public Procurement and Presidential Regulation No.14/1980 on the 
Implementation of the State Budget, private companies could receive government contracts 
from a special fund known as the President’s Special Fund (Bantuan Presiden, BANPRES), 
which was distributed at the discretion of the State Secretariat (Hadiz & Robison, 2013, p. 
48). In addition, the responsibilities of the Supreme Audit Body were unclear (Kuntjorojakti, 
1988, p. 195). During this period, budget leakage was as high as 30 per cent (The World 
Bank cited in Hadiz, 2001, p. 128). This lack of accountability was further exacerbated by the 
extraction of state resources through off-budget mechanisms (Baker, 2015). In addition to 
formal revenue streams developed under the New Order, a pattern of off-budget activity 
expanded very rapidly with the oil boom of the 1970s. The resulting revenue streams were 
hidden and managed through various charitable foundations (Yayasan) and commercial joint 
ventures (McLeod, 2000, p. 101). One high-profile example of this practice was the notorious 
corruption scandal involving the state oil company Pertamina under the direction of Ibnu 
Sutowo. Pertamina channelled a large part of its oil revenues to the armed forces, which used 
the money to expand its businesses in a range of ventures such as hotels. There was no public 
accounting for these funds (Mackie, 1970).  
In sum, Suharto’s wide-reaching control of political resources directly influenced the 
policy-making process, which became highly centralised under the New Order. In the domain 
of fiscal policy, none of the country’s financial institutions had control or oversight of the 
budget, creating an environment that encouraged off-budget activities, corruption and budget 
leakage to serve the regime. In the final years of the New Order, growing public distrust was 
sparked by the practice of corruption committed by Suharto’s cronies and his government 
(Kramer, 2015, p. 68). Public dissatisfaction was exacerbated by the Asian Financial Crisis, 
resulting in widespread protest, which ultimately forced Suharto to resign.  
 
The Politics of Budgeting in Post-New Order Indonesia 
Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 shifted Indonesia’s political framework dramatically, 
providing reformist groups with the opportunity to establish democratic institutions. 
Indonesia’s path to democracy was marked by amendments to the Constitution and reforms 
in the electoral system. Constitutional amendments strengthened the legislature and the 
country’s audit institutions, and paved the way for the implementation of regional autonomy. 
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They also led to reforms to the judiciary, defence and security, and improved the protection 
of human rights (Crouch, 2010, p. 62). These reforms did not, however, eliminate informal 
practices. Indeed, as this section demonstrates, the	rules	of	the	game	in	the	post-New	Order	period	have	been	shaped	by	ongoing	contestation	between	formal	and	informal	political	institutions.		
Indonesia’s Path to Democracy 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 triggered a period of political chaos which ultimately 
led to the resignation of Suharto in May 1988. When the rupiah crashed and inflation sky-
rocketed in 1997, oppositional forces were drawn together in questioning Suharto’s 
legitimacy (Aspinall, 2005b, pp. 218-221).5 Despite this pressure, Suharto was re-elected in 
March 1998 by the People’s Consultative Assembly for another five-year term. Subsequently, 
demonstrations by students and other civil society groups increased in number, reaching a 
crisis point in May, when massive anti-Chinese riots broke out, causing the deaths of around 
a thousand people (Feith, Aspinall, & Van Klinken, 1999). Members of the political elite then 
stepped up pressure on Suharto, who handed over power to Vice President B.J. Habibie on 21 
May 1998 (Feith et al., 1999). 
On becoming President, Habibie instigated a series of fundamental reforms that 
provided the foundations for measures instituted by his successors, removing restrictions on 
the press and media, reforming the anti-subversion law and releasing political prisoners, and 
facilitating an increase in the number of political parties and the implementation of free and 
fair elections (Crouch, 2010, p. 27). Since that time, the Indonesian political system has 
changed dramatically, with the election of thousands of government officials, including 
presidents, governors, mayors, as well as legislators.  
Indonesia’s first democratic elections since the fall of the New Order were held in 
June 1999. In contrast to elections during the New Order, where only Golkar, PDI and PPP 
were allowed to participate, the 1999 election was contested by the 48 political parties that 
met the eligibility criteria (Crouch, 2010, p. 51). Although Megawati Soekarnoputri’s 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) 
won the legislative election, Abdurahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, was elected President 
                                                
5 As Aspinall (2005b) explains, elite dissidence, proto-oppositional forces (NGOs), the student 
movement and Megawati’s faction within the PDI had greatly undermined Suharto’s legitimacy. 
However, the opposition movements remained poorly organised and lacked the ability to develop an 
alternative leadership. 
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by the new People’s Consultative Assembly. Wahid’s presidency contributed to reform in the 
area of human rights, and he was committed to limiting the role of the military (Haris, 2014). 
However, his leadership style was erratic and controversial, and he lacked support within the 
legislature, which had a far stronger voice in the post-New Order period (Crouch, 2010, p. 
31). Conflict with the legislature eventually forced Gus Dur to step down in 2001, when he 
was replaced by Megawati.  
Wahid’s demise prompted further reform of the political system through a series of 
constitutional amendments designed to clarify the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature (Crouch, 2010, pp. 54-56; Kawamura, 2013, p. 160). One of the most crucial 
impacts of these constitutional amendments was the mandating of a stronger role for the 
legislature, which shifted the Indonesian political system from a presidential system towards 
a parliamentary system (Crouch, 2010, pp. 54-55). Amendments were made to emphasise the 
importance of clear procedures for the impeachment of presidents, direct presidential 
elections and the establishment of two new institutions, a Regional Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) and a Constitutional Court. As a consequence of the 
establishment of the Regional Representative Council, the People’s Consultative Assembly is 
now divided into two chambers, the members of both of which are now elected. The role of 
the Regional Representative Council, which consists of members representing every 
province, was to monitor and give consideration to local issues in the legislative and 
budgetary processes. The Constitutional Court, meanwhile, functions to ensure the law 
complies with the Constitution and responds to requests by the House of Representatives to 
assess whether the President and Vice President have violated the Constitution (Crouch, 
2010, p. 56). It also has a role in deciding disputes over the election results, mandating the 
dissolution of political parties and disputes between state institutions. An important outcome 
of its establishment was the elimination of the power of the legislature to simply remove a 
president from office. 
In 2004, Indonesia introduced direct presidential elections. Many observers saw 
Yudhoyono’s election through the new process as a milestone in Indonesia’s transition to 
democracy (see, for example, Aspinall, 2005a; Crouch, 2010). Further reform also took place 
with the strengthening of representation in the legislature by the direct election of all 
candidates and the application of an electoral threshold to consolidate the party system 
(Mietzner, 2009, pp. 106-107). However, proportional representation, which was adopted 
from the 1999 election on, produced a multi-party system that in turn created political 
fragmentation without any majority party in the legislature (Table 3.1). This system produced 
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minority presidents who lacked partisan support in the legislatgure, forcing them to form 
oversized coalitions which embraced all significant political parties. This meant that there 
was no identifiable opposition and the check and balance function of the parties failed, as a 
consequence of what Slater (2004, pp. 64-65) calls the ‘accountability trap’. While this 
challenge was most significant for Wahid and Megawati, the practice continued under 
Yudhoyono, whose position was nevertheless not as exposed, since he could no longer be 
impeached after losing political support (Haris, 2014, p. 175; Sherlock, 2015, p. 97). 
 
Table 3.1. The Relationship between the President and the Legislature 
President B.J. Habibie Wahid Megawati 1st SBY 2nd SBY 
Period 20 May 98 – 
19 Oct 99 
20 Oct 99 
– 22 July 
01 
23 July 01 
– 19 Oct 
04 
20 Oct 04 
– 19 Oct 
09 
20 Oct 04 
– 19 Oct 
14 
System of 
presidentialism 
Executive is 
Dominant 
Legislature is 
Dominant 
Separation of Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Powers 
% held by the ruling 
party 65.0% 10.2% 30.6% 10.2% 26.4% 
% held by the 
parties of the 
President & Vice 
President 
– 40.8% 42.2% 33.3% 26.8% 
% held by the ruling 
Coalition 
97.8% 94.8% 83.2% 63.8% 75.5% 
Number of coalition 
parties 
2 parties & 1 
fraction 
7 parties & 
1 fraction 
5 parties & 
1 fraction 
8 parties 6 parties 
 
Source: Adapted from Kawamura (2013, p. 175) 
 
Following these reforms, the division of power between the executive and the legislature with 
regard to policy-making also shifted from control by the executive to a more evenly-balanced 
relationship. A series of constitutional amendments made the legislature no longer just a 
rubber stamp for government proposals. A clearer separation of powers was implemented 
between the legislative and executive branches, with substantial powers of oversight now 
invested in the former, giving it the ability to propose policies to the executive based on 
article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, which states that it has the authority to make laws. The 
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power of the legislature has been further boosted by the fact that the President no longer has 
the power to veto bills passed by the legislature (Juwono & Eckardt, 2008, p. 298). However, 
since the Constitution requires joint deliberation between the executive and the House, the 
President can use this provision as an informal veto power. The President can also simply not 
send a minister to participate in deliberations in the relevant sectoral committee. If the 
President takes either course of action, the House cannot progress a bill to a final vote in the 
Plenary Session (Kawamura, 2013, p. 164; Sherlock, 2015).  
The dominance of technocrats within the bureaucracy has been challenged, not only 
by politicians in the legislature but also by other interest groups including civil society. 
Through Indonesia’s democratic transition, political space has become more open, providing 
a sphere for representatives of civil society to consolidate and express their interests, seek 
election and take advantage of intra-elite contests to deliver reform on issues such as the 
military, women’s rights and labour (Mietzner, 2013, pp. 34-42). There have been many civil 
society victories in the policy-making arena, both within key legislative and executive 
institutions and outside the formal political systems, as lobbyists exercise pressure on 
decision-makers. For instance, even though labour unions were marginalised and fragmented 
under Suharto’s rule, the government passed the Manpower Law in 2003 as a result of 
pressure from the labour movement (Caraway & Ford, 2014). In terms of formal politics, the 
pro-democracy activists now integrated into formal political institutions have used their 
positions to influence policy (Mietzner, 2013, p. 33). 
Overall, then, Indonesia has remained on a path to democracy, characterised by 
decentralisation, free and fair elections and civic participation. As Mietzner (2009, p. 105) 
asserts, democratic consolidation in Indonesia has been more successful than in other 
countries in the Southeast Asian region, as indicated by the emergence of stronger political 
institutions, attempts to eradicate corruption and the absence of ongoing communal conflict. 
It is significant that the distribution of power in decision-making processes—including those 
associated with the national budget—has taken place alongside transformation of the formal 
political institutions.  
  
40 
	
Budgetary Dynamics in the Post New Order Period 
The budget process is an extremely important political activity, arguably second only to 
general elections themselves. Amendments to the Constitution in 2001 and 2002 introduced a 
role for the legislature in what was formerly a closed budgetary system. In budgetary matters, 
the Constitution provides exclusive power to the President in the sense that, unlike other laws 
which can be proposed by the President or the House of Representatives, the Budget Bill can 
only be initiated by the President. In the event that the House of Representatives fails to 
approve the Budget Bill, the government must adopt the budget of the preceding year (Article 
15 clause 6, Law No.17/2003). Yet while Budget Bills are proposed by the President, they 
must be approved by the legislature, a process in which the Sectoral Commissions and the 
Budget Committee—which have the power to amend budget proposals—play a key role. This 
fundamental change affected the distribution of power among key budget players. The more 
even distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches of government in 
the budgetary process has improved the transparency and accountability of budgetary 
decision-making.  
 The impetus for the Indonesian government to embark on fundamental reform of the 
budget process was clearly linked to the Asian Financial Crisis, which forced President 
Suharto to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. The IMF provided a 
USD 430 billion rescue package, which required institutional reform including the 
introduction of the rule of law, trade liberalisation, the introduction of fiscal transparency and 
the recapitalisation of banks (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro, 2006, p. 350). These reforms have 
produced three fundamental changes that have resulted in improvements in budget 
accountability. First, the legal framework for the budget accountability system in Indonesia 
has been significantly improved. Second, with the introduction of new laws, the budget 
system shifted from a traditional public administration paradigm to modern practices of 
financial management underpinned by a results-oriented approach. Third, the direction of 
budget accountability has changed from vertical accountability within the bureaucracy to 
horizontal accountability outside government. Moreover, as explained below, reform of 
Indonesia’s budgetary institutions can be divided into three elements: reform of the legal 
framework, changes in the distribution of power between actors in the budget process and 
changes the process of budget decision-making. 
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The Legal Framework 
The budgetary system in place at the time of democratisation was effectively a continuation 
of the system used during the Dutch colonial period (Ginting, 2003, p. 353). After protracted 
negotiations, the Megawati administration enacted a finance law package to replace the 
colonial-era regulations in 2003–04. It consisted of four related laws, namely Law 
No.17/2003 on State Finance, Law No.1/2004 on the State Treasury, Law No.15/2004 on 
State Audit and Law No.25/2004 on the National Development Planning System. 
The main objective of Law No.17/2003 on State Finance was to ensure the 
management of the national budget in an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
manner and to reduce off-budget activities, which had served as a loophole for legalised 
corruption during the New Order period (Ginting, 2003, p. 354). The law sets out the 
institutional framework for the budgetary process and budget structure, the actors involved 
and their responsibilities, and the relationship between institutions involved in the 
management of state finances. It also clarifies the role of the legislature in approving the 
budget and in holding the executive responsible for its implementation. Before the 
introduction of the law, there were separate routine and development budgets, the former 
being the responsibility of Ministry of Finance and the latter the responsibility of Bappenas. 
The new system unified these budgets in an effort to reduce duplication and improve the 
interaction between the planning and budgeting processes. Law No.17/2003 also states that 
government financial reports must be audited by the Supreme Audit Body six months after 
the end of the fiscal year, with the resulting report provided to the legislature for review. The 
Supreme Audit Body also has a responsibility to audit all the local budgets (Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD) and state-owned enterprises. In terms of fiscal 
discipline, a ‘balanced budget’ system had been adopted during the New Order, which 
required that revenue and spending should be balanced. Under Law No.17/2003 this was 
replaced by a performance budget approach, incorporating a deficit-surplus system. In this 
system, the government is required to provide comprehensive information, including 
performance indicators, rather than simply financial information (Ginting, 2003, p. 355). The 
new law also introduced tighter fiscal rules limiting budget deficits to a maximum of 3 per 
cent of GDP.  
Law No. 1/2004 on the State Treasury was drafted in response to the need to establish 
a modern treasury system and to complement the State Finance Law. It focuses on accounting 
methods to be used in the budget and treasury’s responsibilities in the management and 
implementation of state finances. As defined in the law, treasury’s function with regard to 
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fiscal management includes budget allocation, payment, accounting systems, cash 
management and financial planning, debt management government procurement and internal 
control system (Siallagan, 2013, p. 98). The main objective of Law No.15/2004 on State 
Audit, meanwhile, is to ensure that government institutions are accountable and transparent. 
It seeks to achieve this by obliging each ministry and local government to submit a financial 
report to the Supreme Audit Body for auditing before it is tabled in the legislature. Law 
No.15/2004 also sets out a definition of auditing and auditors and defines the scope of 
auditing, as well as auditing standards, the freedom and independence of auditors, their 
access to information, audit results and follow up. The law also regulates the timeframe 
available for budget reports and mandates the establishment of an office of the Supreme 
Audit Body in every region to conduct budget audits at the sub-national level. In short, the 
law provides the legal basis, premised on international best practice, for a strong and 
independent auditing process (Dwiputrianti, 2011, p. 87).  
Finally, Law No.25/2004 on the National Development Planning System provides a 
new foundation for the national planning system and requires integration between planning 
processes and budget processes. The law resolved the problem of dual budget functions of 
Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance (Siallagan, 2013, pp. 103-104)6. Law No.25/2004 
defines national development planning as integrated planning across government departments 
and agencies, as well as across different levels of government. It also outlines the national 
development planning approach, specific milestones and dates for preparation and approval 
of development plans, and the role of Bappenas. The new planning system acknowledges that 
planning is a political process, since voters can hold political leaders to account if programs 
described in planning documents are not implemented. This new system is very different 
from the system in place during the New Order, when technocratic and top-down approaches 
dominated the planning process (Booth, 2005, p. 210). The budgeting process is also referred 
to in Law No.27/2009 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, the Legislative Council, the 
House of Representatives, and the Regional Houses of Representatives—the so-called MD3 
(MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD) law. The MD3 law stipulates the roles of the legislature in the 
                                                
6 Prior to the passing of this Law, it was unclear whether the Ministry of Finance or Bappenas had the 
authority to formulate the budget.  
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budget process. It also sets out the internal mechanism for discussion of the budget within the 
House of Representatives and its relationship to the Regional Representative Council.7 
These laws all had important strengths, but they were also very general and open to 
interpretation. For example, even though Law No.17/2003 introduced a Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the operationalisation of that concept was unclear. 
Similarly, Law No.1/2004 mandates the use of an accrual system, but it was unclear whether 
this system was to be applied only to the financial system or also to the budget. In another 
example, Law No.15/2004 requires the Supreme Audit Body to report on financial matters 
but provides no clear explanation of the extent to which government financial reports are to 
be subject to audit. Likewise, Law No.25/2004 includes five approaches: political, 
participatory, technocratic, top-down and bottom-up. However, there is an on-going debate 
about how to integrate those approaches without introducing conflicts between them. In 
practice, the deliberation forum for development planning (Musyawarah Perencanaan 
Pembangunan, Musrenbang) as a vehicle for bottom-up and participatory approaches is often 
ignored by political, technocrat and top-down approaches.  
As with so many laws in Indonesia, there is overlap in certain areas and conflicts in 
others. For example, at least three articles regulating the budgetary process at the sub-national 
level in Law No.17/2003 are restated in Law No.33/2004 on Fiscal Balance. A similar 
problem also emerged in the MD3 Law, which regulated some of the same matters as Law 
No.17/2003, providing even more detail in some areas. Article 161 of Law No.17/2003, for 
instance, sets a limit of deviation between the budget and macroeconomic indicators as the 
basis for the budget revisions the government may propose to the legislature. There is also 
conflict between Law No.25/2004, which stipulates that local Mid-Term Plans should be 
enacted by a regulation issued by the district head (Peraturan Kepala Daerah, Perkada), and 
Law No.32/2004 on Local Government, which stipulates that they should be enacted by a 
regulation issued by the local legislature (Peraturan Daerah, Perda). There was also 
competition between institutions to enact legislation. For example, Bappenas proposed Law 
No.25/2004 as a response to Law No.17/2003, which had been proposed by Ministry of 
Finance in response to the fact that Law No.17/2003 largely ignored the national planning 
role that is part of Bappenas’s mandate (Hawkesworth et al., 2009, p. 7).  
                                                
7 The MD3 law was revised as Law No.17/2014 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, the 
Legislative Council, the House of Representatives, and the Regional Houses of Representatives. 
However, content relating to the budget process did not change. 
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The Distribution of Power among Budget Actors 
According to Law No.17/2003 on State Finance, there are three main actors in the annual 
budgetary process: the executive, the legislature and the Supreme Audit Body. Within the 
executive, the President delegates his/her power to the Ministry of Finance to act as Chief 
Financial Officer, with responsibility for fiscal policy and the macroeconomic framework as 
well as for preparing an annual budget proposal. As stated in Law No.17/2003, the President 
delegates power to sectoral ministries and agencies as spending agencies for the execution of 
programs. Another vital institution is Bappenas, which is responsible for coordinating the 
planning process. Conflict regularly occurs between spending agencies, which make demands 
for increased shares of the budget, and the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for 
scrutinising the budget proposal demands of those ministries and other government agencies. 
This relationship pattern between the Ministry of Finance and the spending ministries has 
been described by Wildavsky (1974, p. 75) as a pattern of behaviour characteristic of a 
guardian, who manages the budget, and various advocates, who demand increases in their 
share of the budget.  
Following amendments to the Constitution made in 2004, Indonesia adopted a 
bicameral system, with the House of Representatives acting as the lower house and the 
Regional Representative Council, representing the regions at the national level, acting as the 
upper house. Although the formal structure of Regional Representative Council is as strong 
as House of Representatives, as the upper house the Council is less powerful and smaller, 
with 124 members compared to the House of Representatives’ 550 members (Schneier, 2008, 
p. 204).8  
The House of Representatives consists of fractions (fraksi), which represent various 
political parties. However, it has an organisational structure comprised of the House 
Speakership (Chair and Vice Chair) and different committees including the Sectoral 
Commissions (standing committees), the Steering Committee (Badan Musyarawah, Bamus), 
the Legislation Body (Badan Legislasi, Baleg), the Budget Committee (Badan Anggaran, 
Banggar), the Public Finance Accountability Committee (Badan Akuntabilitas Keuangan 
Negara, BAKN), and the Ethics Committee (Badan Kehormatan). These are complemented 
                                                
8 Sherlock (2004, p.14) explains that the Regional Representative Council (DPD) is not a true upper 
house since its power is limited to the creation of new laws that are related to sub-national issues. 
Even in the budgetary process, its role is merely advisory, giving advice on decisions related to 
regional issues. The DPD does not have the same power as the United States and Australian senates. 
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by the Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Body (Badan Kerjasama Antar Parlemen, BKSAP), 
the Household Affairs Committee (Badan Urusan Rumah Tangga, BURT), different ad hoc 
committees (panitia khusus, pansus), and other necessary bodies that can be established by 
the Plenary Session (Article 81, point 1, Law 27/2009).  
Sectoral commissions are defined according to their counterpart ministries and 
executive agencies. There are eleven such commissions, and every member of the House is 
assigned to a particular commission based on fractional proportions. Other committees that 
pertain to the legislature’s budgetary functions are the Budget Committee and the Financial 
Accountability committee, which has the Supreme Audit Body as its counterpart. The Budget 
Committee is the biggest committee in the House of Representatives. It is intended to 
accommodate representatives of each commission and should also reflect the relative size of 
different parliamentary fractions. The size of its membership has been increased in every 
term of the legislature. As of 2014, it consisted of 100 members, compared to 85 members in 
the previous term. Budgetary roles are also embedded in the Sectoral Commissions. In 
addition, the House of Representatives is equipped with a supporting system, which functions 
in parallel to the technical support provided to the executive by the bureaucracy. A total of 
1,500 support staff makes the Indonesian legislature, in theory, the best equipped in the world 
(Linert, 2013, p. 16). Despite these numbers, however, the support for budget analysis is 
limited. The Budget Committee has only ten support staff, and there is no dedicated office 
like the United States Congressional Budget Office to provide nonpartisan support (Linert, 
2013, p. 16).  
 These and other reforms have resulted in substantial changes to the political system, 
which in turn have shifted the balance of power between the executive and the legislature, 
including in the budget decision-making process. The Budget Bill may still be formulated by 
the President via various ministries and government agencies, but the bargaining position of 
House of Representatives is now relatively strong, since it now has the power to modify 
revenues and expenditures as long as the amendments do not result in an increase in the 
projected budget deficit. Put differently, the House of Representatives’ power to amend the 
budget proposal provides space in which to build consensus between the executive and 
legislature to accommodate interests of both in the budget discussions.9 The next section 
                                                
9 The ways in which the executive uses the budgets to win the support of the legislature and the ways 
in which the legislature amends the budget to accommodate its interests are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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discusses the way in which the distribution of power between the executive and legislature 
affects the budget process. 
The Budget Process 
The budget process consists of four stages: formulation, approval, execution and monitoring 
(Figure 3.1). The first of these, budget formulation, takes place within the executive.10 The 
Ministry of Finance establishes the extent of financial resources available and sets the 
macroeconomic assumptions and spending limits for the next fiscal year.  
In a parallel process, Bappenas drafts a Government Work Plan (Rencana Kerja 
Pemerintah, RKP) based on the Medium Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan 
Jangka Menengah, RPJM), which describes the government’s priorities for programs and 
ministries for a period of five years and contains the government’s priorities for the next 
fiscal year. Bappenas’s planning process begins with a series of multi-stakeholder 
consultation meetings for development planning, or Musrenbang. The Musrenbang process 
starts at the village level then proceeds to the sub-district level and then to the 
city/municipality, before it is escalated to the provincial level and finally the national level. 
At the national level, Musrenbang involves sub-national governments and spending 
ministries, which work to finalise the government’s work plan. This document is in turn used 
by spending ministries to formulate their own annual work plans (Rencana Kerja 
Kementerian Lembaga, Renja–KL). At this stage, the President leads a series of meetings 
with his/her cabinet in order to finalise its work plan, in which s/he gives general direction to  
cabinet (Interview with the former Ministry of Finance, 31 September 2015).  
The next step in the budget process consists of preliminary budget discussions with 
the legislature, which usually commence in May when the executive submits its fiscal policy 
framework and its budget priorities. This document consists of its basic macroeconomic 
assumptions (Bank Indonesia Certificate, economic growth, inflation rate, interest rate, 
exchange rate, international crude oil price, oil production, and gas production). At this stage, 
the Budget Committee, Commission XI (which deals with finance) and Commission VII 
(which deals with energy) engage in intense debate with the government—represented by the 
Ministry of Finance, Bappenas and the Governor of Bank Indonesia, as the counterparts of   
                                                
10 The documents and the formulation process is based on Law No 25/2004 on the National 
Development Planning System.  
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Aug Week 4–Sept Week 
1 
 (Working Meeting of 
Coms VII & XI with 
Partner Ministries) on 
macroeconomic 
assumptions, revenue & 
finance 
Sept Week 1 
(Working Meeting 
of Coms I-XI with 
Partner Ministries) 
• Discussion of 
RKA-KL 
• Discussion of 
proposal for 
Special Allocation 
Fund (DAK) 
• Send the result to 
the Budget 
Committee 
 
Oct Week 1 (Presentation of adjustment 
results of RKA-KL by Sectoral Commissions in 
writing) 
 
Sept Week 1 (Working 
Committee Meeting on 
Macro-economic, 
Revenue and Finance) 
  
Sept Week 2 
Formulation Team 
Meeting on Macro-
economic, Revenue and 
Finance  
 
Sept Week 2 (Internal 
Meeting of the Budget 
Committee) 
Sept 2nd week 
Work Meeting of 
Budget Committee 
with the Government 
(MoF) and Governor 
of Bank Indonesia 
Approval on the 
temporary budget 
posture 
August Week 2 (Plenary Meeting) 
• President Presents RUU APBN including 
Financial Notes 
• General view of the factions about RUU APBN 
• Government responds to factions’ general 
views on the APBN 
 
Sept Week 3 (Formulation Team 
Meeting) 
• Central Government Expenditure 
• Funds Transfers to the Regions and Villages  
 
Oct Week 2 (Plenary Meeting) 
• Presentation of report of discussion results at 
level I in the Budget Committee 
• Verbal statement of approval/disapproval 
from every faction 
• Presentation final opinion of the government 
 
Sept Week 4 (Meeting of Working 
Committee on the Budget Bill) 
 
Sept Week 4 (Work Meeting of 
Commissions with Counterparts) 
• Adjustent of RKA-KL according to results of 
Budget Committee discussions  
 
Oct Week 1 
(Budget Committee Internal Meeting) 
• Synchronise results of working committee 
and formulation team 
• Presentation of adjustment results of RKA-
KL by the commissions with work partners 
to the Budget Committee & Ministry of 
Finance 
 
Oct Week 1 
 (Work Meeting of Budget Committee with the 
Government and Governor of Bank Indonesia) 
• Report results validation of working com and 
formulation team of RUU APBN 
• Final opinion of faction representatives and 
government opinion 
• Decision making to be continued to level II 
 
August Week 3 (Work Meeting of Budget 
Committee with the Government (MoF) and 
Governor of Bank Indonesia) 
• Presentation on the main policies in RUU 
APBN  
• Establishment of the working committees: 
o Macro-economic assumptions, revenue and 
finance 
o Central government expenditure 
o Fiscal transfers to the regions 
o Budget Bill 
Figure 3.2. The Process of Budget Bill Approval 
Sept Week 3 (Meeting of Working 
Committee on the Central Government 
Expenditure in the Budget Bill and  Meeting of 
Working Committee on Fiscal Transfers to the 
Region and Village Funds in the Budget Bill) 
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the Budget Committee and Commission XI—on the document. Commission VII discusses 
macroeconomic assumptions related to the energy sector.  
Under the MD3 Law, the Budget Committee only discusses budget allocations that 
have already been decided by the commissions. In order to accommodate this requirement, 
the Budget Committee synchronises the decisions made in Commission XI and Commission 
VII in a draft agreement on fiscal policies, consisting of macroeconomic assumptions, 
revenue forecasts, an indicative budget ceiling and deficit targets. This agreement is not 
finalised until the budget document is enacted by law at the end of October. In the meantime, 
however, it is used by ministries and government agencies to formulate a detailed annual 
budget and work plan (Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Kementerian Lembaga, RKA–KL). 
Every Sectoral Commission then holds discussions with their respective ministries and 
agencies. These discussions focus on spending for program priorities in every line ministry. 
Usually, the aggregate budget ceiling remains unchanged, but the budget composition may be 
amended. The discussions also provide an opportunity for the legislators to insert their 
aspiration programs for their constituency regions to be included in the state budget proposal 
in the Budget Bill.11 
Following these discussions, the Ministry of Finance prepares a budget proposal 
(Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, RAPBN) and financial notes, based 
on the fiscal policy agreements and budget proposals from ministries. Traditionally, the 
President delivers a budget speech during a Plenary Session of the legislature on 16 August, 
the day before Indonesia’s Independence Day. The financial notes and draft budget law are 
subsequently formally submitted to the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives. At 
this stage, every fraction in the House has an opportunity to deliver its response to the 
financial notes, to which the Ministry of Finance responds in the next Plenary Session on 
behalf of the President. However, these steps are usually ceremonial rather than substantive, 
since most amendments are decided upon in meetings of the Budget Committee and the 
Sectoral Commissions.  
As the preliminary budget discussions are taking place, there are parallel budget 
deliberations involving the Budget Committee and Sectoral Commissions (Table 3.2). The 
Budget Committee focuses on the macroeconomic assumptions, revenue, spending and 
financing to cover any budget deficit. The Sectoral Commissions review the budget details 
                                                
11 Aspiration programs for the electoral regions can be inserted by moving the location of the existing 
programs to their constituency regions or by reallocation programs. See Chapter Seven. 
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and work plans for their counterpart ministries/agencies, discussing the budget proposal with 
the related ministries to decide upon the state revenue and expenditure. However, the 
legislature’s responsibility for scrutinising the budget means that budget discussions tend to 
focus closely on details of spending, a process which consumes a great deal of time 
(Hawkesworth et al., 2009, p. 30; World Bank, 2007, p. 96). The commissions then submit 
their findings to the Budget Committee for synchronisation. In theory, the Budget Committee 
only discusses items that have been decided on by the commissions. However, in practice, in 
many cases budget discussions, decisions are made by the Budget Committee that do not 
reference the decisions made by the commissions (The Indonesian Institute, 2012). In the 
final round of the budget deliberations in the House of Representatives, the Budget 
Committee leader reports to the legislature during a Plenary Session. During this session, 
fractions are given an opportunity to deliver their final views on the Budget Bill. If legislators 
agree, the Plenary Session passes the budget document into law, classified by spending 
agencies, functions and program activities. 
In most cases, the Budget Bill is passed unanimously. However, there were two occasions in 
2012 and 2013 when the Plenary Sessions resisted passing the revisions of the Budget Bill. 
On both these occasions, PDIP, the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, 
Hanura), the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) 
and Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) rejected government proposals 
to cut fuel subsidies.12 This deadlock occurred even though parties in the government 
coalition held a majority of seats in the legislature. As shown in Table 3.1 above, 
Yudhoyono’s coalition, consisting of six parliamentary fractions, held 75 per cent of seats in 
the House of Representatives in his second term. However, PKS joined with the parties 
outside the governing coalition to reject the government’s proposal (Plenary Session Meeting 
Minutes, 17 June 2013). This unresolved issue was finally decided by voting in the Plenary 
Sessions (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 30 March 2012 and 17 June 2013). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Indonesian budgets have suffered from fiscal pressure caused by fuel subsidies. Further discussion 
on the extent to which fuel subsidies affected the budget in the Jokowi era is included in Chapter 
Four. 
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Table 3.2. Main Duties of the Budget Committee and the Sectoral Commissions 
Sectoral Commissions Budget Committee 
Hold preliminary discussions regarding the 
preparation of the draft state budget included in 
the scope of its counterpart ministry or agency. 
Engage in discussions with the government, 
as represented by the relevant Minister, to 
determine the main fiscal policy and budget 
priorities to be used as a reference for each 
ministry/agency in preparing the budget 
proposal. 
Hold discussions with government and propose 
improvements to revenue and expenditure in the 
draft budget included in the scope of its work. 
Work with the executive arm of government 
to set the state revenues based on the 
proposal of the relevant commissions. 
Discuss and set a budget allocation for the 
functions and programs of the ministries/agencies 
which are partners of that committee. 
Discuss the draft law on the state budget with 
the President (or a minister representing 
him/her) on budget allocations for the 
functions and programs of government and 
the allocation of fiscal resources to the 
regions based on decisions of meetings of the 
relevant commissions. 
Hold discussions of national financial reports and 
the realisation of the budget, including the results 
of Supreme Audit Body investigations. 
Synchronise the results of discussions within 
the commissions and other committees 
regarding the annual budget and work plan of 
the ministries/agencies. 
Present the result of their preliminary discussions 
to the Budget Committee for synchronisation. 
Synchronise assessments of development 
programs for different electoral regions 
proposed by the commissions.13 
Discuss and set a budget allocation of their 
counterpart ministries/agencies based on the 
synchronisation of the budget allocation to those 
ministries/agencies by the Budget Committee. 
Discuss financial statements and forecasts. 
Submit the results of the discussions to the 
Budget Committee for consideration in the final 
draft of the national budget. 
Discuss the financial reporting bill. 
Hold discussions and set a budget allocation for 
annual and multi-year programs of counterpart 
ministries. 
 
 
Source: Author’s Analysis of Articles 98 and 110 of Law No.17/2017. 
                                                
13 The development program for the electoral regions is also known also as the aspiration fund. The 
aspiration fund is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
51 
	
The third stage is budget execution, which is envisaged as the point at which the executive 
simply implements the budget allocations approved by the House of Representatives. Once 
the Budget Bill is passed, the Ministry of Finance prepares a supporting budget document 
that is used as an implementation guide. It also has an active role to ensure the budget 
realisation complies with the budget as approved by the House of Representatives. In 
accordance with this role, ministries/agencies must present their disbursement plans to the 
Ministry of Finance. As part of their oversight function, the Sectoral Commissions can also 
initiate discussions with their counterpart ministries/agencies to monitor the budget 
execution. Half way through the financial year, the Budget Committee holds discussions with 
the executive and Bank Indonesia to evaluate the first-semester budget realisation report and 
the forecast for the next six months.  
If any significant change has to be made in the budget, the executive must submit a 
revision of the Budget Bill to the House of Representatives. According to Article 182 of Law 
No.17/2017, the parameters for budget revisions include significant changes in 
macroeconomic assumptions (a decline in economic growth of at least 1 per cent or deviation 
in other macroeconomic assumptions of at least 10 per cent); significant changes in the 
budget position (a decrease in tax revenue of at least 10 per cent and increase or decrease the 
budgets of spending ministries/agencies of at least 10 per cent of the ceiling); urgent 
expenditure needs; an increase in the deficit of at least 10 per cent of the ceiling. In cases 
where the macroeconomic assumptions and the budget posture have not changed 
significantly, the government does not need to propose a revision of the Budget Bill. In 
practice, however, the budget revisions are always made. Where revisions of the Budget Bill 
are required, discussions are significantly shorter than in the case of the annual budget. The 
executive and the legislature are required to conduct the deliberations within a period of one 
month after the executive submits the revised Budget Bill to the legislature. The discussions 
take place in the Budget Committee and are reported in the financial statements of the 
government.  
The last stage in the budget process is evaluation of the budget execution. Compared 
to the approval and execution stages, the legislature has a lower level of engagement in this 
phase. Although the report on the budget execution must be approved by the House of 
Representatives according to the same process as that used for the Budget Bill, individual 
legislators have little incentive to engage with this stage of the process. It is not surprising, 
then, that the legislature dissolved the Financial Account Committee, which was tasked with 
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analysing the reports of the Supreme Audit Body, and moved its function to the Sectoral 
Commissions under the MD3 Law. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the way the changing political environment in Indonesia has 
affected the dynamics of the budget process. During the New Order period, political power 
was centralised under an authoritarian regime, undermining the country’s fiscal institutions 
and allowing Suharto to use state resources to maintain his power. Although formal 
institutions governing the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature 
existed in the Constitution, in practice, the legislature did not perform its oversight role but 
rather rubber-stamped the government’s budget proposals. Political reforms adopted by 
governments in the post-Suharto period, including a number of constitutional reforms, have 
resulted in substantial changes to the political system which in turn have shifted the balance 
of power between the executive and the legislature. These changes have resulted in more 
proportional power relations between the executive and legislature, including in the budget 
process.  
As a consequence of these shifts, Indonesia’s budget-making practices have become 
more open. Budget formulation is no longer considered a technocratic process, but instead as 
a political one. However, close to two decades on from the fall of Suharto, we still have little 
understanding of the way in which formal and informal institutions interact to shape budget 
decision-making. It is very common, for example, for consensus (mufakat) among fraction 
leaders to be reached in informal meetings and through backroom deals rather than through 
formal processes of deliberation (musyawarah), reflecting a New Order legacy that still 
dominates the culture of the House of Representatives (Sherlock, 2003, pp. 31-32). As 
Schneier (2008, p. 206) argues, this process ‘makes it extraordinarily difficult to trace the 
locus of decision making’. As a consequence, it is almost impossible to track the history of a 
particular budget item or to understand why its allocation has decreased or increased. It is 
unsurprising, then, that many legislators have been involved in political corruption cases 
related to their roles in the budgeting process since 2004. The stronger role of the political 
process, however, influences the political dynamics of the budgetary process within the 
executive. This situation, in turn, generates potential within the budgetary process for the 
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development of a patronage dynamics by which the executive engages into budget 
transactions with the legislature.14 
The following chapters investigate the interplay between formal and informal 
institutions in order to demonstrate the ways in which the post-2014 political environment 
has affected the budget process and the various incentives presented to the executive and 
legislature in that process. Case studies of capital injections into state-owned enterprises, the 
optimisation fund and the aspiration fund reveal that both formal institutions (for example, 
the constitutional boundaries of budgetary power and electoral rules) and informal practices 
(for example, rent seeking and cartel behaviour) shape the stability of the interactions 
between the executive and the legislature in the budget process. Before turning to the case 
studies, however, it is first necessary to examine the working of the budget process from 
2014.
                                                
14 Further discussion on how the executive engage into the budget transaction with the legislature 
discus in chapter 6 Optimisation Fund 
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Chapter 4: Politics and Budgeting after the 2014 Elections 
 
A national budget is not simply a technical document. It exists within a political arena, and it 
is the product of negotiations among multiple actors with different interests in allocating 
limited public resources. This means that the Indonesian budgetary process cannot be 
separated from the political context that shapes the interaction among parliamentary actors. 
The question of power and how it is distributed is thus fundamental to an analysis of budget-
making (Norton & Elson, 2002, p. 22).  
This chapter argues that the political dynamics that informed the 2014–15 budgetary 
process did not reflect broader political constellations within the political system at that time. 
Jokowi’s minority government was able to pass its budget in a legislature dominated by an 
opposition coalition. In other words, the government’s minority status did not affect 
parliamentary support for the Budget Bill. The chapter begins with a discussion of Indonesian 
politics after the 2014 elections, explaining how the relationship between the executive and 
the legislature was influenced by political competition between the ruling and opposition 
coalitions and how this competition affected the budget process. The purpose of this 
discussion is to assess the way in which the election results shaped the political configuration 
in the first year of Jokowi’s government.  
The second section analyses the impact of the election outcome on political dynamics 
within the three rounds of the budgetary process in the course of the revision of 2015 budget, 
the formulation of the first Jokowi budget, and the subsequent 2016 budget. First, I discuss 
the 2015 budget, tracing the ways in which the 2014 election influenced power relations 
between the parliamentary actors involved in the budgetary process. Second, I explain the 
structure of the revised 2015 budget, which was the first Jokowi budget. Here, I explore the 
differences between Jokowi’s budget policy and that of his predecessors. Finally, I discuss 
the extent to which Jokowi’s growing political power was deployed to shape the 2016 budget. 
The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the political dynamics during these three 
budget cycles. 
Indonesian Politics in the Post-Election Period 
The year 2014 was characterised by two significant electoral milestones, the legislative 
elections of 9 April and the presidential election held in July. A tight race between two very 
different candidates, the presidential election represented a particular challenge for 
Indonesian democracy. One candidate, Prabowo Subianto, planned to re-centralise power and 
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roll back democratic institutions. The other, Joko Widodo, was known for the series of 
democratic governance reforms he had delivered as mayor of Solo and, later, as governor of 
Jakarta. The campaigns of the two candidates were very different. While Prabowo’s 
campaign strategy was supported by ‘oligarchic-machine politics’ and massive funding, 
Jokowi’s campaign was poorly organised and lacked funding support (Aspinall & Mietzner, 
2014). As Aspinall and Mietzner (2014) have noted, the two candidates also had different 
approaches to coalition-building. Prabowo offered power-sharing agreements with a cabinet 
seat distribution, while Jokowi rejected power-sharing deals. Despite these disadvantages, 
Jokowi defeated Prabowo by a margin of 6.3 per cent. However, Prabowo’s supporters 
controlled the majority of seats in the House, making Jokowi’s government vulnerable to 
executive and legislative deadlock and threatening the new President’s ability to implement 
his agenda.  
In this section, I will illustrate the ways in which political competition during the 2014 
elections affected party composition in the legislature and the presidential coalition in 
cabinet. I will begin with a discussion of the legislative and presidential elections, before 
moving to a discussion of the impact of outcomes of these elections on the formation of the 
new government.  
The 2014 Elections 
The 2014 legislative elections resulted in the election of 136 members of the DPD, 560 
members of the DPR and thousands more members of DPRDs from 34 provinces and 498 
districts across Indonesia. The DPR and the DPRD are elected through an open-list 
proportional system first adopted in the lead-up to the 2009 election, which allows citizens to 
vote for an individual candidate or a party. Candidates with the highest number of personal 
votes are eligible to claim the parliamentary seats won by their party. This system has led to 
competition between individual candidates within a party, as well as between the parties 
themselves. The outcome has been a massive increase in the influence of money politics 
(Aspinall, 2014) at the expense of policy debate, since candidates are mainly concerned with 
building their own personal reputations in the competition for votes (Kramer, 2015). 
The results of the legislative election, announced in May 2014, demonstrated a clear 
desire for change on the part of voters. While most parties increased their representation, 
former President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat) suffered a massive loss, 
with its proportion of seats declining from 20.9 per cent in the 2009 election to 10.2 per cent 
in 2014 (Table 4.1). After ten years in power, this defeat had been widely predicted. Not only 
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was Yudhoyono in his final months as President, but the party had suffered from a series of 
corruption scandals, involving former Chairman Anas Urbaningrum and former Ministry of 
Sports Affairs Andi Mallarangeng (Aspinall, 2014). However, another party that had been 
rocked by corruption scandals involving its Chair, PKS, lost only about 1 per cent of its 2009 
vote. According to Kramer (2014), this relatively robust performance reflected PKS’s solid 
base and the ability of its elites to minimise the impact of these attacks on its image.  
 
Table 4.1. Results of the 2009 and 2014 Legislative Elections 
Party 2009 2014 
 % Seats % Seats 
PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) 14.00 94 18.96 109 
Golkar (Functional Group Party) 14.50 106 14.75 91 
Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement Party) 4.50 26 11.81 73 
PD (Democrat Party) 20.90 149 10.19 61 
PKB (National Awakening Party) 4.90 28 9.04 47 
PAN (National Mandate Party) 6.00 46 7.57 49 
PKS (Prosperous Justice Party)  7.90 57 6.77 40 
PPP (United Development Party) 5.30 38 6.53 39 
NasDem (National Democrat Party) N/A N/A 6.74 35 
Hanura (People’s Conscience Party) 3.80 17 5.27 16 
Other 2.70 0 2.40 0 
Total 100.00 560 100.00 560 
 
Source: Indonesian Election Commission. 
 
The PDIP headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the fourth President, performed best, receiving 
18.95 per cent of the total vote. However, the size of the PDIP victory was below the 
expectation of many observers. As Mietzner (2015) explains, the announcement of Jokowi’s 
nomination less than a month before the legislative election failed to provide the boost PDIP 
needed to meet its electoral target.15 The other two parties that benefited from the Democrat 
                                                
15 For a detailed analysis and discussion of internal political dynamics within the PDIP in relation to 
Jokowi’s candidacy, see Mietzner (2015) and Aspinall and Mietzner (2014). 
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Party’s poor performance were Surya Paloh’s NasDem and Prabowo’s Gerindra. NasDem 
and Gerindra received 6.7 per cent and 11.8 per cent of the vote respectively. 
The election result not only determined which parties controlled the legislature but 
also set the stage for the presidential election. As stipulated in Law No.42/2008 regarding the 
General Election of the President and Vice President, a party must win at least 20 per cent 
of seats in the legislature or 25 per cent of the popular vote to be eligible to nominate a 
presidential candidate. Since no party reached this threshold, the parties had to form 
coalitions to be able to nominate a presidential candidate. As shown in Figure 4.1, two 
coalitions were formed. The first was the Great Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat, 
KIH) with 37 per cent or 224 seats. Led by PDIP, this coalition also brought together 
NasDem, Hanura, and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). 
KIH nominated Jokowi and former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who was also former 
Chairperson of the Golkar Party.16 The second coalition was known as the Red and White 
Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih, KMP), a reference to the colours of the Indonesian flag. It 
consisted of Gerindra and four other parties, Golkar, PKS, PPP and the National Mandate 
Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). This was the majority coalition, controlling 292 seats 
in the legislature. KMP nominated Gerindra Chairperson Prabowo Subianto for President and 
PAN Chairperson Hatta Rajasa as his running mate.17 
 
                                                
16 Jokowi’s nomination was not fully supported by his party. As Aspinall and Mietzner (2014) 
explain, Megawati’s daughter Puan Maharani, who controlled campaign funding, also had presidential 
ambitions and so transferred only a small amount of funding to Jokowi. Jokowi was also an outsider 
in many other ways. He did not have a military background, had no links to leading political or 
bureaucratic families, and was a newcomer to the national stage. Most of his life had been spent in 
Solo in Central Java, where he was elected mayor in 2005. In 2012 he moved to Jakarta as Governor 
of the Special Capital City District (DKI Jakarta). He became a media darling with his so-called 
blusukan approach, visiting communities directly to discuss ways in which he could serve them better, 
or making unannounced visits to spot-check development projects. For more details, see Aspinall and 
Mietzner (2014). 
17 Prabowo is the son-in-law of former President Suharto, a wealthy businessman and a former general 
with a poor human rights record, who was dismissed from the army for his involvement in the 
kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists in late 1997 and early 1998. Aspinall (2015) describes Prabowo 
as an oligarchic populist who used an ultra-nationalist message to challenge Indonesian democratic 
institutions. For further analysis of Prabowo’s background and his plan to roll back democratic 
institutions, see Aspinall (2015); Aspinall and Mietzner (2014).  
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Figure 4.1. Coalitions in the 2014 Presidential Election 
 
The presidential contest between Jokowi and Prabowo was very tight. The polling company 
Polltracking reported an increase in support for Prabowo as preferred President from 27.1 per 
cent in March to 41.1 per cent in June 2014. Over the same period, support for Jokowi 
declined from 54.9 per cent to 48.5 per cent (Detiknews, 2014). Nevertheless, although 
Prabowo was supported by oligarchic machine politics and a well-organised campaign, he 
secured only 46.85 per cent of the ballot (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014; Mietzner, 2015).18 By 
contrast, despite a chaotic campaign, Jokowi secured 53.5 per cent of the vote. 
Prabowo’s anti-democratic agenda became apparent in the aftermath of the election. 
After the result was declared by the General Election Commission on 22 July, it was 
unsuccessfully challenged by Prabowo in the Constitutional Court (Aspinall & Mietzner, 
2014). A week before the new legislature was inaugurated, the outgoing legislature, 
controlled by Prabowo’s allies, passed a new law abolishing the direct election of regional 
                                                
18 Mietzner (2014) offers three explanations for Jokowi’s victory. First, Prabowo’s extreme rhetoric 
was inappropriate in a relatively stable political and economic situation. Second, Jokowi did not have 
a traditional elite background and delivered a moderate campaign message, both of which were 
popular with voters. Third, a strong citizen support network ensured that the election outcome was not 
manipulated. 
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heads. This move would have returned power to local legislatures, which Prabowo’s camp 
expected to control. Following widespread criticism, however, outgoing President 
Yudhoyono issued a Government Regulation in Lieu of a Law (Peraturan Pemerintah 
Pengganti Undang-Undang, PERPPU) that reinstated direct elections. Nevertheless, this 
incident demonstrated that a majority opposition could block a minority government in 
Indonesia’s legislature (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014).  
Jokowi’s refusal to compromise on his ‘no favours’ position in forming his cabinet led 
to the consolidation of the opposition camp (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014; Muhtadi, 2015). 
Parties denied cabinet seats in the new legislature joined Prabowo’s coalition, which also 
secured the speaker positions in the DPR and the MPR before the new government was 
installed. In response, Jokowi’s coalition refused to take part in House sessions dominated by 
the opposition coalition. Although a compromise was eventually reached, the split in the 
legislature led to gridlock lasting more than a month.19  
Jokowi’s New Government 
Jokowi was inaugurated on 20 October 2014 with high expectations of his capacity to 
promote reform. Both inside and outside Indonesia, supporters and observers welcomed the 
new government and its promise of democratic renewal. However, Jokowi was weak in many 
respects. As a newcomer to national politics with little experience in the process of dealing 
with national elites and little power within his own party, it was difficult for the new 
President to maintain his political support. And although he tried to uphold his reputation for 
integrity, he proved vulnerable to the patrimonial politics that underpins Indonesia’s political 
structure (Muhtadi, 2015). 
Jokowi’s first year was very challenging on a number of fronts. He was not only 
threatened by the majority opposition coalition in the legislature, but also by members of his 
own party. He had to reward party supporters, although he initially refused to allow this to 
influence the formation of his new cabinet. Ultimately, though, he was forced to compromise, 
thereby breaking his promise to avoid a ‘transactional’ cabinet (Muhtadi, 2015). He was 
forced to grant PKB four ministerial posts, NasDem three, and Hanura two. His own party, 
                                                
19 As Liddle and Mujani (2006) noted, the deadlock situation in the split parliament had occurred in 
the first term of Yudhoyono Presidency. The opposition coalition with majority seats in the parliament 
that consist of PDIP, Golkar and some small parties controlled all leadership in parliamentary 
commissions and intended to block the government agenda. However, the domination of opposition 
coalitions was destroyed by Vice’s President Kalla’s election as Chair of Golkar. 
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PDIP, was disappointed to end up with no more than four ministerial posts (Stefanie, 2014). 
Initially, Jokowi had proposed nine candidates from PDIP, but only four of these were 
approved by Megawati (Interview with PDIP Board of Trustees Member, 29 July 2015).  
The pressure from PDIP continued throughout Jokowi’s first year of office. The 
extent to which Jokowi was held hostage by the party was on clear display when he 
nominated former Megawati adjutant, Budi Gunawan, as Chief of Police in January 2015. 
Budi’s nomination was controversial because he had been named as a suspect by the 
Corruption Eradication Commission just one day before the announcement of his 
appointment as Chief of Police. Under pressure, Jokowi cancelled Budi’s inauguration, much 
to Megawati’s disappointment. This political drama took place at the same time as the debate 
on the revision to the 2015 budget, forcing Jokowi to postpone dealing with the issue of 
Budi’s nomination until the Budget Bill was passed (Rastika, 2015). Although a compromise 
was reached and Budi was appointed Deputy Chief of Police, PDIP heavyweights were very 
unhappy with the situation (Interview with PDIP Board of Trustees Member, 29 July 2015). 
Jokowi subsequently reshuffled his cabinet a week before the 2016 budget proposal was 
submitted to the House, awarding the position of Cabinet Secretary to PDIP. A PDIP senior 
board member, Pramono Anung, was chosen to fill that position, a move that strengthened 
support from the party. Meanwhile, the opposition coalition was weakened by internal 
conflict in PPP and the Golkar Party, and by PAN’s defection to the governing coalition. This 
gave Jokowi control of 256 seats in the House, a thirteen-seat majority over the 243 seats 
held by the Prabowo camp. Jokowi used this opportunity to consolidate his power, through a 
second reshuffle of the cabinet in which one ministerial position was allocated to the Golkar 
Party and a second to PPP. This gave the President the support of seven of the ten parties, 
which meant control over 69 per cent of seats in the legislature in July 2016. 
Jokowi’s formation of a minority cabinet can be read as a challenge to cartel party 
theory in the interpretation of Indonesian politics. Political cartel theory argues that 
competition between political parties occurs only during elections; afterwards, all political 
parties ignore their political ideology to form a government coalition and draw in potentially 
oppositional forces. (Ambardi, 2008; Slater, 2004; Slater & Simmons, 2010). By contrast, 
Jokowi discontinued the tradition of ‘rainbow’ coalitions that had operated under Presidents 
Megawati and Yudhoyono, refusing to expand the government coalition to include the 
opposition in the first year of his new cabinet. Second, the sharp line between the government 
and the opposition meant political competition continued in the legislature after the election. 
The formation of the minority Jokowi cabinet also challenges coalitional presidentialism 
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theory. The literature on coalitional presidentialism argues that presidents offer ministerial 
positions to all significant parties in order to build stable government through a majority 
coalition (Chaisty et al., 2014; Raile et al., 2011). In October 2014, Jokowi formed his new 
cabinet with just 37 per cent of the seats in the legislature under his control. This rose to 45 
per cent in August 2015 and became a 69 per cent majority by mid-2016. Importantly, the 
process that turned Jokowi’s government into a supermajority coalition in the legislature did 
not involve offering cabinet seats to extend the presidential coalition, as under the previous 
presidents. Rather, as Mietzner (2016) argues Jokowi adopted a coercive approach, 
intervening in internal conflicts within two opposition parties, Golkar and PPP, and using the 
government’s authority to recognise the party’s board to force them to support the 
government.20 The following section discusses the extent to which these different forms of 
political power affected the budgetary process during Jokowi’s first year in power. 
The Politics of Budgeting in the 2014 Post-Election Period 
Jokowi’s first and second year in office provide an intriguing opportunity to evaluate the way 
in which the budget process has played out in the context of different political configurations 
in Indonesia’s multiparty presidential system. The budget process is itself a part of the 
broader policymaking process, through which political actors negotiate the distribution of 
public resources. However, as will be demonstrated in this section, the political competition 
between the majority opposition coalition and the minority ruling coalition in the 2014 post- 
election period was not reflected in the budgetary process at this time. Rather, the minority 
government coalition was able to win the support of the legislature for the revision of the 
2015 budget. By contrast, the 2016 budget was rejected, even though the government 
coalition had become stronger and the opposition coalition had weakened in the meantime. 
  
                                                
20 The government recognises a party board by providing a decision letter from the Ministry of Law 
and Human Rights.	The leadership ballots of Golkar and PPP that held after 2014 elections resulted in 
two governing boards within party, pro-government and pro-opposition. In case of the Golkar Party, 
the government issues the legal status letter for Agung Laksono faction who supported Jokowi’s 
government and put pressure on Aburizal Bakrie bussines who supported opposition coalition. A 
similar intervening also occurred in PPP. Mietzner (2016) also explained, the government interference 
has caused fearing in other three parties the Democratic Party, PAN and PKS.  
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Table 4.2. Background of Budget Committee Members, 2014–19 
Party 
Number of 
Budget 
Committee 
Members 
Incumbents Position in Party 
Central Board (DPP) 
Number % Number % 
PDIP 19 17 89 12 63 
PKB 8 6 75 7 88 
Nasdem 6 N/A N/A 3 50 
Hanura 3 2 33 3 100 
Ruling Coalition 36 25 69 25 69 
Golkar 17 9 53 10 59 
Gerindra 13 1 8 9 69 
PKS 8 4 50 4 50 
PAN 7 6 86 3 43 
PPP 7 5 71 4 57 
Opposition Coalition 52 25 48 30 57 
Democrat 11 4 36 10 91 
Total 99 54 56 65 66 
 
Source: Author compilation from www.dpr.go.id, www.wikidpr.org, www.dct.kpu.go.id.  
 
It has been widely acknowledged that the prevailing electoral system is an important factor in 
determining the way in which legislators behave in office (Ames, 2001). A feature of the 
Indonesian electoral system that may be relevant to the budget process is its open-list 
proportional system which, as noted earlier, was introduced in the lead-up to the 2009 
legislative elections. As a consequence of this system, incumbents’ chances of re-election 
became far less certain, prompting them to seek extra resources to finance their campaigns 
(Chang, 2005). As a result, the legislators have become more interested in the budgetary 
process, which can contribute to their chances of re-election by providing tangible benefits 
for their constituents. 
As shown in Table 4.2, more than half the Budget Committee members were 
incumbents, compare to incumbents in the House that only occupied 40 per cent of seats. 
(Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014). As Table 4.2 also shows, most Budget Committee 
members occupied high-level positions within their parties, with 33 members from the 
opposition coalition and 25 members from the ruling coalition holding a position on their 
party’s central board. 
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Figure 4.2. The Budget Cycle and Political Events, 2014–16 
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The budget discussions in Jokowi’s first and second years occurred amidst political tension 
between the two coalitions. As shown in Figure 4.2, the 2015 budget discussions occurred at 
the same time as Prabowo was disputing the election result and the legislature was voting on 
the bill to prevent direct local elections. Deliberations on the 2015 budget revisions took 
place alongside the controversial nomination of Budi Gunawan as Chief of Police.The 2016 
budget discussion, meanwhile, occurred at a time when Jokowi was beginning to consolidate 
his power by accepting PAN’s entry to the ruling coalition and carrying out his first cabinet 
reshuffle. 
The 2015 Budget 
In order to understand the first round of budget negotiations after Jokowi took power, we first 
need to examine the 2015 budget, which was formulated in the transition period. The 2015 
budget was the Yudhoyono administration’s last budget and was implemented by the new 
government. Its importance was two-fold. First, as noted above, it was discussed amidst the 
political tension between coalitions after the 2014 election and with the legislature dominated 
by the opposition. Second, it was overshadowed by public concern about energy subsidies, 
the biggest and also the most long-standing fiscal policy challenge in Indonesia 
(Aswicahyono & Hill, 2014; Howes & Davies, 2014).  
The 2015 budget provided an opportunity for the opposition coalition to block the 
new government’s agenda. However, the budget discussions were far removed from the 
political struggle taking place between the two coalitions, which was focused on the new law 
to eliminate direct local elections. Even the fuel subsidy, which had been an ongoing political 
issue during the previous decade, did not escalate the tension between the two coalition 
camps in the budget discussion. During the period of Yudhoyono’s administration, the state 
budget came under significant pressure due to the fuel subsidies, leaving it vulnerable to 
external shocks, including volatility in the international oil price and the exchange rate.  
From 2009, the annual budget allocation for fuel subsidies increased by an average of 
47 per cent. Before the 2009 election, when he was campaigning for a second term as 
President, Yudhoyono announced that he would reduce the retail price of a litre of fuel from 
Rp 6,000 to Rp 4,500. This price remained unchanged until 2012, forcing the government to 
increase the allocation for fuel subsidies by 21 per cent in 2012, after four of the nine 
fractions in the legislature rejected the government’s proposed increase in the retail price of 
fuel (see Figure 4.3). In 2013, the government did succeed in increasing the retail fuel price 
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to Rp 6, 500. However, this did not significantly reduce fiscal pressure, as the share of fuel 
subsidies in central government expenditure only decreased to 18 per cent. By 2014, fuel 
subsidies accounted for 20 per cent of government expenditure, severely limiting options for 
new expenditure. In the budget proposal for the 2015 fiscal year, the burden of fuel subsidies 
still consumed 17 per cent of the central government’s spending.  
 
 
Source: Author compilation from the State Budget and the Report on Budget 
Realisation. 
 
Figure 4.3. Fuel Subsidies as a Share of Government Expenditure, 2005–15 
 
Yet even though the fuel subsidy had been a major political issue for more than a 
decade, it did not surface in the budget discussions. Indeed, Yudhoyono’s last budget speech, 
on 15 August 2014, failed to tackle the need for further reform of the subsidy (Budget Speech 
of the 2015 State Budget, Jakarta,15 August 2014). In their responses to the President’s 
budget speech, the parliamentary fractions were largely of one mind. All agreed that reform 
of the fuel subsidy was essential, if Indonesia’s fiscal problems were to be solved (Plenary 
Session Meeting Minutes, Jakarta, 19 August 2014). However, no parliamentary fraction had 
a clear position on how the problem of the fuel subsidy might be addressed in the 2015 
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budget. As a consequence, neither the government coalition nor the opposition took a strong 
stance on fuel subsidy policy in the 2015 budget.  
 
Table 4.3. Draft Bills Decided by the Outgoing Legislature in 2014  
Bill Plenary Session Date 
The 2014 Revised Budget 18 June  
New autonomous region 24 June  
Extradition agreement between Indonesian and India 24 June  
Mental health 08 July  
Legislative institutions (MD3 Law) 08 July  
Standardisation and conformity assessment 26 August  
Geothermal energy 26 August  
2013 budget realisation report 04 September  
ASEAN agreement on trans-boundary haze pollution 16 September  
Copyright 16 September  
Search and rescue 16 September  
Insurance 23 September  
Military discipline  24 September  
Witness and victim protection 24 September  
Animal husbandry and health 24 September  
Nursing 25–26 September  
Health workers 25–26 September 
Halal product assurance 25–26 September 
Child protection 25–26 September 
Regional head elections 25–26 September 
Local government 25–26 September 
Government administration 25–26 September 
The 2015 budget 29 September  
New autonomous region 29 September 
Land acquisition  29 September 
Public housing savings 29 September 
Financial management of the hajj 29 September 
Plantations 29 September 
Maritime 29 September 
Soil and water conservation 29 September 
 
Source: Author compilation from Plenary Session minutes, June–September 2014.  
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A week after the Constitutional Court rejected Prabowo’s challenge to the election results, 
Jokowi moved to lobby President Yudhoyono for a cut to the fuel subsidy in the 2015 budget. 
However, a meeting between the outgoing and incoming presidents in Bali on 26 August 
failed to produce a conclusive decision on the issue, and Yudhoyono refused to increase the 
fuel price (Samutra, 2014). For its part, the Budget Committee agreed to retain the fuel 
subsidy in the 2015 budget, and debate focused on the level at which the fuel subsidy should 
be set (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 September and 22 September 2015). This 
discussion took place in a working committee meeting involving the Budget Committee and 
the Ministry of Finance. Satya Yudha from the Golkar Party and Ecky Muharam from PKS 
imposed additional articles on the 2015 Budget Bill, which required parliamentary approval 
for adjustments in the size of the fuel subsidy (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 28 
September 2014). For his part, the Finance Minister asserted that the new government should 
have the discretion to adjust the fuel price. Instead of supporting the government’s argument, 
one Budget Committee member from Jokowi’s own party, Dolfie, sided with the opposition 
coalition, stating that ‘the adjustment of the fuel subsidy volume must be discussed further 
with the related commission; this probably needs to stipulate on elucidation of the Budget 
Law’ (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 28 September 2014). In short, the ruling 
coalition did not attempt to oppose the move by the opposition coalition to restrict the 
government’s capacity to increase fuel prices.  
The 2015 budget did not become a political battlefield because at the time, the 
opposition coalition was focussed on increasing its control over the regions. Among the 28 
bills to be discussed by the outgoing legislature before the inauguration of the new legislature 
was a draft bill for direct local elections (see Table 4.3). As discussed earlier, it was this, 
rather than the budget, which preoccupied the opposition in the lead-up to the inauguration of 
the new legislature. 
Within weeks of taking power, Jokowi had nevertheless announced the removal of the 
fuel subsidy. He was able to do so because the 2014 Budget Bill gave the President the 
discretion to change the fuel subsidy without parliamentary approval. The removal of the fuel 
subsidy saved the budget around Rp 211 trillion. In order to reallocate these savings, Jokowi 
was required to propose a revision of the 2015 budget. This revision is the subject of the 
following section. 
The 2015 Revised Budget 
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The 2015 revised budget provided the first opportunity for Jokowi to implement his 
campaign promises. As noted earlier, the budget debate took place against a backdrop of 
tension over the inauguration of the controversial Chief of Police Budi Gunawan, and in a 
context where KIH was still a minority coalition. With regard to fiscal challenges, Jokowi’s 
budget proposal was very different from the budgets of his predecessors, and was thus 
inherently controversial. Yet the majority opposition did not block the Budget Bill, and it 
passed despite the fact that Jokowi did not have the full support of his own alliance. Thus, 
although Jokowi’s fiscal policy was by no means business-as-usual, the Budget Bill came 
into law with only minor changes.  
 
 
Source: Author compilation from the State Budgets, 2005–15. 
Figure 4.4. Expenditure under Yudhoyono (2005–14) and Jokowi (2015) 
 
There were many issues with the 2015 budget revised by the outgoing government.	Besides 
the fiscal pressure resulting from the fuel subsidy, the government	was	hamstrung	by	a	great	number	of	mandatory spending requirements, including the requirement to transfer at 
least 29 per cent of its revenue to the regions, at least 10 per cent of which was to be allocated 
to village governments. It was also required to allocate 20 per cent of public expenditure to 
education and to spend 5 per cent on health services. These mandatory spending requirements 
accounted for around 45 per cent of total revenue. Once the fuel subsidy and interest 
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payments were taken into account, only approximately 30 per cent of revenue was available 
for discretionary spending (Howes & Davies, 2014).  
The removal of the fuel subsidy at the end of 2014 gave the government the flexibility 
to introduce new initiatives in the revised budget. Jokowi cut almost half of the subsidy 
spending in his first budget proposal and used the	savings	for	capital	expenditure	(Figure 
4.4).	The way Jokowi’s government managed the additional funds freed up by cuts to the fuel 
subsidy also departed from unusual practice. Rather than distributed proportionally across 
ministries as was occurred previously, only the ministries that directly supported Jokowi’s 
programs received significant additional allocations. As shown in Table 4.4, among the ten 
ministries with the highest expenditures, the biggest increase in budget allocation went to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, followed by the Ministries of Public Works and Transport. Two 
ministries outside the top ten also did well, with the Ministry for Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries and the Ministry of Social Welfare also gaining an increase of 58 per cent and 261 
per cent respectively (Financial Notes of the 2015 Revised Budget Proposal, 2015). In 
addition, the deficit target was set to decline from 2.21 per cent of GDP in the 2015 budget to 
1.9 per cent in the 2015 revised budget. Another surprising feature was the escalation in state 
capital investment. In the largest allocation in ten years, capital investment in state-owned 
enterprises climbed fourteen-fold, from Rp 5.1 trillion to Rp 70 trillion. In brief, Jokowi’s 
budget policy was totally different from that his predecessors.  
The government delivered the proposed 2015 revised budget in January 2015, six 
months earlier than would normally have been the case. The Ministry of Finance argued that 
this was necessary to accommodate new government programs. It also wanted to give effect 
to the decision to remove fuel subsidies, made in the previous November (Budget Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 19 January 2015). In addition, the legislature had only a relatively short 
time to scrutinise the proposal, since discussions on revised budgets are shorter than for main 
budgets. According to Law No. 17/2014 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, the House 
of Representatives, the Regional Legislative Council, and the Regional House of 
Representatives, a revised Budget Bill must be discussed and approved by the legislature no 
later than one month after it is delivered. During this period, the Budget Committee invited 
the eleven ministries that had received the largest increases in spending to meet with them in 
three working sessions (rapat kerja) (Budget Committee Report, 13 February 2015). Given 
the time constraints and the fact that the budget was not business-as-usual, the Chairperson of 
the Budget Committee, Ahmadi Noor Supit, required the relevant Ministers to be present to 
identify the programs to which the additional funding had been allocated (Budget Committee 
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Meeting Minutes, 20 January 2015). In the end, the committee confirmed the budget 
allocation as proposed. 
 
Table 4.4. State Ministries with the Largest Budget Allocation 
Ministry/Agency 2015 Budget 
(trillion 
rupiah) 
Proposed 2015 Revised 
Budget 
(trillion rupiah) 
Percentage 
Change 
Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing 
84.9 119.4 41 
Ministry of Defence 96.9 97.5 1 
Ministry of Transportation 44.9 64.9 45 
Ministry of Religion 56.4 57.4 2 
National Police 51.6 53.2 3 
Ministry of National Education and 
Culture 
46.8 53.3 14 
Ministry of Health 47.7 51.3 8 
Ministry Research and Higher 
Education 
42.3 42.4 0 
Ministry of Agriculture 15.9 32.8 106 
Ministry of Finance 18.7 25.7 37 
 
Source: Financial Notes to the 2015 Revised Budget. 
 
The Budget Committee was less comfortable with adjustments to the macroeconomic 
assumptions contained in the proposal. The assumption of economic growth had been 
lowered by 0.1 per cent, and the rupiah exchange rate had been set at Rp 12,500, leading to a 
decline in expected domestic revenue and international trade taxes (see Table 4.5). The 
international crude price was also lowered to US$10, and estimates of oil production dropped 
to 825,000 barrels per day. These corrections drew questions from representatives of both 
coalitions on the Budget Committee. Ahmadi Supit from KMP said that the government’s 
macroeconomic assumptions did not support the President’s programs. The Deputy 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee, Said Abdullah from PDIP, also expressed his concern, 
noting that ‘this was the first time … the Budget Committee has talked about government 
pessimism’ (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 29 January 2015).  
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Table 4.5. Macroeconomic Assumptions in the 2015 Revised Budget 
Indicator/Item Budget 
Proposal 
Enacted 
Budget Margin 
Economic growth (%yoy) 5.8 5.7 (0.1) 
Inflation (%yoy) 5.0 5.0 0 
Rupiah exchange rate (Rp/USD) 12,200 12,500 300 
Average 3-month interest rate (%) 6.20 6.20 0 
International crude price (USD/barrel) 70.0 60.0 (10) 
Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 849 825 (24) 
Gas production (thousand barrels per day) 1,177 1,221 44 
Revenue (trillion rupiah) 1,768 1,761 (7) 
Expenditure (trillion rupiah) 1,995 1,984 (11) 
Surplus/deficit (trillion rupiah) (226) (223) 3 
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Notes to the 2015 Revised Budget. 
 
Even though the opposition coalition that controlled the majority of seats in the legislature 
had the opportunity to block the new government’s agenda, neither coalition saw the revision 
of 2015 budget as a political issue. The role of the opposition also did not reflect in the 
budget balance. As Falcó-Gimeno and Jurado (2011) argued, the opposition have a vested 
interest in maintaining budget deficits to signal that the minority government was weak. In 
fact the budget deficit decreased by Rp 3 trillion. More specifically, although the debate on 
state capital investment in state-owned enterprises was hard-fought, the Budget Committee 
eventually approved the investment with only minor changes.  
In the final meeting, instead of emphasising their own parties’ standpoints, both ruling 
and opposition parties agreed that the revision of the 2015 budget could be enacted in a 
Plenary Session of the legislature. None of the party representatives who took part in the last 
meeting of the Budget Committee expressed their own fraction’s view of the revised budget, 
as the Chairperson of the Budget Committee had suggested: ‘I suggest the fractions just 
submit the fraction opinion of the document. We assume this [document] has been read’ 
(Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 13 February 2015). It seemed that fraction views on 
the budget were a mere formality and parties from both coalitions had reached agreement on 
the Budget Bill.  
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Differences between the two coalitions also failed to surface in the Plenary Session 
held to enact the Budget Bill. The Plenary Session had to be postponed for five hours, but this 
was not due to political contentions between the parties but rather procedural objections from 
the members of the Sectoral Commissions representing both coalitions. For example, Saleh 
Daulay, a Commission VII member from PAN, which was then part of KMP, complained 
that the committee had cut the budget of the Ministry for Social Welfare without Sectoral 
Commission approval.21 Aria Bima, a PDIP member of Commission VI, also protested that 
decisions made by the Budget Committee on capital investment in state-owned enterprises 
differed from those made by his commission. The Vice Chairperson of the House, Taufik 
Kurniawan, who was chairing the Plenary Session, ruled that a lobby forum was needed to 
synchronise the results of the budget deliberations of the Sectoral Commissions and the 
Budget Committee (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 13 February 2015).	22 
As this discussion suggests, the dynamics of the budget discussion were dominated by 
the conflict between the Sectoral Commissions and the Budget Committee rather than 
between the governing and opposition coalitions. And since the process surrounding the 
revised budget was disconnected from the political constellations that dominated the 
legislature in early 2015, the government’s minority status in the legislature did not obstruct 
the passing of Jokowi’s first budget, which was approved by a legislature dominated by the 
opposition coalition.  
The 2016 Budget 
By the time the legislature embarked on discussions on the 2016 budget, the political context 
had changed significantly. Jokowi had reshuffled his cabinet, giving PDIP an extra ministry. 
The nature of the coalitions had also changed. PAN had joined the governing coalition, 
giving it control of 46 per cent of seats in the legislature. In the meantime, the opposition 
coalition, which now controlled just 43 per cent of seats, was further weakened by internal 
conflict in both the Golkar Party and PPP. However, this consolidation of power did not 
guarantee parliamentary support for Jokowi’s 2016 Budget Bill. The majority of parties, 
                                                
21 As stipulated in Law No. 17/2014 on Legislative Institutions, known as the MD3 Law, sectoral 
commissions are responsible for scrutinising the budget within their counterpart sectoral ministries, 
while the budget committee has the authority to scrutinise the allocations for all ministries.  
22 It is common in Indonesia’s legislative decision-making process to move unresolved issues to 
smaller group discussions (lobby forums) involving key decision makers including fraction 
coordinators, commission and committee leaders and the House speaker in order to reach consensus.  
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including those in his alliance, rejected the bill, forcing the government to freeze its capital 
injections into state-owned enterprises. 
Before the discussions began, it was not evident that the majority of parties were 
planning to reject the budget. The government had submitted a document outlining its fiscal 
policy and budget priorities in May 2015. This document was principally a pre-budget 
statement that included a description of its macroeconomic framework, fiscal policies and 
priorities, revenue and proposed expenditure. It had also submitted an annual Working Plan, 
which included working plans for the individual spending ministries. The intended results of 
the pre-budget discussion were confined to the range of macroeconomic assumptions to be 
used by the government in formulating the state budget proposal. In this phase, legislators 
from both coalitions had the opportunity to insert their political agendas into the budget 
proposal. However, the general exchange of views between the government and the 
legislature revealed no fundamental difference between the two coalition camps (Plenary 
Session Meeting Minutes, 28 May 2015). Indeed, the main point made by various party 
fractions in the House, regardless of coalition affiliation, was criticism of the government’s 
slow disbursement of the budget. As stated by Bambang Soekartono from Gerindra, ‘the DPR 
is united. There is no more KMP, no more KIH. We are committed to supporting the 
government in accelerating budget disbursement’ (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 25 
August 2015).  
The 2016 budget was proposed under the pressure of slow economic growth and 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. The assumption that the exchange rate would drop from Rp 
12,500 per USD in the 2015 revised budget to Rp 13,400 per USD in the 2016 budget 
proposal proved to be too modest. The exchange rate weakened during the budget 
discussions, forcing the government to revise its underlying assumptions to Rp 13,900 per 
USD and reduce expectations of economic growth from 5.5 per cent to 5.3 per cent (Table 
4.6). These adjustments increased the budget deficit from 2.14 per cent to 2.46 per cent, or 
around Rp 39.3 trillion. The Budget Committee asked the government to reduce the budget 
deficit to 2.15 per cent of GDP based on new macroeconomic assumptions approved by the 
committee (Observation of the Budget Committee Meeting, 15 October 2015). The 
government then announced a proposal to cap ministry spending at around Rp 21.3 trillion. 
As a director in the Ministry of Finance later explained, ‘We had to cap the budget to secure 
the budget deficit; we will suspend non-priority spending, and hopefully, if the tax revenue 
increases, we can adjust for the budget suspension in the revised budget’ (Interview, 21 
October 2015). 
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Table 4.6. Macroeconomic Assumptions, 2015–16 
Indicator/Item 2015 Revised 
Budget 
2016 Budget 
Proposal 
2016 
Enacted 
Budget 
Economic growth (%yoy) 5.7 5.5 5.3 
Inflation (%yoy) 5.0 4.70 4.70 
Rupiah exchange rate (Rp/USD) 12,500 13,400 13,900 
Average 3-months interest rate (%) 6.20 5.50 5.50 
International crude price (USD/barrel) 60.0 60.0 50.0 
Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 825 830 830 
Gas production (thousand barrels per day) 1,221 1,155 1,155 
Revenue (trillion rupiah) 1,761 1,848 1,822 
Tax revenue 1,489 1,846 1,820 
Non-tax revenue 269 280 273 
Expenditure (trillion rupiah) 1,984 2,121 2,095 
Central government spending 1,319 1,339 1,032 
Fiscal transfer to the regions 664 782 770 
Surplus/deficit (trillion rupiah) (222) (273) (273) 
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Notes to the 2015 Revised Budget, the 2016 
Budget Proposal and the 2016 Budget. 
 
As a consequence of these changes in the macroeconomic climate, the government had to cut 
allocations to 38 ministries in order to reduce the budget deficit. In contrast to the 2015 
revised budget, in which most of the ministries received additional funds from the 
reallocation of funds earmarked for fuel subsidies, allocations to the ministries dropped from 
Rp 795.5 trillion to Rp 780.3 trillion in the 2016 budget proposal. However, the working 
committee also decided to allocate additional funds of around Rp 23.6 trillion to 21 of the 
ministries. As shown in Table 4.7, this supplementary allocation consisted of priority 
spending of Rp 18.1 trillion and urgent spending of Rp 5.5 trillion. 
The simultaneous cutting and raising of ministerial budgets drew criticism from 
PKS’s Ecky Muharam (Observation of the Budget Committee Meeting, 15 October 2015). 
Commenting on this issue, an informant from the Ministry of Finance explained that the 
supplementary budget would be sourced from increased non-tax revenue according to the 
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Table 4.7. Additional and Suspended Funds in the 2016 Budget 
Ministry/Agency 
Additional Funds 
Suspended 
Funds Priority 
Spending 
Urgent 
Spending 
National Police 6.4 trillion 2 trillion 1 trillion 
Ministry of Defence 3.46 trillion 3 trillion 3.1 trillion 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2.9 trillion  2.6 trillion 
Ministry for Villages and Remote 
Regions 
1.5 trillion  214 billion 
House of Representatives 740 billion   
National Search and Rescue Body 520 billion  75.4 billion 
State Intelligence Body 480 billion   
Ministry of Home Affair 360 billion  203 billion 
Coordinating Ministry for Maritime 
Affairs 
250 billion   
Ministry of Law and Human Rights  200 billion  204 billion 
National Anti-Terrorism Body 200 billion   
National Disaster Management Body 200 billion   
State Cryptography Agency 100 billion   
Ministry of Research and Higher 
Education 
170 billion   
Supreme Court 150 billion  150 billion 
National Standardisation Body 100 billion   
Ministry of Labour and Transmigration 100 billion  103 billion 
Coordinating Ministry of Political 
Affairs, Security and Defence 
100 billion   
Ministry of Trade 75 billion  158.5 billion 
National Archive Body  40 billion   
Ministry of Industry 20 billion  102.3 billion 
Ministry of Youth and Sport  500 billion 49.4 billion 
Other Ministries/Bodies/Agencies   14.2 trillion 
Total 18.1 trillion 5.5 trillion 21.3 trillion 
 
Source: Author compilation from observation of the Budget Committee meeting on 15-16 
October 2015. 
 
decisions of the Budget Committee. The informant noted that the supplementary funds fell 
under the authority of the Budget Committee, and that those funds could not be used to offset 
part of the budget suspension (Interview, 21 October 2015). However, the decision on budget 
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cuts and additional allocations was not taken in this meeting (Observation of the Budget 
Committee Meeting, 15 October 2015). Rather, it was reported to the working committee 
meeting by the Finance Minister, having been made elsewhere.  
This move to allocate additional funding at a time of budget austerity triggered 
questions from Budget Committee members from Hanura, PPP and PKS regarding the 
criteria used to determine which ministries would be provided with additional funds, 
especially when some ministries identified by the Sectoral Commissions as requiring 
additional funding to the value of Rp 274 trillion had so far received nothing (Observation of 
the Budget Committee Meeting, 16 October 2015).23 The Sectoral Commissions also 
questioned the budget suspension, which delayed the plenary budget meeting by one week. 
The rejection of the budget suspension in fact proved to be a political blunder. Four parties—
PKB, PPP, PAN and Hanura—agreed to pass the 2016 Budget Bill. However, Gerindra 
refused to support the bill, while PDIP, PKS, PAN, the Democrat Party and the Golkar Party 
said that they would only accept the Budget Bill if the government accommodated their 
objections, which focused primarily on the proposed capital investment in state-owned 
enterprises (Budget Committee Report, 30 October 2016).24 Eventually, the DPR including 
Gerindra passed the Budget Bill after the government agreed to freeze capital investment and 
to attach all fraction notes to the Budget Bill (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 30 October 
2015). As this suggests, Jokowi’s consolidation of power was not enough to secure 
acceptance of his budget policy.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the relationship between the political configuration 
following the 2014 election and the political dynamics that informed the 2014–15 
parliamentary budget discussions. It has shown that the relative size of the two parliamentary 
coalitions was not a determining factor in the budgetary arena, as evidenced by the fact that 
the minority government won parliamentary support for its budgets.  
                                                
23 It is important to note here that typically the budget committee members from the sectoral 
committees fought to increase the budgets of their counterpart ministries then forced their counterpart 
ministries to accommodate their political interests, especially in the form of projects for their 
constituency regions, known as the ‘aspiration fund’. The aspiration fund is the subject of the 
following chapter.  
24 The reasons why most of the fractions rejected the capital investment proposal are discussed in the 
following chapter.  
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 The fact that competition between the two coalitions did not translate into the 
budgetary arena can be explained by two analytical points. First, minority coalitional 
presidentialism does did not always lead to legislative gridlock. Discussions of the 2015 
budget and the 2015 revised budget support this argument. The 2015 budget occurred in a 
context of high political tension. The Constitutional Court had rejected Prabowo’s challenge 
to the election results and the opposition coalition, which dominated the ongoing legislature, 
had passed a law to abolish direct local elections. Yet even though the fuel subsidy had been 
a hot political issue for a decade, the opposition coalition did not use its majority power in the 
legislature to block the budget. A similar situation materialised in discussions of the 2015 
budget revisions. Although the legislature was dominated by the opposition coalition, Jokowi 
won enough parliamentary support to pass his first Budget Bill despite its strong departure 
from standard budgetary practice and the fact that it both removed the fuel subsidy and 
dramatically increased the capital investment allocation to state-owned enterprises. Second, 
the presence of a minimal winning coalition can make the President hostage to his own 
supporters. By the time of the 2016 budget discussion, KIH controlled 46 per cent of seats in 
the legislature, as opposed to the 43 per cent of seats held by KMP. Yet the majority of the 
party fractions, including that of his own party, rejected Jokowi’s 2016 budget proposal, 
which suggests that party loyalty to the coalition was weak. This finding confirms Sherlock’s 
(2012) argument that the coordination between parties, fractions and alliances in the policy 
making process is at best inconsistent and temporary.  
The disconnection between the political configuration within legislature and the 
political dynamics in the budgetary arena raises important questions. Why did coalition size 
not matter? How did the minority government acquire support from a House dominated by 
the opposition? What incentives did it provide? What made the government coalition join 
with the opposition coalition to oppose the President’s agenda? These questions are explored 
through the three case studies presented in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Capital Injections into State-owned Enterprises 
 
In the decade before Jokowi came to power, the issue of capital injections into state-owned 
enterprises was not a government priority. Then, in the revised budget for 2015, a significant 
amount of capital investment (around Rp 70 trillion) was allocated to 39 state-owned 
enterprises for the first time in the history of Indonesian fiscal policy. These capital injections 
were controversial for two reasons. First, at more than seven times the average allocation for 
the preceding ten years, it was not business-as-usual fiscal policy, especially since in the 
initial 2015 budget, the average allocation was just Rp 5.1 trillion. Second, the savings that 
made the capital injections possible were derived from the President’s decision to cut fuel 
subsidies by up to Rp 205 trillion. These savings were being diverted away from the people 
affected by the removal of the subsidies and into state-owned enterprises. 
In Chapter Four, I explained that the political dynamic informing the 2015–16 budget 
deliberations did not reflect the political configuration following the 2014 elections. By using 
state capital injections into state-owned enterprises as a case study in this chapter, I aim to 
show that the parties’ standpoints on this policy were not related to their platforms, but rather 
depended on the extent to which political incentives were provided to legislators and party 
elites from both coalitions. I do so by addressing the following question: Why did a 
legislature dominated by non-government coalition parties approve the capital injections in 
the revised 2015 budget and then reject them in the 2016 budget, after the government had 
captured the balance of power in the House?  
The chapter consists of four sections. The first sets the scene by describing the 
political economy of state-owned enterprises, explaining their development and problems, 
their political connections, and their economic contribution to GDP. The second and third 
sections focus on the political dynamics of the budget discussions on capital injections in the 
revised 2015 budget and the 2016 budget. These sections discuss the interaction between the 
government and the legislature, and between the Sectoral Commissions, the Budget 
Committee, and individual legislators from both coalitions. In these two sections, I will 
demonstrate that—rather than being determined by party platform and coalition size—the 
standpoint of the parties on capital injections into state-owned enterprises was driven by the 
interests of individual legislators. The final section summarises the main variables that 
prompted the legislature to pass the Budget Bills. 
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The Development of Indonesia’s State-owned Enterprises 
Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises have been the subject of political controversy since the 
New Order period, when they were seen not only as significant contributors to economic 
development, but also as part of the patronage networks that helped Suharto stay in power for 
32 years. During that time, state-owned enterprises provided jobs for Suharto’s supporters 
from the military and senior ranks of the bureaucracy, as well as his friends and relatives 
(McLeod, 2000). The state-owned enterprises—especially the oil companies and state 
banks—were also exploited as cash cows, providing privileges through business transactions 
for Suharto’s inner circle, family companies and the conglomerates (McLeod, 2005, 2008). 
As a result, they were politically sensitive, and policies related to them were potential areas 
of conflict. 
The fallout from the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 added to the political 
sensitivities surrounding state-owned enterprises. According to Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution, ‘Sectors of production that are important and affect the life of the people shall 
be controlled by the state’. This article provides the main basis for the state’s role in national 
economic development through state-owned enterprises. Following the 2003 financial 
reforms described in Chapter Three, the government issued Law No. 19/2003 on State-owned 
Enterprises, which restates the position that these enterprises are not only dedicated to 
pursuing profits and contributing to state revenue as government business entities, but must 
also serve the public interest. At the same time, this law defined the role of the Ministry of 
State-owned Enterprises as including responsibility for restructuring and privatisation. The 
threat of privatisation triggered nationalist sentiment among those concerned that strategic 
sectors of the economy would fall into hands of foreign parties (Wicaksono, 2008). As 
defined by the new law, restructuring involved the development of a national holding 
company for state-owned enterprises. The main argument for a holding company was that it 
would build a ‘sense of cooperation’ and simplify the bureaucratic structures normally 
characteristic of government entities (Kamal, 2010).25 As shown in Figure 5.1, there was a 
decrease in the number of non-listed state-owned enterprises as a result of the formation of 
this holding company. 
                                                
25 As Wicaksono (2008) notes, the strategy of merging state-owned enterprises was not new. Sofyan 
Djalil had served as the Deputy Minister to the previous Minister for State-owned Enterprises, Tanri 
Abeng, who formulated the master plan for state-owned enterprises to merge under a holding 
company. 
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Source: Ministry of State-owned Enterprises 
 
Figure 5.1. The Development of SoEs, 2012–16 
 
As of 2007, there were 157 state-owned enterprises in Indonesia, across diverse business 
sectors. In 2015, the government wanted to slash the number of these enterprises to just 25, 
but this target was never realised, since most of the Ministers for State-owned Enterprises 
came from political parties that were not committed to the plan to establish a holding 
company (Wicaksono, 2008). As shown in Figure 5.1, there were still more than 100 state-
owned enterprises in 2016. This figure includes all profit-oriented state-owned enterprises, 
which are categorised as listed and non-listed state-owned enterprises, the latter being special 
purpose entities (Perusahaan Umum, Perum). 
 The fact that ministers come to their positions from particular political parties means 
that the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises has never been free from political interference. 
This interference can operate in many ways. The government can use positions on boards of 
commissioners to provide jobs for their supporters, as occurred regularly under the Suharto 
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regime and was also prevalent in the post-Suharto period. Six months after President 
Jokowi’s inauguration, for instance, there were 16 politicians and campaign volunteers who 
held positions on boards of commissioners in state-owned enterprises (Asril, 2015a). These 
enterprises are also subject to scrutiny by the House in the context of the budget. As the 
representative of the government, the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises discusses the 
allocation of capital injections and dividend contributions to revenue as part of its budget 
discussions with Commission VI and the Budget Committee. In practice, the House also 
negotiates directly with state-owned enterprises that require capital injections or make 
dividend contributions. This means that to a large extent, decisions regarding state-owned 
enterprises are driven more by political factors than commercial business considerations. The 
involvement of the House in these negotiations provides an opportunity for rent extraction. 
Another way in which politicians and bureaucrats seek rents from state-owned 
enterprises is through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. It has been 
acknowledged that legislators have used CSR programs in this way to serve their 
constituency regions. For example, Endang Handayani from Golkar distributed a CSR 
contribution from a state-owned bank to her constituency (Ade, 2017). In other examples, 
Ramson Siagian from Gerindra distributed CSR funds from the State Electricity Company 
(Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN) to his constituency (Triyono, 2016), as did Refrizal, a 
legislator from PKS (Zulkifli, 2016). CSR funds derived from state-owned enterprises can 
also be manipulated to serve bureaucratic interests. For example, the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources sent a letter to Pertamina requiring it to provide health insurance for the 
Ministry’s employees (Tempo, 26 December 2016). 
 Yet, despite problems of ownership and political interference, state-owned 
enterprises have become increasingly important for Indonesian economic development. At 
the end of 2006, their market capitalisation had reached Rp 493.26 trillion, a sum equal to 
40.23 per cent of total market capitalisation on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Wicaksono, 
2008). A decade later, their assets were worth Rp 6,325 trillion, or more than three times the 
value of the 2016 budget. As shown in Figure 5.2, although state capital injections did not 
exceed Rp 10 trillion in any one year under the Yudhoyono presidency, the dividends paid by 
state-owned enterprises increased significantly. During the last five years of the Yudhoyono 
administration, taxes and dividends from state-owned enterprises contributed about 10 per 
cent of state revenue (Ministry of State-owned Enterprises, 2016).  
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Source: Author compilation from the State Budgets, 2005–14 
 
Figure 5.2. Capital Investment in SOEs and Dividends, 2005–14 
 
Aware of these trends, Jokowi attempted to optimise the potential economic benefits of state-
owned enterprises after becoming President in 2014. In Jokowi’s strategy document, the 
Nawacita (Nine Priorities), state-owned enterprises were described as ‘agents of 
development’, particularly in the area of infrastructure development (Visi, Misi dan Program 
Aksi Jokowi dan Jusuf Kalla). The government contended that new investment in these 
enterprises was essential to support infrastructure programs that had been allocated through 
the spending ministries and agencies. To obtain an injection of capital, state-owned 
enterprises were required to address government priority programs, including public 
infrastructure, food sovereignity and maritime services (Kompas, 29 January 2015). Jokowi’s 
strategy of optimising the role of state-owned enterprises by injecting new capital was risky, 
since the policy could trigger a political backlash. The way in which the new government 
revitalised state-owned enterprises in the 2015 revised budget and the 2016 budget is 
discussed in the next section.  
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State-owned Enterprises in the 2015 Revised Budget  
Jokowi’s plan to revitalise state-owned enterprises must be seen not only in terms of the 
formal relationship between the executive and the legislature, but also in its political context. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Jokowi faced several political challenges at the time of his first 
budget, not least among them the fact that the opposition coalition held the majority of seats 
in the legislature and controlled the speakership. As a newcomer to national-level politics, 
without any experience of deal-making with the national elites, Jokowi’s position within his 
own coalition was also weak. Yet, his proposal to increase state capital injections into state-
owned enterprises by more than ten times those provided for in the 2014 budget passed 
through the legislature with only minor changes. 
This section examines the political dynamics surrounding these capital injections. As 
argued below, there was no clear division between the ruling and opposition coalitions on the 
issue of state capital injections in these discussions. This was because the government 
provided incentives for opposition leaders to support the policy, and public opinion put 
pressure on the opposition coalition to fall into line.  
The Debate on State Capital Injections 
The debate on state capital injections required seven sessions of the Budget Committee 
before a decision could be reached. These lengthy discussions involved actors from the 
government, the legislature and the state-owned enterprises themselves. As this section 
shows, the discussions were the result of the departure from the business-as-usual position on 
state-owned enterprises, rather than competition between the coalitions. In fact, the massive 
increase proposed in state capital injections drew criticism from legislators regardless of their 
party affiliation.  
Actors involved in these discussions included key players from the executive and the 
House. On the executive side, they included representatives of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises, but also the directors of all the state-owned 
enterprises in line for capital injections. While the Ministry of Finance represented the 
government in the all the budget deliberations, the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises 
played a vital role in the discussion of state capital injections. President Jokowi appointed 
Rini Soemarno, the former chief of his transition team, to head the Ministry.26 Rini’s first task 
                                                
26 Rini was known to have a close relationship with former President Megawati. As the Minister for 
Trade for three years in Megawati’s administration, she was expected to become a mediator between 
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was to convince the legislature to approve the massive increase in capital injections into state-
owned enterprises in the revised 2015 budget. In the legislature, two Sectoral Commissions 
had responsibility for scrutinising the capital injections proposed for each of the state-owned 
enterprises: Commission VI, the counterpart of the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises, and 
Commission XI, the counterpart of the Ministry of Finance. The Budget Committee reviewed 
the budget allocation to each of the enterprises, based on the decisions made by the two 
Sectoral Commissions. 
Initially, the issue of capital injections produced strong reactions among members of 
the Budget Committee. Regardless of their coalitional affiliation, most members at first 
rejected the proposal for a massive increase in investment in state-owned enterprises. It was 
only after the seven Budget Committee meetings on the topic that the committee reached 
agreement on the issue of capital injections, and even then only with several adjustments. The 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee, Ahmadi Noorsupit, stated:  
 
We have discussed the capital injections many times. It was really tough to get 
approval from us. In the last few years, there was only a small number of SOEs that 
we thought needed an injection of new capital. And now, enormous capital injections 
are proposed (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 20 January 2015).  
 
The rejection of capital injections into state-owned enterprises came not only from parties 
outside the ruling coalition, but also from parties within it. For example, Daniel Tobing, a 
Budget Committee member from PDIP, questioned the capital injections in the absence of a 
five-year roadmap for the enterprises, raising concerns that it would lead to inefficiencies 
(Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 20 January 2015).  
The capital injections were rejected by the Budget Committee for three reasons. First, 
the committee argued that the government needed to focus on reform of state-owned 
enterprises prior to injecting new capital. This position was put by Sukur Nababan, a Budget 
Committee member PDIP, who observed in a meeting of the committee, ‘I have spent five 
years in Commission VI, so I know precisely what the problem with state-owned enterprises 
is. It does not relate to financial capital. The problem is mismanagement’ (Budget Committee 
                                                                                                                                                  
PDIP and Jokowi. Hasto Kritiyanto, the Deputy Head of the transition team and a Deputy Secretary 
within PDIP signalled that Rini would serve as Minister for State-owned Enterprises before Jokowi 
officially announced her appointment (Ericssen, 2014). 
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Meeting Minutes, 20 January 2015). Problems in relation to the management of state-owned 
enterprises were also identified in the audit findings of the Supreme Audit Body, which sent a 
report to the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises, the Ministry of Finance and the legislature 
noting that 86 separate findings, to the value of Rp 3.15 trillion, in fourteen state-owned 
enterprises, had not been followed up (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 2015).  
Second, the most common concern among the Budget Committee members was that 
the capital injections would be misallocated. The committee wanted to know why each of the 
state-owned enterprises selected for the injection of new capital had been chosen. For 
example, Bowo Pangarso, a Budget Committee member from Golkar, questioned the need for 
capital injection into Bank Mandiri, which is a public company and is therefore able to 
generate capital on the financial market without the need for capital injections from the state. 
Daniel Tobing from PDIP also questioned why the state-owned electricity firm (Perusahaan 
Listrik Negara, PLN) was not slated to receive an injection of capital when the government 
had initiated an ambitious project involving the generation of 35,000 megawatts (MW) of 
power (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 20 January 2015). 
Third, there were also perceptions in the legislature that state-owned enterprises 
should be contributors to state revenue, not recipients of capital injections from the state 
budget. It was pointed out that Article 2 of Law No. 19/2003 on State-owned Enterprises 
explicitly states that the purpose of state-owned enterprises is to contribute to economic 
development and boost state revenue. In the revised 2015 budget, the government was not 
only proposing an increase in the size of capital injections but also a reduction in the dividend 
paid by state-owned enterprises, from Rp 44 trillion to Rp 35 trillion. The government argued 
that this reduction was necessary, in order to strengthen the capital structure of state-owned 
enterprises and to support their function as agents of development (Budget Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2015). The Budget Committee was not convinced, however. As 
its Chairperson, Ahmadi Noorsupit, observed, ‘Normally we focus on how state-owned 
enterprises can provide a dividend, which is their purpose. So I think my colleagues in the 
Budget Committee were shocked, because this has never happened before’ (Budget 
Committee Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2015). In short, the Budget Committee’s objections 
focused on the unusual nature of the government’s request. Importantly, however, this did not 
give rise to conflict between the ruling and opposition coalitions, which were united in their 
criticism of the government’s proposal to inject such large amounts of capital into enterprises 
owned by the state.  
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Reaching a Compromise 
Despite these objections, a consensus was finally reached between the Budget Committee, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises. As demonstrated below, 
this consensus was made possible through an incentive for members of the Budget 
Committee to approve the measure in the form of an increase in the dividends paid by state-
owned enterprises—an increase that enabled the generation of an optimisation fund. As is 
discussed in Chapter Six, the optimisation fund gave the government the means to appeal to 
legislators’ self-interest, especially in the form of rewards for their constituencies, or to 
provide them with benefits that were otherwise beyond their reach.  
After a period of intense bargaining between members of the Budget Committee and 
the Ministry for State-owned Enterprises, the government ultimately agreed to increase the 
dividend paid by state-owned enterprises from Rp 34.9 trillion to Rp 37 trillion. At least five 
Budget Committee members, including three from PDIP, were active in forcing this increase 
(Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2015). Ecky Mucharam from PKS, for 
example, engaged in a lengthy discussion with the Secretary of the Ministry. He questioned 
the logic in the reduction of the dividend, based on the payout ratio in previous years and the 
profit share of net income that companies pay to the state as a shareholder. Ecky’s argument 
was reinforced by Budget Committee members from PDIP and Golkar, who asked the 
Secretary to agree to an increase in profit-sharing by state-owned enterprises (Budget 
Committee Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2015).  
During the Budget Committee’s seventh session, the government finally agreed to 
make some adjustments. In total, capital injections were reduced from Rp 48 trillion to Rp 
39.9 trillion (Table 5.1). This target was achieved by rejecting capital injections to three state-
owned enterprises and reducing the amount of capital to be injected into a further four. 
However, two other state-owned enterprises, namely PLN and PT Askrindo, the State 
Insurance Company, were allocated new capital not included in the initial proposals.  
However, these proposed adjustments did not win the approval of all parliamentary 
fractions. Committee members from PPP and Gerindra, from the opposition coalition, 
continued to argue that the policy was unacceptable. Amir Uskara from PPP questioned the 
criteria under which capital injections had been awarded. Wilgo Zainal from Gerindra was of 
a similar opinion: 
 
 On behalf of my colleagues in the Gerindra fraction, I want to say that I do not agree 
with the allocation approved by the Budget Committee. We must review and discuss 
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this issue further within our fractions. So, the Gerindra fraction does not support this 
motion (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 4 February 2015). 
 
NasDem, a member of the government coalition, also consistently rejected the capital 
injections proposed in the first meeting of the Budget Committee because it considered them 
unacceptably high (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 21 January 2015).  
 
Table 5.1. Adjustment of Capital Injections in the 2015 Revised Budget 
  
State-owned Enterprise  Sector 2015 Revised Budget 
(in Rp Billion) 
Pr
op
os
ed
 
A
pp
ro
ve
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
Rejected Capital Injections 
PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia  Trade and agroindustry 280 –  
PT Krakatau Steel Mining 956 –  
PT Bank Mandiri Bank 5,600 –  
Reduced Capital Injections 
PT Angkasa Pura II Airport services 3,000 2,000 1,000 
Perum Perumnas Housing 2,000 1,000 1,000 
PT Kereta Api Indonesia Transportation 2,750 2,000 750 
PT Aneka Tambang Mining 7,000 3,500 3,500 
PT Perusahaan Pengelola Aset Asset management 2,000 1,000 1,000 
New Capital Injections 
PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara Electricity – 5,000  
PT Asuransi dan Jaminan Kredit 
Indonesia (Askrindo) 
Insurance – 1,000  
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Notes to the Revised 2015 Budget 
 
Nevertheless, Budget Committee members from these three fractions altered their standpoints 
in the committee’s final meeting. The purpose of this final meeting was to formulate the 
committee’s report to the Plenary Session of the House. Fractions from the government and 
opposition coalitions all delivered their views on the budget to this meeting, and all supported 
the committee’s decision on capital injections (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 13 
February 2015). Nevertheless, the Plenary Session to approve the revised 2015 budget had to 
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be postponed for around five hours to resolve a dispute between the Budget Committee and 
Commission VI. The dispute arose because the Budget Committee had decided to reject a 
capital injection for PT Krakatau Steel to the value of Rp 956 billion that had been supported 
by the Commission (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 13 February 2015).  
In summary, although the Budget Committee initially refused to countenance capital 
injections, the government was able to win its support by agreeing to increase the dividend 
from state-owned enterprises to generate an optimisation fund. The government also allowed 
the Budget Committee to amend the allocation of new capital between state-owned 
enterprises. The conflict that arose from a later decision by the Budget Committee and 
Commission VI raises an important question about the role of political identity in the Budget 
Committee. This is the subject of the next subsection.  
Political Identity and Political Incentives 
The dynamics of the debate on capital injections in the revised 2015 budget reveal the way in 
which the government worked around its minority status to win the support of a legislature 
dominated by the opposition coalition. It did so by providing incentives to individual 
legislators and to party leaders within the opposition coalition, blurring the lines of 
demarcation between political parties to such an extent that coalition membership was no 
guide to a party’s stance on the issue of capital injections.  
A number of significant conclusions emerge from the nature of this debate. First, the 
legislature’s initial rejection of the capital injections was sparked by the dramatic increase in 
their value and the shift in the role of state-owned enterprises from revenue-raisers to agents 
of development, rather than by political fragmentation. Second, the debate indicated that the 
identity of legislators tends to be more strongly aligned with their committee membership 
than their party affiliation. This was illustrated in a statement by Riski Sadig, a Budget 
Committee member from PAN, in his response to the rejection of capital injections by two of 
the parliamentary fractions: ‘I do not feel comfortable with these two fractions taking a 
dissenting position in this decision-making process. This is highly unusual’ (Budget 
Committee Meeting Minutes, 4 February 2015). The strength of committee identity meant 
that the budget debate on capital injections was dominated by conflict between Commission 
VI and the Budget Committee, rather than between the government and opposition coalitions. 
The approval of capital injections into state-owned enterprises was also influenced by 
two external factors. The first was public opinion, which drove the opposition coalition to 
support the move. According to PKS’s Fahri Hamzah, the Secretary of the opposition 
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coalition who also served as the House’s Deputy Speaker, the coalition’s elites took public 
support for Jokowi as the newly elected President into account. Reflecting on this situation, 
Fahri observed that ‘the coalition did not want to be seen as standing in the new 
government’s way, which would have been the case if we rejected the government’s 
proposal’ (Interview, 14 September 2015).27 In short, the opposition coalition recognised that 
the President had majority public support, and so decided not to actively block presidential 
programs in the budget discussion, even though it had the numbers to do so. Second, elites 
within the opposition coalition were offered political incentives when Jokowi approached 
them for support for his nomination for Chief of Police. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this 
controversial appointment occurred at the same time as the discussion of the revised 2015 
budget. Jokowi was under pressure from his primary party supporter to inaugurate Budi 
Gunawan, who had been named by the Corruption Eradication Commission as a graft 
suspect. At the time, Jokowi faced a difficult choice: either to lose public support, or face a 
backlash from within his own coalition. In an attempt to avoid either outcome, Jokowi chose 
to seek the support of the opposition leader Prabowo Subianto, his former rival during the 
presidential election campaign. A meeting between Jokowi and Prabowo discussed both Budi 
Gunawan’s nomination and the revised 2015 budget. After the meeting, Prabowo stated that 
he would support whatever decision Jokowi made (Ihsanuddin, 2015d). By brokering this 
agreement, Jokowi signalled to the ruling coalition that he would abandon them if they 
continued to interfere with his decisions. At the same time, he provided a political incentive 
for his former rival to support his decisions, since Prabowo’s support would demonstrate to 
the public that he remained part of the power structure.  
Jokowi’s move succeeded in winning the opposition coalition’s support, or at the very 
least ensured that opposition members would not block his budget proposal, including his 
                                                
27 The prescience of this position was confirmed by a Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) survey 
released in February 2015, which found that satisfaction with Jokowi’s performance remained high, at 
61.6 per cent. More than 80 per cent of respondents also believed that Jokowi's welfare programs, 
such as the Smart Indonesia Card (Kartu Indonesia Pintar, KIP), the Healthy Indonesia Card (Kartu 
Indonesia Sehat, KIS) and the Prosperous Family Card (Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera, KKS) would be 
useful (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2015). The Smart Indonesia Card and the Healthy Indonesia Card 
were implemented when Jokowi was Governor of Jakarta. During the presidential campaign, he 
promised to extend the benefits of the cards across Indonesia. In November 2014, after his 
inauguration, Jokowi launched and distributed the cards without waiting for the 2015 budget to be 
revised. The Smart Indonesia Card targeted poor students, by providing financial assistance to meet 
their educational needs. 
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plans for capital injections into state-owned enterprises. Gerindra’s Bambang Haryo, a 
Budget Committee member, confirmed that he had received a direction from Prabowo to 
support capital injections wherever they related to people’s needs (Interview, 8 September 
2015). Ahmadi Noor Supit, the Budget Committee Chairperson from Golkar, explicitly 
confirmed the opposition’s support for the President’s program, saying ‘We will provide an 
opportunity for the new government to implement its programs according to its vision and 
missions’ (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 3 February 2015). In short, tension around 
capital injections within the legislature was a product of the dramatic increase in the size of 
the capital injections, which took them out of the realm of business-as-usual, as well as 
conflict among key committees, rather than coalition size or political fragmentation in the 
legislature.  
State-owned Enterprises in the 2016 Budget  
The government’s designation of state-owned enterprises as agents of development also 
figured in the design of the 2016 budget, although this time a considerably lesser amount (Rp 
48 trillion) was allocated to capital injections. As discussed in Chapter Four, the 2016 budget 
deliberations coincided with the beginning of a period of political consolidation under 
Jokowi. Nevertheless, the discussion on capital injections did not produce the expected 
outcome: they were rejected by the majority of parties in the House, including PDIP. As the 
analysis in this section will show, this was because they ran counter to the interests of 
individual legislators.  
The Dynamics of the Debate on Further Capital Injections 
In May 2016, the government delivered its macroeconomic framework and fiscal policies for 
2016 (Kerangka Ekonomi Makro dan Pokok-Pokok Kebijakan Fiskal), and the Government 
Work Plan to the House. These documents clearly stipulated that the government would 
continue to make capital injections into state-owned enterprises that supported its program 
priorities, including energy and food sovereignty, infrastructure development and maritime 
services. The preliminary budget discussions involved both an examination of the fiscal 
policies in the Budget Committee and a review of the government plan in the Sectoral 
Commissions. Although these two documents did not indicate which state-owned enterprises 
were earmarked for capital injections, they described the policies that would be used as the 
basis for formulating the 2016 budget proposal. For the legislators, this stage of the budgetary 
process was crucial, because it gave them the opportunity to influence the budget policy 
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before the government submitted the Budget Bill. Moreover, legislators had a longer window 
of engagement, as this was a full budget, not simply a revision. However, they appear to have 
overlooked the capital injections at this stage, in the push to insert the aspiration fund 
described in Chapter Seven into the 2016 state budget proposal (Ihsanuddin, 2015b)  
The government officially delivered the 2016 budget proposal in August. Although 
Jokowi did not specifically mention capital injections in his 2016 budget speech to the House, 
the government’s plan was included in the budget’s financial notes. This document spelled 
out the allocation of capital injections, which had decreased from Rp 70.3 trillion in the 2015 
revised budget to Rp 48.2 in the budget proposal for 2016. The government also proposed a 
reduction of Rp 5 trillion in the dividends to be paid by state-owned enterprises.  
 
Table 5.2. Fractions’ Positions on Capital Injections in the 2016 Budget Proposal 
Fraction Position 
PDIP Capital injections must only be made to state-owned enterprises that support 
the government’s priorities 
Golkar Did not mention capital injections 
Gerindra Did not mention capital injections 
PD Did not mention capital injections 
PKB Dividends are expected to increase; capital injections will accelerate 
government programs 
PAN The government needs to control dividends; disbursements of capital 
injections to state-owned enterprises were low 
PKS  The contribution of state-owned enterprises to the state budget was low; 
capital injections need to be evaluated based on performance 
PPP Did not mention capital injections 
NasDem State-owned enterprises need to increase their dividends 
Hanura  Did not mention capital injections 
 
Source: Fractions’ views on the State Budget Proposal 2016  
 
As shown in Table 5.2, views on the capital injections were delivered by four fractions within 
the government coalition (PDIP, PKB, PAN and NasDem). Among members of the 
opposition coalition, only PKS criticised the proposed injections. The other two largest 
parties in the opposition coalition, Golkar and Gerindra, did not mention capital injections 
when they presented their views. Although the exchange of views between the government 
and the House in the two Plenary Sessions was more ceremonial than substantive 
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(Hawkesworth et al., 2009), the opposition coalition in the House could have made use of this 
forum to place its standpoint before the public, if it had had strong views it wished to display. 
The Decision-making Process 
In contrast to the debate on capital injections during the revision of the 2015 budget, only one 
meeting of the Budget Committee was required to reach a decision on capital injections in the 
2016 budget (Observation of the Budget Committee meeting, 12 October 2016). In that 
meeting, the Budget Committee approved the capital injections with only minor adjustments. 
In fact, as shown in Table 5.3, the Budget Committee approved the increase of around Rp 1 
trillion in capital injections into state-owned enterprises that had been discussed by 
Commission VI. Compared to capital injections in the 2015 budget, the amendments made by 
the legislature were not significant. The legislature increased the size of capital injections into 
four state-owned enterprises, added one new injection and cut injections into two state-owned 
enterprises.  
During the Budget Committee meeting that specifically discussed state capital 
injections, only five committee members questioned the government’s proposal. Kahar 
Muzakar from Golkar suggested that capital injections should not be used to cover company 
losses. The Chairperson of Commission VI, Iskandar Saihu (PPP), and Commission member 
Bambang Haryo (Gerindra) asked why the government continued to inject state capital into 
state-owned enterprises and why the disbursement of capital injections in 2015 had been so 
slow (Observation of the Budget Committee meeting, 12 October 2016). Although most of 
the questions came from members of the opposition coalition, this did not mean they were 
opposed to capital injections as such. In fact, there were no objections from the opposition 
coalition when the Budget Committee made the decision to support the proposal.  
The Budget Committee did, however, succeed in forcing the government to increase 
the dividends paid by state-owned enterprises, from the Rp 31.1 trillion proposed by the 
government to Rp 34.1 trillion. The meeting’s Chairperson, Said Abdullah (PDIP), requested 
the increase, and although the Secretary of the Ministry for State-owned Enterprises argued 
against it, saying that dividend should be retained by the enterprises, Said was supported by 
Golkar’s Ahmadi Noorsupit, who declared: ‘The dividend of the state-owned enterprises 
can’t be Rp 31 trillion—that would mean a further decrease. This makes no sense … The 
dividend must increase to around Rp 34–35 trillion’ (Observation of the Budget Committee  
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Table 5.3. Adjustment of Capital Injections Approved in 2016 
State-owned Enterprise/Program 
Capital Injection (Billion Rupiah) 
Proposal Approval Deviation 
Food Sovereignty 
Perum Bulog 2,000.0 2,000.0  
PT Perikanan Nusantara 29.4 29.4  
PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia 692.5 692.5  
PT Perusahaan Perdagangan Indonesia 500.0 1000.0 500.0 
PT Sang Hyang Seri  500.0 500.0 
Infrastructure and Maritime Services 
PT Sarana Multi Infrastructure 5,000.0 4,160.0 –840.0 
PT Sarana Multigriya Finansial 1,000.0 1,000.0  
PT Penjaminan Infrastruktur 1,000.0 1,000.0  
PT Hutama Karya 3,000.0 3,000.0  
PT Wijaya Karya 3,000.0 4,000.0 1,000.0 
PT Pembangunan Perumahan 2,000.0 2,250.0 250.0 
Perum Perumahan Nasional 235.4 485.4 250.0 
PT Angkasa Pura II 2,000.0 2,000.0  
PT Jasa Marga 1,250.0 1,250.0  
PT Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia 564.8 564.8  
PT Amarta Karya 32.1 32.1  
Energy Sovereignty 
PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara 10,000.0 10,000.0  
PT Geo Dipa Energi 1,160.0 – –1,160 
Strategic Industry Development    
PT Krakatau Steel 2,456.5 1,500.0  
PT Industri Kereta Api 1,000.0 1,000.0  
PT Barata Indonesia 500.0 500.0  
Economic Sovereignty 
PT Bahana Pembinaan Usaha 500.0 500.0  
PT Askrindo 500.0 500.0  
Perum Jakrindo 500.0 500.0  
Total 39,420.8 40,420.8 1,000 
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Notes to the 2016 Budget Proposal.  
 
meeting, 1 October 2016). The Ministry for State-owned Enterprises eventually agreed to 
increase the dividend. From the perspective of the Budget Committee, this was a significant 
victory, since the additional revenue could be used to generate the optimisation fund. 
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Interest Disruption 
The decision on capital injections was, however, reversed at the end of budget discussion 
session. Although the Budget Committee had approved the allocation, the fractions ultimately 
rejected it in the Plenary Session, because spending cuts in several ministries ran counter to 
the interests of other members of the House.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the suspension of the spending ministries’ budgets 
proposed by the government resulted in a delay of one week in the scheduling of the Plenary 
Session. The delay led to speculation that the opposition coalition was planning to block the 
budget altogether. NasDem, a member of the government coalition, blamed the opposition for 
the delay in the approval of the 2016 budget, which did not accommodate the opposition’s 
proposal for an aspiration fund, as is discussed in Chapter Seven. Hidayat Nurwahid, a PKS 
member, rebutted NasDem’s statement, asking it not to politicise the delay (Kami, 2015b).  
A day before the final meeting of the Budget Committee, the opposition coalition 
elites held a meeting to discuss the budget. Abrizal Bakrie, the then Chairperson of Golkar 
and head of the opposition coalition’s presidium, accused the budget of not being ‘pro-poor’. 
In his statement, Bakrie highlighted insufficient spending on forestry and agriculture 
compared to capital injections into state-owned enterprises (Prabowo, 2015a). However, the 
opposition coalition meeting did not reach an agreement on the budget proposal, as evidenced 
by the views of the fractions in the last Budget Committee meeting before the Plenary 
Session. In that meeting, Gerindra was the only party to refuse to pass the bill. Other 
members of the opposition coalition agreed to do so on the condition that some objections be 
noted (Budget Committee report on the 2016 budget proposal).  
As shown in Table 5.4, nine fractions expressed a position on capital injections in the 
last session of the Budget Committee meeting. PAN, PKB and NasDem, all members of the 
ruling coalition, accepted the capital injections. The other six fractions, including PDIP and 
four members of the opposition coalition, requested a reallocation and expressed a 
determination to block the capital injections in their objection notes. Since the fractions in the 
Budget Committee did not reach an agreement on the Budget Bill by the end of the Budget 
Committee session, the unresolved issues were taken to the Plenary Session for resolution. 
Although it is common in the legislative process to bring problems still outstanding in 
committee meetings to the Plenary Session, in normal circumstances this rarely resolves the 
issue. In this case, however, capital injections had not been a contentious issue during 
Sectoral Commission meetings, or even the Budget Committee meetings. The Budget 
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Committee had even approved the allocation of state capital injections in their working 
committee meeting.  
 
Table 5.4. Fractions’ Positions on the 2016 State Budget and Capital Injections 
Fraction Position in 2016 Stance on capital injection 
PDIP Accept with five notes Reallocate the capital injections 
Golkar Accept with six notes Reconsider capital injections 
Democrat Accept with 14 notes Reconsider capital injections 
PAN Accept with five notes 
Capital injections only for state-
owned enterprises working on 
infrastructure and food security 
PKB Accept with three notes Optimise capital injections 
PKS Accept with 17 notes  
Reallocate and re-evaluate capital 
injection recipients  
PPP Accept with six notes 
Concerned about the potential misuse 
of the capital injections  
NasDem Accept with seven notes 
Agreed to capital injections with some 
notes 
Hanura Accept with nine notes – 
Gerindra Reject with three notes Reject capital injections 
 
Source: Budget Committee Report on the 2016 State Budget discussion (author compilation) 
 
This unusual situation led to questions from legislators in the Plenary Session regarding the 
changes in the parties’ standpoints on capital injections. For example, the Vice Chairperson 
of Commission VI, Farid Alfauzi from Hanura, made the following statement to the House: 
 
I am disappointed with the inconsistent attitudes of a number of fractions in this 
Plenary Session. In the Commission VI [meetings], none of the fractions rejected the 
capital injections, including the fraction [Gerindra] that rejected the budget. They all 
agreed … As Deputy Chairperson of Commission VI, I have provided sufficient time 
for the fraction coordinators to consult with their respective members. In fact, the 
decision [on capital injections] has had to be postponed many times because we were 
waiting for some fractions to consult with their parties (2016 Budget Bill Plenary 
Session Meeting Minutes, 30 October 2015). 
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Farid’s statement was countered by Aria Bima, a member of PDIP. Acknowledging that 
PDIP had agreed to the capital injections in Commission VI, Aria nevertheless argued that 
the party had the right to alter its decision as long as the budget deliberations were on-going 
(2016 Budget Bill Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 30 October 2015). Both statements 
suggest that initially, the issue of capital injections had not been a political issue. 
Although nine fractions had accepted the Budget Bill with some objections, the 
rejection of state capital injections forced Jokowi’s administration to lobby party elites and 
the House speakers to make a deal. The President instructed Finance Minister Bambang 
Brodjonegoro and Vice President Jusuf Kalla to lobby Prabowo Subianto (Prabowo, 2015b). 
He also asked senior minister Luhut Panjaitan to lobby the speakers of the House to approve 
the Budget Bill (Kami, 2015a). However, these efforts came too late, and did not succeed. 
After a break of more than three hours for lobbying, the legislature passed the 2016 Budget 
Bill on the condition that the capital injections were ‘frozen’ (2016 Budget Bill Plenary 
Session Meeting Minutes, 30 October 2015). 
The debate on capital injections in the Plenary Session demonstrated once again that 
the interests of individual legislators must be accommodated if government policy is to be 
realised in the budget. In this case, the interests of members of the Sectoral Commissions 
were disrupted by budget cuts, which threatened to affect aspiration programs embedded in 
their counterpart ministries, as I discuss in Chapter Seven. This undermining of their interests 
prompted the political elites in both the opposition coalition and the President’s own party to 
turn capital injections into a political issue. In other words, capital injections were not 
rejected for reasons of policy or because of ideological differences between the coalitions, but 
rather in response to the undermining of an existing form of rent-seeking. This was evidenced 
in the following chain of events.  
First, capital injections only emerged as a controversial issue at the end of the budget 
deliberations, after the government cut the budget allocation. Before that time no objections 
had surfaced, either in Commission VI, which is responsible for scrutinising allocations to 
particular state-owned enterprises, or in the Budget Committee, which discussed the 
allocation of capital injections as a whole. In fact, the Budget Committee agreed on the 
allocation of state capital injections as approved by Commission VI.  
Second, capital injections were not the only issue raised by parties in the legislature. 
PAN, for instance, also challenged budget cuts in the defence sector and rejected the 
renovation of the Bung Karno Sports Centre (Budget Committee report on the state budget 
proposal 2016). Cuts to the defence sector were also questioned by the Democrat Party. 
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Gerindra, the only party to reject the 2016 Budget Bill, did so for several reasons, not just 
because of its opposition to capital injections. Moreover, the government only proposed to 
‘freeze’ capital injections, not revoke them, yet all fractions passed the Budget Bill, 
suggesting that capital injections were not a fundamental issue for the parties.  
Third, the legislature’s refusal to approve capital injections was not a product of 
contestation between the coalitions. Jokowi’s own party joined with the opposition coalition 
to block the move. As noted in Chapter Four, although Jokowi had added one more ministry 
position in the first cabinet reshuffle, PDIP was still dissatisfied with his decision to retain 
Rini Soemarno in his cabinet. This was because Rini had disappointed PDIP leader Megawati 
when, as head of the transition team, she had failed to secure more seats for PDIP in the 
cabinet (Interview with a member of the PDIP board of trustees, 29 July 2015). PDIP’s 
standpoint on capital injections was, therefore, not related to the substance of the matter, but 
rather was a means of exerting political pressure on Rini (Kami, 2015c). This reading was 
confirmed by Farid Alfauzi, the Vice Chairperson of Commission VI from Hanura, who said 
in the budget approval Plenary Session: ‘It would be strange if PDIP rejects the capital 
injections in the plenary, when they fought for it in the Commission’ (2016 Budget Bill 
Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 30 October 2015). 
Fourth, Jokowi did not provide any political incentive for Prabowo, as he had done 
during deliberations on the revised 2015 budget. With no incentive to act otherwise, Prabowo 
took advantage of the situation by calling on his allies to reject the capital injections. 
Realising his error, Jokowi finally instructed his Finance Minister and the Vice President to 
lobby Prabowo, but it was too late to change the trajectory of the vote. Although Gerindra 
eventually altered its position and accepted the Budget Bill, its refusal to approve the capital 
injections had already drawn together the political interests of individual legislators, PDIP 
and the political elites in the opposition coalition.  
Conclusion 
The analysis of the budget debate over capital injections in the revised 2015 budget and the 
2016 budget presented in this chapter illustrates that the standpoints adopted by the various 
parties on the issue were determined by (a) the extent to which the interests of individual 
members of a particular party were accommodated and (b) the kinds of political incentives 
the government had provided to win support from the political elites of both coalitions.  
In the case of the revised 2015 budget, approval for state capital injections was 
motivated by the pressure of public opinion and incentives offered to the political elite and 
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individual legislators. Under the pressure of public opinion, the opposition coalition did not 
want to be seen as preventing the new President from implementing his campaign promises. 
Jokowi also provided an incentive for the opposition leader to support the budget by giving 
Prabowo the opportunity to show the public that he still held influence, despite losing the 
2014 presidential election. Rather than conflict between the coalitions, the tension that 
occurred during budget deliberation was the result of conflict between the Budget Committee 
and Sectoral Commissions which was driven by committee affiliation, not party affiliation.  
By contrast, in the 2016 budgetary process, the interests of individual legislators were 
threatened by budget cuts, leading to the resurrection of party identity within the opposition 
coalition. In addition, the President failed to provide incentives for the opposition leader’s 
support, causing him to mount a public show of political force by rejecting the budget’s 
capital injections. The President’s own party supported the opposition coalition in its 
rejection of capital injections because it too had been denied political incentives in the form 
of a cabinet reshuffle to remove the Minister for State-owned Enterprises from her post.  
To conclude, the budget discussions on capital injections did not proceed according to 
policy considerations. There was no clear policy or ideological distinction between the 
parties’ standpoints on capital injections, nor did tensions between the coalitions during the 
budget debate on capital injections stem from conflicts between coalition platforms. The 
main determinant of the outcome of the budget debate on capital injections was the 
government’s failure to accommodate the interests of individual legislators or to provide 
political incentives for support from party leaders. 
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Chapter 6: The Optimisation Fund 
 
In coalitional presidential systems like Indonesia’s, the legislature’s power to amend the 
budget is a critical point in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. The 
centrality of this power in the budgetary process obliges the executive to allocate resources in 
a way that serves the interests of legislators, in order to obtain support for its proposed 
budget. As the literature on multiparty presidential systems acknowledges, a fragmented 
legislature presents the executive with a means by which it can win support for its budget 
proposal (Chaisty et al., 2015; Limongi & Figueiredo, 2007; Pereira & Mueller, 2004). 
Legislators, meanwhile, use their power to make amendments in order to maximise the 
benefits of the budget for their constituents and to improve their chances of re-election. 
According to Pereira and Mueller (2004), who studied legislative behaviour in Brazil’s 
budgetary process, the legislature’s power to amend the budget provides the executive with a 
low cost instrument for winning support. In the case of Indonesia, one consequence of this 
power has been the emergence of a pool of uncommitted funds known as the optimisation 
fund.  
This chapter argues that the establishment of the optimisation fund, which provides 
incentives for all legislators regardless of party affiliation, has led to budget discussions 
dominated by the political interests of individual legislators, rather than party programs. 
Since members of both the government and opposition coalitions have equal access to the 
fund, the size of the governing coalition does not determine the government’s ability to 
pursue its agenda, as long as the optimisation fund continues to benefit all legislators. As this 
chapter shows, the revision of the 2015 budget demonstrated how a minority government 
could gain the support of the legislature on this basis. By contrast, the 2016 budget 
negotiations showed that a Budget Bill may be rejected, even by a legislature dominated by 
the ruling coalition, if the political interests of individual legislators are threatened by budget 
cuts.  
The chapter is organised into three main sections. It begins with a brief discussion of 
the formal rules and informal practices associated with the legislature’s power to generate the 
optimisation fund in the process of amending the budget. The second section examines how 
the optimisation fund operated in the revision of the 2015 budget and the discussion of the 
2016 budget. The chapter concludes with some reflections on how the optimisation fund, as 
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an instrument for moving the budget agenda forward, meets the interests of both the 
executive and the legislature. 
The Development of the Optimisation Fund 
To understand the way the legislature’s power to amend the budget influences the budgetary 
process, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of the interplay of the formal rules and 
informal norms that govern the interaction of the major players in budgetary discussions. 
These include the distribution of power, the role of each of these players in the budgetary 
process and the incentives provided to them under that process (Hallerberg et al., 2009; 
Santiso, 2005). The formal rules governing budget discussions are made up of constitutional 
provisions and the statutory budgetary law, which together shape the decision-making 
process. However, the way in which the budget players exert power in the actual process is 
also governed by unwritten traditions and informal norms. This section shows that both 
formal rules and informal practices have played a part in the creation of the optimisation 
fund, which has led to corruption scandals and a subsequent limiting of that power. The 
discussion begins with a review of the formal rules and informal practices that govern the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in actual budget discussions. It then 
analyses the use of the optimisation fund, which has led to cases of corruption and a decision 
by the Constitutional Court to limit the legislature’s power over the budgetary process. 
Formal Rules and Informal Practices of the Parliamentary Budget Power 
As discussed in Chapter Three, after the political reforms of 1998, the relationship between 
the executive and legislature shifted from one dominated by the executive to one 
characterised by a more proportional distribution of power. Following a series of 
constitutional amendments, the legislature no longer functioned simply as a rubber stamp for 
the government’s budget proposals. In fact, the legislature came to play a much more 
powerful role in in the actual process of budget-setting than the rules that formally regulate 
the legislature’s budgetary powers would suggest. 
 Under the 1945 Constitution, the legislature is mandated to take a key role in budget 
deliberations. The Constitution clearly stipulates that the President must submit the budget 
proposal to the legislature for approval. The House has the right to reject the bill and force the 
government to maintain its previous budget (Article 23 Clauses 2 and 3, Indonesian 
Constitution 1945). The strength of the legislature’s budgetary power was confirmed by 
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Ahmadi Noorsupit, the Chairperson of the House Budget Committee from Golkar, who 
stated: 
 
The government and the House have relatively the same bargaining position with 
regard to legislation and oversight, but the House has a stronger position when it 
comes to the budget. The House has a right to reject Budget Bills proposed by the 
government, although we can’t propose a Budget Bill (Interview, 5 September 2015). 
 
As Ahmadi Noorsupit observes, the the legislature now has the power to reject a Budget Bill. 
In practice, budget gridlock has never occurred, but the power is nevertheless regularly 
invoked as a means of intimidating the executive. As a former Minister of Finance explained 
when describing his experience of budget discussions with the legislature, ‘They often 
threaten to impose deadlock on the budget discussions, though I believe it would never 
happen’ (Interview, 31 September 2015). In other words, the the legislature’s power to reject 
the Budget Bill can be used to pressure the executive to reshape the budget in ways that serve 
the interests of its members.  
 Besides having the constitutional power to reject a Budget Bill, the legislature also 
has the power to amend the budget, as stipulated in Law No. 17/2003 on State Finance. This 
law allows the legislature to amend proposed revenue and expenditure as long as the 
amendment does not result in an increase in the projected budget deficit (Article 15 clause 3). 
The amendment powers of the legislature can also be used to create an uncommitted budget 
allocation—the so-called optimisation fund—which can be used by legislators to fund 
particular activities as part of the budget, for example to secure additional infrastructure 
projects for their own constituencies. Thus, it is the legislature’s amendment powers that give 
the Budget Committee and Sectoral Commissions the ability to create the optimisation fund. 
As noted earlier, the Budget Committee has the power to amend the budget on the revenue 
and expenditure side, while the amendment power of the Sectoral Commission is limited to 
expenditure within individual ministries. Eka Sastra, a member of the Budget Committee 
from Golkar, explained the way in which the optimisation fund is generated: 
 
We raise revenue, increase the oil production and economic growth targets. Then we 
reduce government expenditure, to make it more efficient, for example, by cutting 
unnecessary items. This combination of increasing the revenue side and reducing 
spending generates the optimisation fund (Interview, 1 July 2015). 
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Importantly, the formal rules are not always followed in the legislature’s attempts to 
maximise the funds available to it through this mechanism. Often, the deficit limit in the 
budget proposal is increased, in violation of the legal provisions. As shown in Figure 6.1, 
during budget discussions from 2006 to 2016, there were seven occasions on which the 
legislature’s budget amendments resulted in an increase in the projected budget deficit.  
 
 
Notes: SB = State Budget, SBR = Revised State Budget 
Source: Author compilation from State Budgets for 2006–16 
 
Figure 6.1. Budget Deficit Changes (%), 2006–16  
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Agun Gunanjar, a former Budget Committee member from Golkar, confirmed that the 
legislature often forced the government to increase the budget deficit target when the political 
interests of its members were not accommodated in the budgetary process (Interview, 25 
August 2015). 
Besides changing the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget, the optimisation 
fund can also be generated or increased by changing the macroeconomic assumptions. The 
macroeconomic indicators used in assembling the budget proposal consist of economic 
growth, inflation, the exchange rate, the interest rate, the international crude oil price, oil 
production and gas production. These are the essential indicators used in formulating revenue 
targets, expenditure, and financing. As outlined in Article 13 of the state finance law, the 
government must submit its fiscal policy and macroeconomic framework to the legislature 
during the preliminary budget discussions. In theory, the government then uses the indicators 
agreed to during the preliminary budget discussions to formulate its budget proposal, and the 
legislature has no legal power to further amend those macroeconomic assumptions during 
discussions of the Budget Bill. 
In reality, however, macroeconomic indicators are discussed again when the 
government submits the budget proposal to the House, leading to revisions to the budget 
position on revenue, expenditure and financing. The macroeconomic assumptions related to 
energy, such as the oil price, and oil and gas production, are discussed by Commission VII, 
while Commission XI discusses the remainder of the macroeconomic assumptions. The 
Budget Committee then uses the macroeconomic adjustments agreed to by Commissions VII 
and XI to formulate the budget position, with implications for either the revenue or 
expenditure side of the budget. 
In addition to these formal procedures, informal practices have also evolved in the 
allocation of the optimisation fund. Although the law outlines the legislature’s power to 
amend the budget, it does not regulate how the use of surplus funds is to be determined; this 
is the responsibility of the executive. Article 13 Clause 2 of Government Regulation No. 
90/2010 on the Formulation of Ministerial Work Plans and Budgets states that the 
government must refer to the policy direction of the President in the use of budget allocations 
from the optimisation fund. However, as explained by a former Ministry of Finance official, 
this regulation does not apply to the legislature, so in practice the allocations from the 
optimisation fund are decided by the Budget Committee and the Sectoral Commissions 
(Interview, 31 September 2015). According to this same official, the fact that there are no 
criteria governing the role of the Budget Committee in the distribution of the optimisation 
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fund to the spending ministries means that it is determined by the political interests of 
individual legislators (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
The informal power of the legislature is also revealed in the scheduling of the budget 
approval. Budget approval in Plenary Sessions of the House is often more ceremonial than 
substantive, and budget discussions between House and the various ministries in fact 
continue after the Budget Bill has passed in the Plenary Session (Interview with Ministry of 
Finance official, 28 July 2015). As shown in Table 6.1, the Ministry of Finance introduced 
regulations that provide additional time for ministries and agencies to discuss the detailed 
budget with the relevant Sectoral Commissions after the Plenary Sessions. The mass media 
and public are not permitted to attend discussions once they leave the formal arena of the 
legislature, since these discussions take place in private. The distribution of the optimisation 
fund is also determined through informal channels, typically in the last days of the budget 
discussions (Interview with Budget Committee member Eka Satra, 1 July 2015; interview 
with Budget Committee member Harry Aziz, 14 September 2015). 
 
Table 6.1. Time between Plenary Session and the Final Budget 
Fiscal Year State 
Budget (APBN) 
Date of Plenary Session of 
Budget Approval 
Completion of Discussion of Budget 
Detail based on MoF Regulation 
SBR 2010  3 May 2010 15 May 2010 
SB 2011  26 October 2010 12 November 2010 
SBR 2011  22 July 2011 16 August 2011 
SB 2012 28 October 2011 14 November 2011 
SBR 2012 31 March 2012 04 June 2013 
SB 2013 23 October 2012 30 November 2012 
 
Source: Author compilation. (SBR = State Budget Revised; SB = State Budget) 
 
This situation is made possible because Clause 4, Article 15 of the State Finance Law 
gives the legislature the authority to approve Budget Bills that contain detailed organisational 
units, functions, programs, activities and types of expenditure. This has led to the House 
spending a great deal of time scrutinising details in the budget. It is worth noting that 
currently the state budget consists of 130 programs and 19,945 spending agencies (Satuan 
Kerja), which makes it virtually impossible to scrutinise every aspect of the budget in the 
space of three months. Another consequence of these additional budget discussions has been 
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the emergence of the legislature’s power to block certain expenditure items. The budget is 
effectively blocked when the legislature is unable to reach agreement on a particular aspect of 
spending and requires further discussion with the relevant ministries. According to the 
records of the Directorate-General of Budgeting in the Ministry of Finance, approximately 
Rp 63.4 trillion of the total budget was blocked by the Sectoral Commissions in 2011; Rp 
78.5 trillion was blocked in 2012, and Rp 163.5 trillion in 2013 (Direktorat Jenderal 
Anggaran–Kementerian Keuangan, 2011).  
In summary, this subsection has shown that the legislature’s power to generate the 
optimisation fund extends far beyond that attributed to it in the formal rules. The legislature 
has been able to take advantage of the weakness in the legal framework to make covert deals. 
As explained by the Golkar Budget Committee member, Eka Sastra, an allocation from the 
optimisation fund may first be offered to officials from the spending ministries or local 
governments, who then arrange for their business partners to handle the project. In return, the 
business partners provide ‘kickbacks’ for members of the Budget Committee (Interview, 1 
July 2015). These practices were exposed in 2011–13, leading to a number of corruption 
scandals which are discussed in the next subsection. 
Corruption Scandals 
The power of the legislature to substantively amend the budget attracted public attention 
when several members of the Budget Committee were charged with corruption in relation to 
their use of the optimisation fund. These scandals occurred in a context where corruption 
among politicians had dominated public discourse since 2009 (Kramer, 2013), and they 
ultimately led to restrictions on the legislature’s budgetary powers. In this case, four members 
of the Budget Committee, known as the ‘budget mafia’ (mafia anggaran), were found to have 
been involved in corrupt practices, mostly related to kickbacks in return for allocations to 
certain projects or for arranging for certain companies to handle the projects identified (Table 
6.2).  
The exposure of these corrupt practices drew a public outcry. In 2013, the Indonesian 
Corruption Watch, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
Indonesia, YLBHI), the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Forum Indonesia untuk 
Transparansi Anggaran, FITRA) and the Indonesian Budget Centre mounted a judicial review 
of the legislature’s budgetary powers by the Constitutional Court.28 The groups involved 
                                                
28 I was involved in this process as Secretary General of FITRA and an Expert Witness. 
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believed that budgetary corruption derived from the budgetary powers of the legislature as 
defined by Law No. 17/2003 on State Finance and Law No. 27/2009 on the Structure of the 
Legislature. They questioned the permanent status of the Budget Committee, the legislature’s 
power to intervene in budget detail, its power to block certain budget items, and the budget 
revision process (Constitutional Court, 2014).  
 
Table 6.2. Corruption Scandals, 2011–13 
Name Party Case Description 
Muhammad 
Nazaruddin  
Democrat Accepted a fee of Rp 4.6 trillion in return for arranging a 
project tender for the Athlete Guesthouse (Wisma Atlet) 
and securing a budget allocation from the optimisation 
fund for the project. In court, Nazaruddin claimed that 
Budget Committee members from other parties were also 
involved. Nazaruddin also played a role in arranging an 
optimisation fund allocation for the Hambalang Sport 
Centre project. He is allegedly involved in several other 
corruption cases still in process. 
Waode 
Nurhayati 
PAN Accepted a fee of Rp 6 billion in return for securing a 
budget allocation through a fiscal transfer called the 
Infrastructure Adjustment Fund. During the court case, 
Nurhayati observed that all Budget Committee members 
have a quota under which they can allocate money from 
the optimisation fund as they please. 
Angelina 
Sondakh 
Democrat As budget coordinator in Commission X, which is the 
commission responsible for education and sport, she 
received a kickback of Rp 12.5 billion in return for 
arranging a budget allocation for construction projects in 
particular universities and the Wisma Atlet.  
Dzulkarnaen 
Djabar 
Golkar As a member of the Budget Committee from Commission 
VIII, which oversees allocations to the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, Dzulkarnaen received a fee of Rp 14.3 
trillion in return for arranging an allocation from the 
optimisation fund and intervened to secure a contract for 
a colleague’s company for the procurement of computers 
for Islamic high schools and printing of the Quran. 
 
Source: Author compilation from Corruption Court verdicts.  
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In May 2014, the court issued a verdict that limited the role of the House in the budgetary 
process, insofar as it no longer had the authority to discuss activities and types of expenditure 
in the detailed budget known as ‘Satuan 3’. The legislature was also prevented from blocking 
disbursements after the Budget Bill had been approved (Constitutional Court, 2014). 
This verdict had substantive implications for the budgetary process. In the actual 
budget discussions, legislators still have access to the detailed budget, although they are not 
allowed to discuss and change the budget through these activities (Interview with an official 
of the Ministry of Finance, 28 July 2015). However, as the Second Director for State Budget 
Formulation confirmed, ‘Since the the constitutional court decision, the legislature has no 
longer been able to mark particular items with an asterisk [i.e. block them]’ (Interview, 7 
August 2015). The verdict triggered strong reactions from Budget Committee members, who 
argued that access to the detailed budget was an important mechanism of budget control 
(Interview with Elviana, a Budget Committee member from the United Development Party, 5 
October 2015). Wahyu Sanjaya, a Budget Committee member from the Democrat Party, 
confirmed Elviana’s assessment, arguing that ‘since “Satuan 3” was removed, the legislature 
has lost its ability to monitor the budget, leaving it powerless’ (Interview, 23 June 2015).  
As a result of the court’s verdict, the House reformed its internal rules in a way that 
made the Budget Committee no longer the most powerful committee in the budget decision-
making process in the legislature. As House speaker Fahri Hamzah explained, although 
Budget Committee members still had access to the optimisation fund for fiscal transfers to the 
regions in which their constituencies were located, Sectoral Commissions now also had 
access to the fund (Interview, 14 September 2015). As a consequence, the benefits of the 
optimisation fund no longer accrued solely to members of the Budget Committee, but were 
also available to members of the Sectoral Commissions. Under the new rules, Sectoral 
Commissions have the authority to make allocations from the optimisation fund to the 
spending ministries. Moreover, the decisions of the Budget Committee must now refer to 
decisions made by the Sectoral Commissions, as stipulated in the Law No.17/2014 on 
Legislative Institutions. For example, in deciding macroeconomic assumptions, the Budget 
Committee must now make reference to decisions taken by Commission XI, which has 
oversight of economic growth, inflation, the exchange rate and the interest rate, and 
Commission VII, which has oversight of the international crude oil price, as well as oil and 
gas production.  
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The government has also tried to impose further constraints on the use of the 
optimisation fund in the wake of this verdict. In particular, it has attempted to restrict 
uncontrolled allocations from the optimisation fund, following an evaluation of budget 
allocations made from the fund. Since 2014, the government has asked the Control Agency 
for Budget and Development (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan, BPKP) to 
review the projects that have received allocations from the optimisation fund (Interview with 
Ministry of Finance official, 28 July 2015). In doing so, the BPKP has assessed the extent to 
which these allocations are consistent with government priorities. When it identifies a 
suspicious case, the BPKP alerts the Directorate-General of Budgetary Matters in the 
Ministry of Finance, which then blocks that particular allocation. The former Minister of 
Finance confirmed the process through which the government has come to control the 
optimisation fund: 
 
We presented the review of the optimisation fund from BPKP to the Cabinet meeting. 
I convinced the President to use the results of that review and a warning from the 
KPK [Corruption Eradication Commission] to freeze the disbursement of the 
optimisation fund. He then announced in a Cabinet Meeting that he planned to freeze 
the optimisation fund … I began this practice in 2014 (Interview, 31 September 
2015). 
 
However, attempts to control the legislature’s capacity to reshape the budget were at best 
partial. In the next section, the discussion focuses on how the court’s verdict affected the 
legislature’s power to generate and disperse the optimisation fund in practice.  
The Implementation of the Optimisation Fund after the 2014 Elections 
The Constitutional Court’s verdict limiting the legislature’s budgetary powers, which came 
into force from the 2015 budget onwards, changed the way in which the optimisation fund 
operated. From this time, the Budget Committee was no longer able to allocate the 
optimisation fund as it pleased. As shown in Figure 6.2, the optimisation fund now had to be 
shared with the Sectoral Commissions and, through them, the spending ministries. 
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Figure 6.2. Operation of the Optimisation Fund 
 
This section examines the way in which this shift influenced budget deliberations in the 
revision of the 2015 budget and in the 2016 budget. As the discussion shows, the changed 
institutional environment in which the optimisation fund now operates is nevertheless still a 
critical part of the structure through which the government obtains support from the 
legislature. 
In this new environment, the fund’s benefits are shared not only between all 
legislators, but are also deployed to serve government interests. This collective benefit, in 
turn, has diminished the role of political parties and coalition identities in budget discussions. 
The Optimisation Fund in the Revision of the 2015 Budget  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the revision of the 2015 budget was critical for two reasons. 
First, the budget deliberations occurred at a time of high political tension between the 
majority opposition coalition and the minority government coalition. Second, the budget 
proposal itself was unusual, since the fuel subsidy was halved and capital injections into 
state-owned enterprises were increased 14-fold. The results of the revision were surprising, 
insofar as the Budget Bill was passed by the legislature without significant change, despite 
Optimisation Fund 
Spending Ministries 
Program priorities of 
the spending 
Ministries 
Aspiration Fund 
Parliament's 
facilities (salary, 
new building, etc) 
Transfer to the 
Regions Aspiration Fund 
Budget Financing Deficit Reduction 
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the weak position of the ruling coalition. This section argues that this surprising result can be 
explained by the capacity of the optimisation fund to accommodate the interests of all 
legislators, meaning that the fund provided the incentives needed for the legislature to pass 
the Budget Bill. In the process, the optimisation fund led to the blurring of political party 
identity in both coalitions, which in turn minimised competition between them during the 
budgetary process.  
In this particular budget round, the optimisation fund was not generated through 
adjustments to macroeconomic variables to increase state revenue. In fact, as was reported by 
the Minister of Finance in the working committee meeting, almost all the macroeconomic 
indicators were revised downward, leading to a decrease in revenue. As shown in Table 6.2., 
the economic growth indicator was decreased by 0.1 per cent, while inflation remained at 5 
per cent. The assumed international crude oil price was downgraded by USD 20 per barrel 
and oil production by 24,000 barrels per day. These adjustments affected non-tax revenue 
from natural resources by Rp 14.27 trillion (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 6 February 
2015). As a consequence of these changes in the macroeconomic variables, projected revenue 
decreased by Rp 7.3 trillion.  
 
Table 6.3. Macroeconomic Indicators and the Revised 2015 Budget  
Indicator/Item Budget 
Proposal 
Enacted 
Budget 
Margin 
Economic growth (%yoy) 5.8 5.7 (0.1) 
Inflation (%yoy) 5.0 5.0 0 
Rupiah exchange rate (Rp/USD) 12,200 12,500 300 
Average 3-month interest rate (%) 6.2 6.2 0 
International crude price (USD/barrel) 70.0 60.0 (10) 
Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 849 825 (24) 
Gas production (thousand barrels per day) 1,177 1,221 44 
Revenue (in trillion rupiah) 1,768 1,761 (7) 
Expenditure (in trillion rupiah) 1,995 1,984 (11) 
Surplus/Deficit (in trillion rupiah) (226) (223) 3 
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Note to the Revised 2015 Budget 
 
Rather than adjustments to macroeconomic variables, the 2015 optimisation fund was 
generated through reductions in expenditure. Bambang Brojonegoro, the Minister of Finance, 
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stated that ‘reductions in expenditure are higher than reductions in revenue, which means that 
there might be an extra allocation’ (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 6 February 2015). 
He went on to explain that the biggest decrease in expenditure was the result of a decrease of 
Rp 17.1 trillion in the fuel subsidy. The committee and the government also agreed to 
suspend the social protection fund for two months, generating a further Rp 6.5 trillion. 
Overall, the Minister of Finance reported that the meeting freed up the capacity for additional 
spending to the value of Rp 20.9 trillion—the optimisation fund—which would be allocated 
on the basis of discussions in a working committee.  
The Working Meeting between the Ministry of Finance and the Budget Committee 
revealed that despite the changes, the Budget Committee still had more power to determine 
the allocation of the optimisation fund than the Ministry of Finance. In the Budget Committee 
meeting, a Ministry of Finance representative proposed that the optimisation fund be divided 
into three categories: funds allocated to the spending ministries; funds allocated to the 
regions; and funds allocated to achieve a budget deficit reduction of 1.9 per cent of GDP, as 
stated in the budget proposal (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 6 February 2015). The 
very fact that the Ministry made this proposal indicates that the Budget Committee still had 
the discretion to determine allocations under the fund, even though in this case, the 
committee agreed to the Ministry’s proposal (Interview, Harry Azhar, former Chairperson of 
the Budget Committee, 14 September 2015). In that meeting, Rp 16.3 trillion was allocated to 
the central government’s ministries, Rp 3 trillion went to the regions through the Special 
Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK) and Rp 1.5 trillion—of an optimisation fund 
of Rp 20.9 trillion—was allocated to reducing the budget deficit (Budget Committee Meeting 
Minutes, 6 February 2015).  
Importantly, however, it was clear that the decision on the distribution of the 
optimisation fund was not made in the working committee meeting. The committee did not 
discuss the distribution of the fund; it only reported on the decision which had already been 
taken outside the Budget Committee’s formal meetings. As an official from the Ministry of 
Finance explained, ‘The discussion [of the optimisation fund] between the Minister of 
Finance and the Chairperson [of the Budget Committee] was not open. It took place in the 
lobby forum, and the outcome of that discussion was presented to the formal meeting of the 
Budget Committee for approval’ (Interview, 28 July 2015). This was confirmed by Eka 
Sastra, who explained that the informal meeting where the allocation was determined was 
attended by the key parliamentary stakeholders:  
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The distribution of the optimisation fund was decided in an informal forum. It was all 
arranged before the formal Budget Committee meeting started. Intensive meetings 
were held among the House Speakerships, the Budget Committee leaders, the leaders 
of the Sectoral Commissions, and the fraction coordinators (Interview, 1 July 2015). 
 
This statement also explains why the response of the Budget Committee members in the 
formal meeting was unenthusiastic. There was no incentive for them to take an active part in 
the discussions, because the agreement to share the optimisation fund benefits among all 
fractions and the Sectoral Commissions had been made prior to the formal meeting. Indeed, 
only three of the Budget Committee members responded to the report when it was delivered 
by the Director General of Budgetary Affairs, Askolani. Moreover, there was little in their 
responses that related to the actual content of the optimisation fund (Budget Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 29 January 2015).  
Despite the fact that the decision had been taken in an informal forum, it was clear 
that the distribution of the optimisation fund to the ministries was not based on the formula 
proposed by the government. The government had identified three criteria that were 
consistent with the Government Work Plan 2015: that allocations be efficient, effective and 
accountable, with tangible outputs. In practice, these criteria were invoked only to legitimate 
decisions that had already been taken. As shown in Table 6.4, several ministries received the 
same amount from the optimisation fund, which suggests that the distribution was not based 
on program or ministry needs.  
According to the Director for State Budget Formulation, the spending ministries 
approached their respective Sectoral Commissions to increase their budgets, agreeing in 
return to include allocations in the interests of legislators, such as constituency programs, in 
their requests (Interview, 7 August 2015). Hence, the optimisation fund was leveraged to 
accommodate both the interests of legislators and the requests of the ministries seeking 
additional funding. Furthermore, given that allocations to the spending ministries did not 
relate to public services, it is clear that the entire distribution of the fund was in line with the 
personal interests of stakeholders within the ministries. The highest allocations went to the 
Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian National Police. According to Eka Sastra, this 
additional spending was mostly for equipment for the police and the military; furthermore, 
‘we already knew which companies would get the project, as these companies were willing to 
pay in advance’ (Interview, 25 August 2015). Eka’s assessment was confirmed by an official 
from the Ministry of Finance, who stated that the Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian 
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National Police were Budget Committee ‘favourites’ because monitoring institutions like the 
BPKP were unwilling to review their optimisation fund allocations (Interview, 21 October 
2015). Indeed, the Indonesian National Police has been known to provide lucrative extractive 
opportunities, ever since the New Order period (Baker, 2015).  
 
Table 6.4. Optimisation Fund Allocations in the Revised 2015 Budget 
Ministry/Agency Counterpart 
Commissions 
Amount 
(billion 
rupiah) 
Ministry of Defence I 4,725 
National Police III 3,850 
Ministry for Villages and Remote Regions  V 2,100 
House of Representatives  1,635 
Ministry of Research and Higher Education VII 1,200 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights III 450 
Regional Representative Council III 375 
Ministry of Youth and Sports X 374 
People’s Consultative Assembly  III 365 
State Intelligence Body I 200 
State Cryptography Agency I 200 
National Search and Rescue Body V 200 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs I 150 
Audit Body XI 100 
Supreme Court III 100 
National Security Agency I 100 
National Security Council I 100 
Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical 
Agency 
V 50 
Ministry of Cooperative and Small Enterprises VI 50 
 Total 16,324 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2015 
 
In the revised 2015 budget, the optimisation fund also provided direct benefits to all 
legislators. An additional amount of Rp 1.6 trillion was allocated for improvements to the 
parliamentary facilities, for example, the designing of a new parliament building, the 
provision of operational budgets for members’ constituency offices (Rumah Aspirasi), 
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provision of funds for legislators to visit their constituents, and support for staffing and 
salaries. These measures benefited members of both the opposition and government 
coalitions. Arif Budimanta, a member of the Advisory Team in the Ministry of Finance and 
also a former legislator from PDIP explained one of the reasons why the conflict between the 
Red-White Coalition and the Great Indonesia Coalition did not surface in the revision of the 
2015 budget:  
 
KIH and KMP were not relevant in the budget discussions because the political 
interests of individual members of each coalition had been accommodated in the 
budget. The budget accommodated their constituencies and also proposed an 
additional budget for a new building and facilities (Interview, 8 July 2015). 
 
While members of the Sectoral Commissions gained access to the optimisation fund through 
the spending ministries, the Budget Committee members received allocations through the 
transfer of funds to their electoral regions through the Special Allocation Fund. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven, additional spending of Rp 3 trillion was allocated to the DAK in 
the form of the constituency development fund (also known as the aspiration fund) for 
Budget Committee members, regardless of their coalitional affiliation. 
In summary, changes to macroeconomic indicators and revenue projections in the 
revision of the 2015 budget did not restrict the Budget Committee’s ability to generate a 
sizeable optimisation fund by cutting proposed expenditure items. Although the 
Constitutional Court had acted to limit the power of the legislature to amend the budget, the 
government allowed it to do so because the benefits of the optimisation fund were shared by 
the executive, which wanted to reduce the budget deficit, and by the spending ministries, 
which were seeking to increase their budget allocations. Moreover, the distribution of the 
optimisation fund, which had been decided behind closed doors, provided benefits to all 
legislators regardless of their coalitional affiliation, in turn diluting their political identities. In 
other words, incentives from the optimisation fund pushed the legislature toward 
individualistic rather than party- or coalition-oriented behaviour. Thus, the minority 
government was able to obtain the legislature’s approval for its budget by ensuring that it also 
served the interests of individual legislators.  
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The Optimisation Fund in the 2016 Budget 
The 2016 budget discussions took place at a time when Jokowi was beginning to consolidate 
his power. Its results, however, were completely divorced from developments in the 
Presidential Palace. Despite the fact that the KIH now had a majority of seats in the 
legislature, the budget was not passed. As this section shows, this was the case because other 
interests had been disadvantaged by budget cuts prompted by changes to its macroeconomic 
assumptions.  
 
Table 6.5. Macroeconomic Indicators and the Budget Position, 2016 Budget 
Indicator/Item Budget 
Proposal 
Enacted 
Budget 
Margin 
Economic growth (%yoy) 5.5 5.3 (0.2) 
Inflation (%yoy) 4.70 4.70 0 
Rupiah exchange rate (Rp/USD) 13,400 13,900 500 
Average 3-month interest rate (%) 5.50 5.50 0 
International crude price (USD/barrel) 60.0 50.0 (10.0) 
Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 830 830 0 
Gas production (thousand barrels per day) 1,155 1,155 0 
Revenue (trillion rupiah) 1,848 1,822 26 
Expenditure (trillion rupiah) 2,121 2,095 26 
Surplus/deficit (trillion rupiah) (273) (273) (222) 
 
Source: Author compilation from the Financial Notes to the 2016 Budget Proposal 
 
The 2016 budget entered the legislature under the shadow of a global economic slowdown, 
which forced the government to revise its macroeconomic assumptions in the course of the 
budget discussions. As shown in Table 6.5, the government revised its assumptions on 
economic growth, down from 5.5 per cent in the budget proposal to 5.3 per cent in the Budget 
Bill. The exchange rate was adjusted to Rp 13,900 and the international crude oil price 
dropped by USD 10 per barrel. As a consequence, predicted revenue declined by Rp 48 
trillion; expenditure decreased by Rp 8.7 trillion; and the budget deficit grew by Rp 39.9 
trillion, or from 2.2 per cent to 2.46 per cent of GDP. This situation, in turn, forced the 
government to suspend Rp 21.3 trillion in spending allocations to the ministries in order to 
reduce the budget deficit (Observation of the Budget Committee meeting, 15 October 2015). 
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Said Abdullah: As a leader of the Budget Committee, we ask the ICT Ministry to 
increase [non-taxable] revenue by Rp 3 trillion. 
ICT Ministry: Last year we increased revenue from Rp 14 trillion to Rp 15 trillion, or 
by around Rp 900 billion … this increase is set every year because we 
calculate it based on a formula. So it’s reasonable. We do not have 
access to any sources for the larger increase in revenue requested by the 
committee. 
Djoko Susilo: We are only asking for a contribution. By how much can you raise it? If 
you [the ICT Ministry] are not willing to compromise, we will postpone 
this discussion and re-examine the formula you used in the Commission 
meeting. 
Wayan Koster: I suggest you increase [revenue by] Rp 1.5 trillion, so you don’t need to 
discuss the formula again with Commission I. 
Said Abdullah : We have heard from the Chairperson of the Budget Committee,  
who asked you to increase revenue by Rp 3 trillion and Mr Koster,  
who asked you to increase it by Rp 1.5 trillion. What if we take the  
middle road? We do not want to take up time with a long discussion, 
because we have to finalise the budget position on Monday. 
ICT Ministry:   …based on our calculations, we can increase [revenue] by Rp 2  
trillion.  
 
Figure 6.3. Dialogue between the Budget Committee and the ICT Ministry 
 
Given the severity of these adjustments, it seemed unlikely that an optimisation fund could be 
generated. Indeed, as Ministry of Finance officials reported to the Budget Committee, the 
Working Committee (Panja A) had revised both revenue and expenditure, increasing the 
former by Rp 22.4 trillion and decreasing the latter by Rp 16.9 trillion (Observation of the 
Budget Committee meeting, 15 October 2015). The Budget Committee nevertheless allocated 
Rp 23.6 trillion in extra funding to the 22 spending ministries, demonstrating that the 
committee was willing to act outside the parameters set by the government. In other words, 
instead of using savings intended to ameliorate the impact of the revisions to the budget’s 
macroeconomic assumptions, the Budget Committee pressed on with its standard practice, 
namely using its power to allocate additional money to the ministries in return for the 
accommodation of its own interests.  
The optimisation fund has thus continued to be a product of the Budget Committee’s 
ability to exert pressure on the executive. A striking example of this pressure was its 2015 
decision to request the Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology to increase 
its non-taxable revenue. As shown in Figure 6.3, the committee intimidated the Ministry by 
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threatening to postpone the budget discussions if the Ministry did not raise the requested 
revenue (Observation of the working committee meeting, 1 October 2015):29 
As occurred in the revision of the 2015 budget, the distribution of the optimisation 
fund had already been decided in an informal meeting. Said Abdullah, the Vice Chairperson 
of the Budget Committee from PDIP, explained the formal process as follows: 
 
When commissions propose [additional funds], we ask the House speakership to 
facilitate a meeting with all the Chairpersons of the commissions … the commission 
proposals have to be part of the government work plan, which is approved in a 
trilateral meeting between the Ministry of Finance, the Development Planning Agency 
and the sectoral ministers (Interview, 26 August 2015). 
 
In fact, however, as shown in Table 6.6, the optimisation fund was distributed to all 
counterpart Sectoral Commissions as a transactional instrument with the executive, rather 
than with reference to any formal criteria. The budget cuts applied to all spending ministries 
prompted the ministries to seek other ways to maintain their budget allocations. Eka Sastra 
confirmed that this was the way in which the Budget Committee distributed the optimisation 
fund: ‘The government asks for funding for the programs they think are important and require 
an allocation from the optimisation fund’ (Interview, 1 July 2015). Jazilul Fawaid, the Vice  
Chairperson of the Budget Committee confirmed Eka’s statement by saying that the 
ministries requested extra funds for their program priorities when they met with the Sectoral 
Commissions, which were then discussed by the Budget Committee (Interview, 26 August 
2015). In short, the distribution of the optimisation fund in 2016 was the result of a political 
consensus among the leaders of the Sectoral Commissions, the fraction coordinators, the 
House speakership, the Budget Committee and the executive.  
  
                                                
29 This dialogue was recorded at the Budget Committee meeting. Said Abullah is the Chairperson of 
the Budget Committee from PDIP, Wayan Koster is a Budget Committee member from PDIP and 
Djoko Susilo is the Chairperson of the Budget Committee from the Democratic Party and 
Commission I. 
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Table 6.6. Allocations from the Optimisation Fund in the 2016 Budget 
Ministry/Agency Counterpart 
Commission 
Additional  
Funding 
National Police III 8.4 trillion 
Ministry of Defence I 5.46 trillion 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing V 2.9 trillion 
Ministry for Villages and Remote Regions V 1.5 trillion 
House of Representatives  740 billion 
National Search and Rescue Body V 520 billion 
State Intelligence Body I 480 billion 
Ministry of Home Affairs II 360 billion 
Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs IV 250 billion 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights III 200 billion 
National Anti-Terrorism Body III 200 billion 
National Disaster Management Body VIII 200 billion 
State Cryptography Agency I 100 billion 
Ministry of Research and Higher Education VII 170 billion 
Supreme Court III 150 billion 
National Standardisation Body VI 100 billion 
Ministry of Labour and Transmigration IX 100 billion 
Coordinating Ministry of Political Affairs, Security and 
Defence 
II 100 billion 
Ministry of Trade VI 75 billion 
National Archive Body  II 40 billion 
Ministry of Industry VI 20 billion 
Ministry of Youth and Sport X 500 billion 
Total  23.6 trillion 
 
Source: Observation of the Budget Committee Meeting 
 
During the formulation of the 2016 budget, the President was aware the practices surrounding 
the optimisation fund, although decisions were made by the legislature and the Ministry of 
Finance. As was confirmed by Said Abdullah, the Vice Chairperson of the Budget Committee 
from PDIP:  
 
Currently, the procedure which generates the optimisation fund in the Budget 
Committee is as follows: first, we ask the President for approval to generate an 
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optimisation fund; second, we hold a ‘trilateral meeting’ [between the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of the Planning Agency and the spending ministries] to decide 
on program priorities for each spending ministry. If the President agrees on the 
optimisation fund, it is his prerogative to identify priority spending ministries under 
the Nawacita [Nine Priorities] … But [the optimisation fund] is just transactional. As 
long as it doesn’t disrupt the Nawacita, it’s okay … For example, Nawacita programs 
might be allocated around Rp 1,500 trillion, while programs proposed by other 
colleagues are allocated no more than Rp 60 to Rp 70 trillion (Interview, 26 August 
2015). 
 
This statement confirms that the optimisation fund was used as a transactional instrument to 
ensure the President’s program priorities were adequately represented in the final budget.  
Finally, it needs to be emphasised that the optimisation fund is not a transaction 
between the President and the opposition coalition, but between the President and the 
legislature as a whole. Since the budget was amended collectively by the full legislature, all 
its members sought to benefit from the transaction, regardless of their party affiliations. It is 
clear, then, that the legislature’s power to amend the budget as an executive tool to win the 
support of the legislature comes at a high political cost.  
Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the executive may have power over budget formulation and 
execution, but the legislature uses its powers of amendment to generate an optimisation fund 
that serves the interests of both the legislature and the government. Moreover, the legislature 
is clearly the more dominant actor in the actual budget discussions. Although the legislature’s 
power to amend the budget is restricted by regulations governing the size of the budget 
deficit, the budget must be approved by the legislature, and this approval power can be used 
to intimidate the executive.  
The legislature’s approval power means that the government’s budget proposals are 
unlikely to be passed without informal mechanisms to benefit individual legislators. This 
continued to be the case even after the Constitutional Court decided to limit the legislature’s 
amendment powers. Indeed, the Court’s decision had little effect on the ability of the 
legislature to generate the optimisation fund. The decision did reduce the domination of the 
Budget Committee, but it did not have the effect of eliminating the optimisation fund. The 
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benefits may now be shared more broadly, but the optimisation fund continues to function 
primarily as a means of rewarding legislators for passing the budget.  
 The distribution of the optimisation fund is based on an informal understanding 
between the executive and the legislature. The legislature and the executive agree to divide 
the funds into three categories, adhering to the current legal framework by allocating funds in 
a way that reduces the budget deficit and advances government priorities. This agreement is 
the basis for the process of negotiation that leads to the allocation of the optimisation fund. 
The negotiation process benefits legislators, who can lobby for allocations through the 
spending ministries or through special allocations to the regions. This mechanism also serves 
the interests of the spending ministries, as it provides an alternative channel through which 
the ministries can maximise their funding, especially in areas they have lost out during the 
budget formulation process within government.  
Since the optimisation fund process is based on a mutual exchange of benefits 
between the executive and the legislature, it runs smoothly. For the executive, the 
optimisation fund provides an instrument for moving the budget agenda forward while 
accommodating the interests of the spending ministries. The Sectoral Commissions can offer 
funds to spending ministries seeking a budget increase in return for compensation, for 
example, the relocation of programs to their constituencies. The optimisation fund also 
provides direct benefits to all legislators in the form of salary increases and additional 
spending for constituency meetings. It has even provided them with a new building. The 
optimisation fund also allocates fiscal transfers to the regions, which can be utilised as 
constituency development funds by members of the Budget Committee.  
In short, there is no significant difference of opinion regarding the distribution of the 
optimisation fund between the legislature and the executive, as both benefit from its 
existence. Hence, the optimisation fund generated through the legislature’s power to amend 
the budget is a form of political currency, which the government can employ to avoid 
gridlock in the budget discussions. Since the optimisation fund is distributed covertly and 
equally, party affiliation has little influence on the behaviour of individual legislators in 
budget discussions. To put it differently, the demarcation of party identity is subverted, 
because individual legislators have equal access to the benefits of the optimisation fund. 
However, given that the distribution of the optimisation fund ignores party alignment, it is an 
expensive executive tool. And, since the optimisation fund is generated and allocated in 
collective and secretive ways, it is of course also prone to corruption.  
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Chapter 7: The Aspiration Fund 
 
The aspiration fund is a national budget allocation for development projects in the 
constituencies of individual legislators. As noted in Chapter Six, it is sourced from the 
optimisation fund produced by the legislature through its power to amend the budget. It was 
first proposed by the two largest parties in the ruling coalition formed after the 2009 election, 
namely the Democrat Party and Golkar. Even though the government, with the backing of 
NGOs like FITRA, has repeatedly rejected attempts to incorporate it into the state budget, the 
aspiration fund has continued to be deployed through informal channels. As is in many 
countries, the fund has provoked controversy, because it involves legislators in the utilisation 
of public resources to fund projects that improve their prospects of re-election (Tsubura, 
2013).  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the factors that led to the development of the 
aspiration fund and to explain why it continues to exist, despite having been formally rejected 
so many times. As it shows, the aspiration fund has its origins in the introduction of an open 
list system of proportional representation, which shifted the focus of election campaigns 
away from parties to an emphasis on personal votes. This shift forced legislators to seek 
budget resources to fund programs in their constituencies, in order to maximise their chances 
of re-election.  
The first section describes the emergence of the aspiration fund during Yudhoyono’s 
presidency and the corruption that resulted from its covert management by the Budget 
Committee. The second section examines demands to legalise the aspiration fund, which 
were prompted by inequalities in access to the fund among parliamentary committees. The 
third section discusses the extent to which the aspiration fund was implemented in the 
revision of the 2015 budget and the 2016 budget deliberations. The chapter argues that 
legislators have continued to engage in covert distribution of the aspiration fund either to 
provide tangible benefits for their constituencies or to secure illegal resources for private 
gain. 
The Emergence of the Aspiration Fund 
The concept of an ‘aspiration fund’ first emerged in preliminary budget discussions for the 
2011 fiscal year. The 2011 budget discussion, which began in May 2010, was the first time a 
budget had been discussed by the legislators elected in 2009. As explained below, although 
the aspiration fund was formally proposed by fractions representing the political parties in the 
122 
	
House, it had its origins in the actions of individual legislators seeking to enhance their 
chances of re-election by demonstrating their capacity to serve their constituencies.  
Internationally, funds of this type are known as Constituency Development Funds 
(CDFs). A key characteristic of a CDF is that individual legislators exert a degree of control 
over the way it is spent (International Budget Partnership, 2010). Although it can be seen as 
an example of ‘pork barrel’ spending, a CDF is a somewhat different method of deploying 
public funds. While ‘pork barrelling’ is typically informal in nature, a CDF is an 
institutionalised mechanism through which funds are allocated in the annual budget process 
as compensation for the legislature’s limited capacity to amend the budget under the 
Westminster system (Baskin et al., 2010). However, like Indonesia’s aspiration fund, both 
CDFs and pork-barrel spending are primarily political projects. As several scholars have 
suggested, the main motivation for the existence of such funds is the need to cultivate 
personal votes in an open list system of proportional representation (Baskin et al., 2010; 
Sutter, 1999).  
Although the informal manner in which Indonesia’s aspiration fund came to operate 
mimicked the informal processes of spending found in the US and elsewhere, the 
institutionalised version of the fund proposed by Golkar was more like a CDF. When it first 
proposed the fund in 2010, Golkar expressed the view that it was needed to enhance the role 
of House members in their own constituencies. The party also argued that the proposed fund 
would reduce the fiscal gap between the regions and make the legislature more accountable 
(Golkar view on the preliminary budget discussion, 25 May 2010). The aspiration fund was 
politically necessary, Golkar argued, to fill gaps in the planning and budgeting processes, 
where biases could shape different regional development programs, depending on the 
distribution of political party dominance (Interview with Golkar Chairperson of the Budget 
Committee 2009–10, 17 June 2015). The Democrat Party took a similar line, asserting that 
‘the Government needs to consider an aspiration fund that is delivered by legislators to their 
constituencies to ensure the budget allocation to the regions is effective’ (Democrat Party 
view on the preliminary budget discussion, 25 May 2010).  
Golkar’s proposal included an explanation of the criteria and mechanism through 
which the aspiration fund would be implemented. Under its proposal, the fund would be 
managed by both the central and local governments. An amount of Rp 15 billion, to be 
audited by the Supreme Audit Body, would be allocated to each constituency (Golkar view 
on the preliminary budget discussion, 25 May 2010). Golkar claimed that its proposal was 
approved by the ‘joint secretariat’, a government coalition consisting of the Democrat Party, 
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Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP and PKB. Hatta Rajasa, PAN’s Chairperson and also the 
Coordinating Minister of Economics, stated ‘We support [the aspiration fund]. The role of the 
DPR is only to be a facilitator. District heads will propose a program to the DPR on behalf of 
their districts’ (Suhendi, 2010). The Golkar proposal was also supported by PDIP, the major 
party outside the government coalition (Mayasanto, 2010). At this point, then, the aspiration 
fund was not a contentious issue within the legislature, since PDIP support meant that it had 
the backing of both the government and opposition coalitions. 
The proposal immediately became headline news and drew widespread public 
criticism, especially from civil society groups (Tomsa, 2010). For example, FITRA rejected 
the proposal on the grounds that the aspiration fund would violate existing laws, blur the 
separation of powers between the executive and legislature, and potentially lead to corruption 
(Seknas Fitra, 2010). It also pointed out that Golkar’s proposal to distribute Rp 15 billion per 
year to the constituency of each legislator would exacerbate inequality between the regions. 
For example, the province of West Papua, a remote area with a poverty rate of 35 per cent, 
would receive just Rp 45 billion, since the province had only three legislators, while the 
province of West Java, with a poverty rate of 11 per cent, would receive Rp 1.3 trillion. In 
other words, the proposal for a flat allocation from the aspiration fund did not take into 
account the differences in regional needs. Moreover, since there was no legal provision for it, 
the aspiration fund would disrupt the system of fiscal transfers to the regions, which was 
designed to reduce development disparities (Seknas Fitra, 2010).  
Following the public outcry, a number of parties in the government coalition’s joint 
secretariat shifted their positions to a rejection of Golkar’s proposal. PAN’s Chairperson, 
Hatta Rajasa, who had initially supported the aspiration fund, refused to discuss it any 
further, while the Democrat Party’s Chairperson, Anas Urbaningrum, declared his outright 
rejection of the proposal. As Tomsa (2010) points out, this represented a betrayal of Golkar 
by the other parties in the joint secretariat, which had previously endorsed the proposal. The 
rebel parties were joined by PDIP, which had previously also supported the proposal. Indeed, 
all other parties followed suit.  
  
124 
	
Pursuit of the Aspiration Fund through Illegal Channels 
The aspiration fund proposal vanished from public discussion after President Yudhoyono 
expressed his disagreement and the Ministry of Finance spokesperson, Agus Matowardojo, 
declared that the government would not support it (Tomsa, 2010). However, this was not the 
end of the story. In the 2011 budget discussions, a new budget item emerged in the section 
that dealt with fiscal transfers to the regions called the Infrastructure Development 
Adjustment Fund (Dana Penyesuaian Infrastruktur Daerah, DPID). The DPID offered the 
Budget Committee a mechanism for the allocation of around Rp 7.7 trillion to the regions (at 
district and municipality level). The stated aims of this fiscal transfer were to accelerate the 
development of infrastructure, improve the fiscal capacity of the regions, and reduce the 
fiscal gap between regions (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 25 October 2010). It is 
worth emphasising here that the DPID was not part of the Budget Bill proposed by the 
government (Article 28, the 2011 Budget Bill).  
The DPID, which was not regulated under the existing law, overlapped with other 
types of fiscal transfer to the regions, such as the Special Allocation Fund. The aspiration 
fund also potentially violated Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance and disrupted the fiscal 
transfer system (Farhan, 2015). Moreover, while the criteria governing the operation of the 
DPID were agreed to by the government and the Budget Committee, its implementation was 
based on decisions made by the Budget Committee alone. According to the criteria, the 
selection of recipient regions would depend on fiscal capacity, a term that referred to the 
ability of local governments to finance development. In practice, however, this was not the 
case. Pramudjo, the Director of Fiscal Transfers in the Ministry of Finance, stated that the 
designation of eligible regions according to the government’s assessment of fiscal capacities 
and poverty rates across all regions was not used by the Budget Committee, which reduced 
the number of recipient regions from 398 to 297. The Budget Committee also decided to fund 
regions that were not included in the government’s proposal (The Central Jakarta Corruption 
Court, 2012).  
The Budget Committee created this new category of funding to serve their 
constituencies but also to capture rents from the state budget. Six months after the DPID was 
implemented, the KPK arrested Wa Ode Nurhayati, a member of the Budget Committee from 
PAN (Central Jakarta Corruption Court, 2012). Nurhayati was found guilty of receiving Rp 
6.2 billion in bribes from brokers and businesspeople, intended to secure allocations from the 
DPID to Aceh Besar, Piddie Jaya, Bener Meriah and Minahasa. The brokers had served as 
mediators between local governments seeking additional funds from the central government, 
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the businesspeople who expected to win tenders for the projects by paying fees in advance, 
and the Budget Committee member who had the authority over allocations from the DPID 
fund (The Central Jakarta Corruption Court, 2012). These transactions not only benefited 
Nurhayati herself but all other members of the Budget Committee, regardless of their party 
affiliation. In the Corruption Court, Nurhayati revealed that the allocation of funds were 
distributed to the constituency of the Chairperson of the Budget Committee, all party fraction 
coordinators and members of the Budget Committee: 
 
… every fraction coordinator and the Budget Committee Chairperson was allocated 
between Rp 200 billion and Rp 300 billion from the DPID, while every Budget 
Committee member was allocated Rp 100 billion (The Central Jakarta Corruption 
Court, 2012). 
 
Nurhayati’s description of the allocation of funds was confirmed by Nando, a witness from 
the Budget Committee secretariat, who stated that codes were used to distribute the funds: 
‘codes P1 to P4 refer to the leadership [where P stands for pimpinan—leadership—of the 
Budget Committee Chairs from all factions including the opposition party]; codes 1 to 9 refer 
to the fractions in the House. These codes were used to calculate allocations from the DPID’ 
(The Central Jakarta Corruption Court, 2012). As these statements by Nurhayati and Nando 
reveal, the DPID was distributed proportionally and across the parties. 
In short, the DPID clearly served a political purpose since, as Nurhayati had explained 
to the Corruption Court, every member of the Budget Committee received a budget allocation 
for his or her constituency. This practice was also acknowledged by Tamsil Linrung, the Vice 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee, who served as a witness in the trial of Nurhayati. 
According to Tamsil’s statement to the court, ‘the distribution of the DPID to the recipient 
regions was based on the constituencies of the members [of the Budget Committee]’ (The 
Central Jakarta Corruption Court, 2012). Since distribution to recipient regions was decided 
outside the formal meetings in the House, the potential for corruption was high.30 In 
Nurhayati’s case, for example, funds were allocated on her behest to Aceh Besar, Piddie Jaya, 
Bener Meriah and Minahasa, all of which are located outside Southeast Sulawesi province, 
where her own constituency is located. 
                                                
30 Tamsil also confirmed to the court that the DPID was sourced from the optimisation fund. 
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As is the case also with the optimisation fund, the aspiration fund came at a cost to the 
parties. The fund was distributed proportionally to all Budget Committee members regardless 
of their party affiliation, which eroded the party identity of Budget Committee members and 
reduced the incentive for them to behave as party or coalition members. Even though the 
aspiration fund had been debated among the parties in the first instance, in its execution, it 
was allocated without taking party affiliation into account. This practice was confirmed by 
Abdullah Dahlan, the Coordinator of Indonesian Corruption Watch’s Political Division, who 
observed that ‘when we talk about the aspiration fund, we are no longer talking about party 
lines. We’re talking about the mutual interest that binds individuals within those political 
parties, in hijacking state resources’ (Interview, 12 October 2015). The case also showed that 
the Budget Committee had better access to the resources allocation compared to the Sectoral 
Commissions. As noted by Eva Sundari, a former of legislator from PDIP: 
 
The emergence of the aspiration fund was triggered by jealousy, because only the 
Budget Committee could allocate projects in the budget … (Interview with Eva 
Sundari, 29 July 2015).  
 
As Eva’s statement suggests, unequal access to the illegal aspiration fund triggered a demand 
for a more institutionalised mechanism for the pork-barrelling that it enabled. 
The Legalisation of the Aspiration Fund 
Although public discussion of the aspiration fund ceased after the corruption scandal 
involving Nurhayati, this did not mean that the legislature surrendered its hopes that it could 
be institutionalised. The House had been quietly making use of its legislative power to 
provide a legal basis for the fund through the revision of Law No.27/2009 on the People’s 
Consultative Assembly, the Legislative Council, the House of Representatives, and the 
Regional Houses of Representatives—the so-called the MD3 law (MPR, DPR, DPD and 
DPRD). The revision of the MD3 law was first officially discussed in a Plenary Session on 
23 January 2013, a few months before the 2014 legislative elections and was passed a day 
before the 2014 presidential election. 
The passage of the bill is noteworthy, as it occurred in a context of heightened 
political tension between the two coalitions in the lead-up to the presidential election. After 
the results of the legislative elections were announced, the coalitions became engaged in 
conflict when the opposition coalition’s proposal that the speaker and deputy speakers be 
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elected by a majority decision in the House was rejected by PDIP, PKB and Hanura, all of 
which were part of coalition that nominated Jokowi for the presidential race (Plenary Session 
Meeting Minutes, 8 July 2014).31 However, parties in Jokowi’s coalition had little to say 
about the aspiration fund, which was included in an article in the bill, where it was described 
using the term, ‘Program Proposals for Constituency Development’ (Usulan Program 
Pembangunan Daerah Pemilihan, UP2DP).32  
The discussion of the aspects of the MD3 bill that dealt with the aspiration fund was 
far removed from political debate. In fact, the parties that rejected the aspiration fund in 2010 
now supported its formalisation. For instance, Benny Harman, the Coordinator of the Special 
Committee (Panitia Khusus, Pansus) for the MD3 bill from the Democrat Party, described the 
situation in terms that were the complete opposite of his party’s stance in 2010: ‘The special 
committee requests clear norms guaranteeing the obligation of legislators to fight for their 
constituencies. Every House member has a right to an allocation from the state budget’ 
(Special Committee on the MD3 Bill Meeting Minutes, 12 June 2014). A similar expectation 
was also voiced by Agoes Purnomo, a Special Committee member from PKS, who had also 
previously rejected the aspiration fund. He explained that a similar mechanism had been 
successfully implemented at the province level, where local legislators received an aspiration 
fund allocation of between Rp 5 billion and Rp 10 billion per year (Special Committee on the 
MD3 Bill Meeting Minutes, 20 May 2014). 
The government was also less strident in its rejection of the aspiration fund this time 
around. At the beginning of the MD3 bill discussion, the government, represented by the 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights, argued that the President as Head of State had the 
authority to manage state finances (Special Committee on the MD3 Bill Meeting Minutes, 14 
May 2014). However, in the final meeting in which the bill was discussed, the concluding 
statements of the government and the fractions in the House made no mention of the fund 
(Special Committee on the MD3 Bill Meeting Minutes, 7 July 2014). As a result, the 
                                                
31 Previously, the House speaker and deputy speaker positions automatically went to the party with the 
most seats in the House (in this case PDIP) and the next biggest parties.  
32 A draft bill must be equipped with an academic paper that describes how the problem is to be 
addressed, places it in a theoretical framework, and identifies its philosophical, sociological and 
judicial foundations. The academic paper prepared for the MD3 bill failed to identify the aspiration 
fund as a critical issue. Nor did it provide further explanation or justification for the establishment of 
this fund. It was simply described as a member entitlement, insofar as a House member had the right 
to ‘propose and fight for a development program for his or her constituency’. 
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aspiration fund gained a legal basis through two articles of the MD3 law. Firstly, Article 80 
(j) stipulates that ‘legislators have a right to propose and fight for the development of their 
constituencies’. Secondly, the constituency development program is mentioned in Article 110 
(e), in the context of the Budget Committee’s duty to integrate the constituency development 
programs brought to it by the Sectoral Commissions. Although the MD3 bill was rejected by 
three fractions in the House, their basis for doing so was not related to the aspiration fund.  
It retrospect, it was clear that the aspiration fund did not emerge as a political issue 
during the MD3 bill deliberations for two reasons. First, political debate around the MD3 bill 
was largely focused on control of the speakership. Second, the MD3 bill was discussed by the 
outgoing legislature, where less than half of all legislators had not been re-elected, and there 
was no significant political incentive for outgoing legislators or incumbents to reject the 
aspiration fund. For their part, incumbents needed the fund to serve their constituencies and 
in doing so enhance their chances of re-election. Outgoing legislators, meanwhile, had 
nothing to gain from rejecting the fund.  
It was also clear that the formalisation of the aspiration fund was triggered by unequal 
access to the optimisation fund. At issue was the fact that the Budget Committee had better 
access to the fund than other committees in the House, since their members only have the 
opportunity to meet with ministers, and to propose programs, in the areas of responsibility of 
the Sectoral Commissions (Interview with Elviana, Budget Committee member from the PPP 
and also a member of Commission X, 5 October 2015). Fahri Hamzah, the Vice Speaker of 
the House, also described the different access which the House committees had to programs 
of benefit to their constituents: 
 
Legislators not serving on the Budget Committee are not relevant in the eyes of their 
constituents. I, for example, have been sitting on Commission III for five years. When 
I go to my home region, I am irrelevant, because I can only propose budget 
allocations for the police department in my constituency (Interview, 14 September 
2015).  
 
This differential access to this fund is what led to the demand for the formalisation of the 
aspiration fund, as was confirmed by Jazilul Fawaid, the Vice Chairperson of the Budget 
Committee from PKB, who noted that ‘the aspiration fund nowadays is only for those who 
have access … They are happy for it to be unregulated because then they can keep playing 
with it’ (Interview, 26 August 2015). In short, the formalisation of the aspiration fund was 
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pursued in order to provide equal access for all legislators to budget allocations for their 
constituencies (Interview with Harry Aziz, former Budget Committee Chairperson from 
Golkar, 17 June 2015). 
The Implementation of the Aspiration Fund 
The MD3 law was fully operational when the new legislature took office in October 2014. 
This meant that the aspiration fund could legally form part of the budgetary process in the 
revision of 2015 budget and the formulation of the 2016 budget. Nevertheless, formalisation 
did not guarantee that the aspiration fund would be put to use, as it had been the subject of 
vigorous public criticism and lacked the support of legislators who had benefited from the 
previous arrangements.  
To increase the viability of the fund, the legislature prepared detailed guidelines 
(Peraturan Tata Tertib DPR RI), which were incorporated into Article 195 of the Code of 
Conduct of the Indonesian legislature. These guidelines stipulated the criteria to be used in 
the allocation of the fund and outlined a mechanism through which it could be incorporated 
into the budget. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, programs supported by the aspiration fund could 
be proposed by local government or communities in a particular constituency, or by the 
legislators themselves. However, the guidelines failed to specify the way in which the 
legislature would collect proposals from local governments or communities.  
In the House Plenary Sessions, each legislator was to be given an opportunity to 
present aspiration program proposals identified by their constituencies. This step, it was 
believed, would enhance the transparency of the aspiration fund process, since the public 
could check whether the programs as proposed met local community needs. Next, the House 
speakership would deliver the proposals to the related Sectoral Commissions for discussion 
with their counterpart ministries in the preliminary budget discussions. This phase was 
intended to ensure that the relevant spending ministries would adopt the aspiration programs 
in their work plans. Following this step, the House Budget Committee would consider the 
proposals from the Sectoral Commissions and send them back for any necessary clarification 
before integrating them into its planning. Finally, the results of the aspiration fund proposals 
would be integrated into the Government Work Plan, which acts as a reference for all 
spending ministries when they formulate their budget proposals. This allowed legislators to 
ensure their aspiration fund proposals were included in the budget proposal. The next 
subsection discusses the way in which this mechanism was implemented in the 2015 revised 
budget and the 2016 budget. 
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Source:  Author illustration based on Article 195, Code of Conduct of the Indonesian 
Legislature 
 
Figure 7.1. Mechanism for Constituency Fund Proposals 
The constituency fund proposal is integrated 
into the Government Workplan 
The Budget Committee integrates the proposal 
from the Sectoral Commissions 
The Sectoral Commissions discuss the 
proposal with counterpart ministries in the 
Preliminary Budget Discussion 
The House Speaker sends the proposal to the 
Sectoral Commissions 
Legislators make proposals in the Plenary 
Session 
Constituency fund proposals drafted 
Local Government 
proposals Community proposals 
Legislator 
proposals 
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The Revision of the 2015 Budget 
The revision of the 2015 budget was put before the legislature in January 2015, less than 
three months after the new legislature was inaugurated. This was the first budget to be 
discussed in a legislature now dominated by new legislators, but it was not the composition of 
the House itself that prevented the fund from being adopted at this time. Rather, the fund 
could not be integrated into the 2015 budget because there had been no preliminary budget 
discussion to integrate it into the government work plan. This meant that there had been no 
opportunity for legislatgors to deliver aspiration fund proposals, as required by the MD3 law. 
Loath to forego the leverage that the aspiration fund gave it, the Budget Committee continued 
to apply the constituency fund informally, as had been the case previously.  
The fact that Budget Committee members had access to this informal stream of 
funding meant that there was little incentive for it to support the formalisation of the fund, as 
was confirmed in the discussions regarding fiscal transfers to the regions. In these 
discussions, Budget Committee members asked the government for flexibility in selecting 
recipient regions for the DAK (Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 10 February 2015). For 
example, Miryam Haryani from Hanura argued that the criteria proposed by the government 
did not suit her constituency in Indramayu, West Java. Ecky Mucharam from PKS claimed 
that ‘the criteria concerning the receiving region and program type should not be too strict’ 
(Budget Committee Meeting Minutes, 10 February 2015). The next day, Boediarso Widodo, 
the Director General for Regional Fiscal Balance in the Ministry of Finance, agreed to revise 
the DAK criteria to make them more flexible, and opened up the possibility of adjusting the 
list of recipient regions (Budget committee Meeting Minutes, 11 February 2015). The Budget 
Committee report also noted that the DAK had increased to Rp 23 trillion, in order to 
accommodate local government proposals approved by the legislature (Budget Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 13 February 2015).  
The adoption of the aspiration fund as part of the DAK was noted in Law No. 3/2015 
on the Amendment of Law No. 27/2014 on the Indonesian Budget for the 2015 Fiscal Year, 
although it was not explicitly identified as such. Article 10 (6) of the law included the 
following sentence: ‘DAK Priority Program Support for Kabinet Kerja [the name by which 
Jokowi’s cabinet was known] (P3K2) and DAK Local Government proposals approved by 
House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia amount to Rp 23 trillion.’ The 
clandestine nature of this manoeuvre was confirmed by Sastra, a NasDem expert staff 
member, who stated that the aspiration fund was implemented covertly, as evidenced by the 
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fact that the DAK had not been formulated according to its stated criteria (Interview, 7 July 
2015).  
Once again, the informal distribution of the aspiration fund revealed that the Budget 
Committee had better access to the fund compared to the Sectoral Commissions. The Vice 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee, PDIP member, Said Abdullah, confirmed that the 
Budget Committee was better placed than the Sectoral Commissions with regard to securing 
allocations from the DAK, since Despite the Sectoral Commissions could only access 
aspiration fund programs that related to their counterpart ministries (Interview, 26 August 
2015). For example, a legislator in Commission X, which deals with sport and education, 
could only propose use of the aspiration fund for programs within the Commission’s area of 
responsibility (i.e. sport and education). By contrast, Budget Committee members had access 
to all kinds of aspiration fund programs through the DAK.  
The 2016 Budget 
The controversy surrounding the aspiration fund resurfaced when the House sought for a 
second time to implement it, as required by the MD3 law, during the preliminary budget 
discussions for the 2016 fiscal year. The amount proposed was Rp 20 billion per member per 
year, or a total of Rp 11.2 trillion for all 560 legislators (Ihsanuddin, 2015a). Shortly after, the 
aspiration fund became headline news, generating widespread public criticism (Ihsanuddin, 
2015a; Iqbal, 2015). As a consequence, while the use of the aspiration fund had been 
legalised, and its insertion into the 2016 budget initially had the support of the majority of the 
parties in the House, ultimately attempts to implement it formally again failed.  
Initially, the majority of parties in the House agreed to insert the aspiration fund into 
the 2016 budget. As Taufik Kurniawan, the Vice Chairperson of the House, and member of 
PAN, explained, the legislature’s regulation of the aspiration fund was approved by all 
fraction coordinators in internal discussions (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 23 June 
2015). However, the situation changed when this regulation was delivered at the Plenary 
Session of the House. While the aspiration fund had not been a core issue for parties, public 
criticism triggered a debate between the parliamentary fractions in the House. Ultimately, 
PKB was the only party in the ruling coalition willing to accept the constituency development 
program in the Plenary Session. The other three parties—PDIP, NasDem and Hanura—
rejected it (Plenary Session minutes, 23 June 2015). For example, Arif Wibowo from PDIP 
argued: 
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The constituency development program is not compatible with our electoral system, 
because legislators represent all the people of Indonesia, not just their own 
constituencies. The constituency development program will erode the unity of the 
nation—it will exacerbate the disparity among regions and generate conflict between 
legislators in the same electoral districts, because they will all want to claim personal 
credit for the distribution of projects (Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 23 June 
2015). 
 
Arif’s concerns regarding the potential for disparity among regions were echoed by Elviana, a 
Budget Committee member from PPP: ‘The weakness of the aspiration fund is that it is not 
fair for my home province of Jambi. We have seven legislators, compared to our neighbour 
West Sumatra, which has fourteen’ (Interview, 5 October 2015). The government also 
indicated that it would refuse to fund constituency development proposals, as indicated by the 
Head of Bappenas, Andrinof Chaniago, who stated that the President disapproved of the 
aspiration fund because it would overlap with development planning based on the President’s 
program (Asril, 2015b).  
Public criticism and the rejection of the fund by three fractions did not stop the 
proposal of the aspiration fund in the House. The constituency development program was 
proposed to the Ministry of Finance, representing the government, during the Plenary Session 
(Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 1 July 2015). In contrast to the situation in 2010, when 
almost all the parties altered their position to reject the aspiration fund proposal after it drew 
public criticism, this time it was rejected only by PDIP, NasDem and Hanura (Table 7.1). 
NasDem staged a walk-out from the Plenary Session, simply stating its disagreement with the 
fund. PKB put forward an alternative, suggesting that all legislators should be able to propose 
constituency programs. Reflecting on this proposal, Jazilul Fawaid, PKB’s Vice Chairperson 
of the Budget Committee, stated:  
 
The aspiration fund can make legislators work. They earn a high salary; so, we must 
give them a job. Otherwise, they only sit and wait … The aspiration fund forces them 
to find out what their constituencies need (Interview, 26 August 2015). 
 
In the meantime, all the opposition parties agreed to propose constituency programs. 
Gerindra, PAN, PKS and PPP, which previously rejected the constituency funds, altered their 
standpoints and joined Golkar in supporting the initiative. Bambang Riyanto from Gerindra 
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asserted that ‘the program is the only tool legislators have to pursue their constituents’ needs’ 
(Plenary Session Meeting Minutes, 1 July 2015). Tamsil Linrung, the former Vice 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee (PKS), argued that ‘if the constituency fund is 
approved, legislators will be more focused on strategic policy and its oversight role’ 
(Interview, 10 June 2015). The Democrat Party—the only party outside the two coalitions—
took a different stance, choosing not to deliver proposals for the scheme in the session and 
instead nominating five conditions that should be met for program implementation (Plenary 
Session Meeting Minutes, 1 July 2015). At this point, although all opposition parties 
supported the aspiration fund, the issue did not engender political competition between the 
coalitions, since PKB ultimately agreed to support the fund. The willingness of parties to alter 
their position is further evidence that the aspiration fund was not a priority in party programs, 
as was also evidenced by the fact that the government’s rejection of the fund did not lead the 
opposition coalition to demand the inclusion of the fund in the 2016 budget.  
 
Table 7.1. Party Positions on the Aspiration Fund, 2010 and 2015 
Party Position in 2010 Position in 2015 
PDIP Rejected after public criticism Rejected 
Golkar Proposed the aspiration fund Agreed to propose constituency 
programs  
Gerindra Rejected Proposed constituency programs 
Democrat 
Party 
Rejected after public criticism Conditional support for constituency 
programs 
PAN Rejected after public criticism Agreed to propose constituency 
programs  
PKB Rejected after public criticism Agreed to propose constituency 
programs  
PKS Rejected Agreed to propose constituency 
programs  
PPP Rejected after public criticism Agreed to propose constituency 
programs  
NasDem – Rejected 
Hanura Rejected Rejected 
 
Source: Author compilation from the House Plenary Session minutes. 
 
After the failure to insert constituency programs into the preliminary budget discussions 
through formal channels, the legislature’s attempts to apply the aspiration fund covertly 
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continued throughout the 2016 budget deliberations. This continued push was clear in 
interactions between the Budget Committee and the Ministry of Finance. A Budget 
Committee meeting chaired by Jazilul Fawaid from PKB had agreed to add the words ‘the 
House’s proposal’ to the budget bill article referring to the allocation of the DAK 
(Observation the Budget Committee meeting, 20 October 2015). After media and public 
criticism, the Ministry of Finance eventually removed the words ‘the House’s proposal’ from 
the Budget Bill (Ihsanuddin, 2015c). The following day, the Budget Committee announced 
the postponement of the Plenary Session to pass the 2016 Budget Bill, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. This decision—which served to hold the government hostage by delaying the 
budget—demonstrated that the Budget Committee was highly committed to retaining the 
aspiration fund.33 
These efforts succeeded, and aspiration fund continued to operate informally, which 
meant that it could be accessed in two ways: through the Budget Committee, and through the 
Sectoral Commissions that dealt with public infrastructure (Interview with former Vice 
Chairperson of the Budget Committee Tamsil Linrung, 10 June 2015). In the Budget 
Committee, the aspiration fund was extracted from the optimisation fund and inserted into the 
budget through fiscal transfers to the regions (Dana Perimbangan), by creating a new budget 
line item or by including it in the DAK. Said Abdullah, the Vice Chairperson of the Budget 
Committee and PDIP member, confirmed the role of the DAK as a channel for the dispersal 
of the aspiration fund: ‘The DAK is a political instrument used by Budget Committee 
members to reach out to our constituencies. This is what we, as Budget Committee members, 
sell to our constituencies’ (Interview, 26 August 2015).  
The aspiration fund was also generated through budget discussions in the Sectoral 
Commissions. Eka Sastra, the Golkar Budget Committee member, explained the way in 
which the aspiration fund was accessed in the Sectoral Commissions: 
  
In the Commissions, members attempt to increase the budgets of their counterpart 
ministries so that they can be allocated to their constituencies. However, most of these 
funds don’t end up in the member’s actual electoral districts, but rather in regions 
                                                
33 House pressure to formally implement the aspiration fund resurfaced in the 2017 budget 
discussions. Commission XI urged their counterparts, the Ministry of Finance and Bappenas, to 
accommodate members of Commission XI who had not secured programs for their constituencies 
through the aspiration fund (Kompas, 15 September 2016).  
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where businessmen are ‘ready’ [to provide a fee/kickback], like Maluku and Papua 
(Interview, 1 July 2015).  
 
Eka’s description of this process was confirmed by a new corruption scandal involving 
Damayanti Wisnu, a member of Commission V, which oversees transportation and 
infrastructure. Damayanti, a PDIP member who represents a district in West Java, was 
charged with receiving bribes from businessmen in exchange for allocating her aspiration 
fund to a construction project in Maluku. In the Corruption Court, Damayanti claimed that 
she was not the only member of the commission to be allocated an aspiration program in the 
Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing. Indeed, she claimed that 54 other members of 
Commission V had also been allocated them in the budget (Gabrillin, 2016). In the course of 
the hearing, Damayanti revealed that Commission V had allocated Rp 2.8 trillion to 
aspiration fund programs involving the Ministry of Public Works. She also said that the 
commission leaders, fraction coordinators and all commission members all received budget 
allocations for aspiration programs (Gabrillin, 2016). Damayanti’s case also revealed the 
aspiration fund could be allocated in such a way that it did not go to a member’s constituency 
but rather to another region capable of paying a fee to the member, as in the earlier case 
involving Nurhayati. 
In short, despite the fact that the aspiration fund had been legalised, its legal status 
was not sufficient to ensure that fund was formally adopted in the 2016 budget. It was 
blocked by ambivalence from the parties, for which it was not a priority, and the actions of 
individual legislators who stood to benefit more from the existing informal arrangements, 
including members of the Budget Committee and Commission V. As a consequence, it 
continued to be implemented informally. While formalisation of the fund would have brought 
its own problems, its continuing informality meant that individual legislators were free to 
continue to manipulate the fund for their own benefit.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the emergence of the aspiration fund was triggered by the 
shift in the electoral system to an open list proportional system in the lead-up to 2009 
election, which drove legislators to seek access to state resources to enhance their chances of 
re-election. The open list system allowed voters to select candidates instead of a party, thus 
generating strong incentives for candidates to cultivate personal rather than party votes. As a 
consequence, it was more important for legislators to build direct relationships with their 
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constituencies than prioritising their links to their political parties (Pereira & Mueller, 2004) . 
These new incentives meant that policy debate around the aspiration fund was dominated by 
the interests of individual legislators rather than the interests of the political parties—which, 
in turn, led to a situation where parties’ stance on the fund was easily swayed by pressure 
from legislators intent on maintaining their own access to the aspiration fund. 
It has been recognised that electoral systems shape the behaviour of political actors 
(Ames, 1995). As such, it is unsurprising that demands for an aspiration fund surfaced during 
budget discussions involving legislators elected in 2009. The ways in which this fund was 
deployed were also influenced by the electoral system (Ames, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 
1986; Lancaster, 1986). Politicians wanting to improve their individual chances of re-election 
need to provide tangible benefits to their constituencies. And the most direct way elected 
politicians can win credit from voters is by providing specific services through pork-
barrelling (Golden, 2003). In post-2009 Indonesian legislatures, the most effective 
mechanism for pork-barrelling was through the informal allocation of the aspiration fund.  
The formalisation of this fund through the UP2DP scheme promised to transform this 
pork-barrelling into into a legitimate transfer to constituencies. As Tamsil Linrung confirmed: 
‘Now that the constituency fund exists, incumbents’ chances of re-election are much greater 
than those of a new candidate , as long as the electoral district does not change’ (Interview, 
10 June 2015). However, as international experience has demonstrate, CDFs also distort the 
allocation of public resources since, as Hicken and Simmons (2008) argue, electoral systems 
that focus on personal votes exacerbate inefficiencies in public spending. This is certainly the 
case with the aspiration fund, as illustrated by the potential gap in the distribution of funds to 
West Papua and West Java. In this case, the wealthier region (West Java) stood to benefit 
more than the remote region (West Papua) by virtue of the different number of legislators 
representing each province.  
The value of personal votes in the open-list proportional representation system has 
also increased the potential for corrupt behaviour. By escalating the cost of the campaign for 
individual candidates, it has put pressure on incumbents to access illegal resources (Chang, 
2005). Unsurprisingly, the emergence of the aspiration fund was not only important because 
it provided tangible benefits for constituents but also because provided an opportunity for 
corruption. The combination of access to the budget through the aspiration fund, control over 
the distribution of resources, and access to funds to cover campaign costs meant that the 
aspiration fund was prone to corruption (Hicken & Simmons, 2008), as evidenced by 
corruption cases involving Budget Committee members and some Sectoral Commissions.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This study has explored parliamentary behaviour in the national budget-making process in 
Indonesia, with a focus on the interplay between the formal and informal political institutions 
that determine the distribution of power and resources among political interest groups within 
the legislature. As it has demonstrated, parliamentary behaviour is influenced by the 
constitutional budgetary power of the President, but also by electoral rules that incentivise 
legislators to prioritise access to patronage resources over party affiliation. On the one hand, 
the executive exercises its constitutional budgetary powers to influence the behaviour of 
legislators, with the aim of moving its budget agenda forward in a multiparty presidential 
setting. On the other hand, the value of the personal vote in Indonesia’s open-list proportional 
system encourages individual legislators to abandon their coalitional/party affiliations in their 
efforts to leverage the budget-making process, resulting in a form of cartelisation within the 
legislature based around individual interest rather than party allegiance. In other words, 
interactions between the executive and the legislature in the budget-making process are 
shaped by a combination of formal political institutions (multiparty presidentialism, electoral 
rules, constitutional budgetary powers) and informal practices (cartel-like behaviour in 
seeking control over patronage resources). In short, the budget decision-making process is 
driven by a combination of the executive’s need to advance its budgetary agenda, the absence 
of political party direction and discipline and legislators’ need to secure patronage resources. 
 In demonstrating this interplay between the executive and the legislature, the analysis 
presented here offers a number of fresh perspectives on the study of politics and budgeting. 
First, it brings a political economy perspective to the study of Indonesian budget-making, a 
field dominated by technical analyses that draw on the new public management and 
institutional reform approaches. Second, it complements accounts of clientelism that focus on 
the relationship between politicians and voters during election campaigns by providing a 
deeper understanding of how clientelism influences parliamentary practice. Third, it provides 
an Asian perspective on the study of the politics of budgeting in a literature dominated by 
analyses of Western and Latin American countries. Fourth, it makes a theoretical 
contribution to the literature on the politics of budgeting through its focus on the relationship 
between formal and informal political institutions and their impact on interactions between 
the executive and the legislature in multiparty presidential democracies.  
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Each of cases studies has revealed the political determinants of the budgetary process. 
Chapter Four examined the relationship between the political configuration following the 
2014 election and the political dynamics that informed the 2014–15 parliamentary budget 
discussions. This chapter illustrated the that the size of the Presidential coalition was not a 
determining factor in the budgetary arena. In order to explain the extent to which party 
affiliation determines the political dynamics of the budget making, I examined the party 
standpoints on capital injections in Chapter Five. As it showed, rather than being determined 
by party affiliation, the standpoint of the parties on this policy was driven by interests of 
individual legislators. The budget discussions on state capital injections into State-Owned 
Enterprises, meanwhile, displayed a contradictory process and contradictory outcomes.  
Chapter Six offered an explanation on the disconnect between the president partisan 
power (coalition size) and the political dynamic in the budgeting process, as discussed in 
Chapter Four and Five. Here I argued that the legislative power to amend the budget is a key 
element for the stability of the budget decision-making. As Pereira and Mueller (2004, p. 
781) suggest, the budget process gives the executive a low-cost and useful political means to 
garner political support in the legislature. The power of the legislature to amend the budget 
produces a pool of uncommitted fund or optimisation fund through both formal rules and 
informal practice of the parliamentary budget power, which can be used to this end. The 
individualistic behaviour of legislators, who lack programmatic distinctiveness in the budget 
decision-making, is in turn driven by the shifting of electoral rules from parties to personal 
votes, as explained in Chapter Seven. This chapter argues that this change drove individual 
legislators to seek state resources through both formal and informal channels either to provide 
a tangible benefit for their constituencies in order to enhance their chances of re-election, or 
for private gain. 
Main Findings 
As this study has shown, the multiparty presidential system adopted by Indonesia in 2004 
changed the dynamics in Indonesia’s legislature. Multiparty presidentialism strengthens the 
separation of powers between the legislative and executive branch but also generates a 
‘difficult combination’, such that a president with minority support in the legislature is forced 
to negotiate gridlock (Mainwaring, 1993, p. 198). This was the case during the first term of 
the Yudhoyono presidency, when the legislature remained split for a period of two months. 
The gridlock was only resolved when Vice President Kalla was elected as Golkar 
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Chairperson and Golkar joined the governing coalition, giving President Yudhoyono majority 
support in the legislature (Liddle & Mujani, 2006).  
In his second term, Yudhoyono strengthened his partisan power by forming an 
‘oversized coalition’ to build legislative support, as suggested by the literature on the 
coalitional presidential approach (Chaisty et al., 2015; Raile et al., 2011). However, it became 
clear that this coalition was unstable when the PKS decided to move to the opposition 
coalition after the government proposed the removal of fuel subsidies in the 2012 and 2013 
Budget Bills. This incident called into question the effectiveness of coalition size as a means 
of ensuring stability.  
The early stages of the Jokowi presidency confirmed that coalition size is not a 
determining factor in the budgetary arena. As discussed in Chapter Four, Jokowi assumed 
government in October 2014 with minority support in the House. His governing coalition 
held just 37 per cent of seats when he proposed the 2015 budget revision in January 2015, a 
proportion that rose to 46 per cent in August 2015, when the 2016 budget was proposed, and 
69 per cent by mid-2016. Although Jokowi was unwilling to blur the lines between the ruling 
and opposition coalitions, he was able to secure support for his first Budget Bill without 
forming an oversized coalition. Although the coalitions were locking horns on direct local 
elections at the time, this conflict had no impact on budget decision-making during the 
transition period, when the 2015 Budget Bill was formulated. Instead, the opposition 
coalition, which dominated the outgoing legislature, chose not to block the removal of fuel 
subsidies even though they had been a sensitive political issue for more than a decade. The 
opposition coalition also chose not to use its majority power to block the 2015 revised 
budget, which was also the first Jokowi budget designed to implement his campaign 
promises. The opposition coalition did not even attempt to use the budget discussions to 
signal the weakness of the minority government by increasing its deficit target, as Falcó-
Gimeno and Jurado (2011, p. 554) suggest is normally the case. Although the budget 
proposal was radically different from those of Jokowi’s predecessor, the bill was passed by 
the legislature with only minor changes.  
As in the Yudhoyono years, the effectiveness of presidential coalitions was again 
brought into question in the 2016 budget discussions, when Jokowi’s coalition controlled a 
slim majority of seats. In that round, a majority of party fractions, including that of his own 
party, refused to support the 2016 Budget Bill at the final stages of the process, forcing the 
government to freeze capital injections into state-owned enterprises. Moreover, as this 
development suggests, the size of the ruling coalition was only one determining factor in 
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regard to partisan power; the fact that Jokowi had little influence within his own party made it 
difficult for him to maintain party support. Thus, the partisan power is not only about the size 
of a presidential coalition; it is also influenced by the extent to which a president can control 
his/her own allies. Consequently, as Raile et al. (2011, p. 324) suggest, a ‘lack of party 
loyalty and discipline means that a minimal “winning” coalition may be not enough to win 
consistently’. 
The disconnect between the President’s partisan power (coalition size) and the 
political dynamic in the budgeting process is mediated by the legislature’s power to amend 
the budget. Institutional reforms made in 2002 shifted the distribution of power between the 
executive and legislature in many areas, including budget decision-making, such that the 
President is no longer dominant. Although the executive has the power to formulate and 
execute the budget, the legislature has the significant power to amend the budget over the 
course of the deliberation process. Thus while the Budget Bill is the only bill that must be 
initiated by the President, the legislature has authority to reject and to modify the bill, 
increasing the possibility of deadlocks in relation to the budget. This outcome has been 
largely avoided, however, because the budget-making process provides space for negotiations 
between the executive and legislature with the aim of building consensus with regard to 
budget outcomes.  
As demonstrated in the case study of the optimisation fund, the legislature’s power to 
amend the budget produces a pool of uncommitted funds that can be used in their favour. 
This is permitted under the formal rules of the process but, in practice, legislators’ ability to 
generate a pool of uncommitted resources extends far beyond that attributed to it in the 
formal rules, for example when proposed amendments to the budget exceed the permitted 
budget deficit. The optimisation fund functions smoothly because it is based on an exchange 
of benefits between the executive and legislature. For the executive, the fund provides an 
instrument for moving its budget agenda forward while accommodating the interests of the 
spending ministries. However, since the budget is amended collectively by the full 
legislature, rather than by individuals or parties, the President is unable to use parliamentary 
budget amendments to provide selective incentives to secure political support. For legislators, 
the fund not only provides direct benefits to all legislators in the form of salary increases and 
better facilities; it can also be utilised as patronage resources in their constituencies.  
At first glance, then, the operation of the optimisation fund may seem to confirm the 
findings of proponents of the cartel party approach, namely that political parties put aside 
ideology and programmatic principles to behave as a group to capture state resources 
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(Ambardi, 2008). However, a closer examination reveals that Indonesia’s system is quite 
different from those found in some other multiparty presidential democracies, such as 
Brazil’s, where the President has the capacity to veto the budget and reward individual 
legislators and parties (Alston & Mueller, 2006; Ames, 2001; Pereira & Acosta, 2010; Raile 
et al., 2011; Zucco, 2009). Since the optimisation fund is distributed covertly and without 
reference to party affiliation, it encourages legislators to act without reference to party 
membership or coalitional affiliation. In other words, it fosters collusion between individual 
legislators rather than between parties.  
To assess the extent of the influence of party affiliation on the political dynamics of 
the budget-making process, the thesis examines the party standpoints on capital injections to 
state-owned enterprises. Budget discussions around proposed state capital injections in 
successive budget rounds have been deeply contradictory. In the 2015 revised budget, which 
was negotiated at a time when the government coalition held a minority of seats, the value of 
proposed capital injections was more than ten times those included in the 2014 budget. 
Although they were the subject of prolonged debate within the Budget Committee, they were 
ultimately passed by the legislature. By contrast, the much smaller capital injections proposed 
in the 2016 budget proposal coincided with the beginning of a period of political 
consolidation for Jokowi. Yet, despite the fact that they had been approved in a single Budget 
Committee session, the party fractions represented on the committee later rejected the 
proposal during the Plenary Session. As these contradictory outcomes reveal, party affiliation 
is not always a determining factor in budget deliberations. 
Further insights into the (ir)relevance of party affiliation in these deliberations can be 
gleaned through a comparison of the debates around capital injections and those around 
attempts to remove fuel subsidies in the 2012 and 2013 revised budgets, when some parties 
had indicated their policy positions from the outset of the budget deliberations. In the case of 
capital injections in the 2016 budget round, the proposal was not rejected on the basis of 
policy positions or inter-coalition rivalry, but rather in response to a threat to an important 
source of patronage resources, namely the aspiration fund, which benefits legislators as 
individuals, rather than as members of a given party. In this case, then—rather than being 
determined by party affiliation—the outcome was driven by interests of legislators as 
individuals. 
As explained in the case study dealing with the aspiration fund, individualistic 
behaviour in the legislature has been driven in large part by the shifting of electoral rules 
from an arrangement favouring the party machines to one that privileges personal votes. As 
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Ames (2001) shows, the electoral system is an important factor in determining the way in 
which legislators behave in office. In Indonesia’s case, the shift to a more candidate-centred 
system has prompted candidates to build personal relationships with their constituents rather 
than prioritising their links to a given political party. This phenomenon is widely recognised 
in studies of electoral campaigns, but it is also evident in the behaviour of legislators, where it 
drives individuals to seek rents from the budget process, sometimes for private gain, but also 
to secure tangible benefits for their constituents, and thus enhance their chances of re-
election. The aspiration fund is an important mechanism for achieving these goals, because it 
is distributed on the basis of electoral districts, and thus can be used to provide patronage 
resources in return for political support.34 Importantly also, it is distributed to all Budget 
Committee members, as well as to members of several strategic parliamentary committees 
regardless of party affiliation. This feature of the process undermines the party identity of 
Budget Committee members by reducing the incentives for them to behave as party or 
coalition members. 
The importance ascribed by legislators to the preservation of this mechanism, which 
began as an informal institution, is evident in their efforts to formalise it through the MD3 
Law. Rather than being a matter of contestation between parties, debates around the 
aspiration fund in this context focused on inequalities in access to it among parliamentary 
committees. Although this and other attempts to institutionalise the fund have repeatedly 
been rejected, an undercover aspiration fund can be identified in different funds, like the 
Special Allocation Fund and the Infrastructure Adjustment Fund, which are managed by the 
Budget Committee, and in other forms of funding inserted through the spending ministries by 
the sectoral committees. These forms of funding not only produce inefficiencies in resource 
allocation but also make the budget process more vulnerable to corruption (Hicken & 
Simmons, 2008, p. 110). 
  
                                                
34 Note, however, that in contrast to electoral systems that incorporate single-member districts— 
where incumbents can claim direct credit for pork-barrelling (Lancaster, 1986, p. 70)— Indonesia’s 
large electoral districts and system of multi-member representation make it difficult for a single 
legislator to claim personal credit for the allocation of a particular project. Theoretically, as Lancaster 
(1986, p. 71) argues, a free-rider problem exists by which other legislators representing the same 
electoral district can claim the credit as well. This element of the system may help explain why re-
election rates are relatively low. 
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Implications of the Study 
This study’s findings have implications for our understanding of both the Indonesian political 
system and multiparty presidential systems more generally. In relation to the former, the 
study adds to the body of literature that challenges the utility of the oligarchy thesis (Hadiz & 
Robison, 2013; Winters, 2013) in understanding the relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. It does not dispute the influence of the very wealthy in 
Indonesian politics, as was all too evident in the 2014 elections.35 However it does reveal the 
shortcomings of the oligarchy thesis when it comes to accounting for the day-to-day 
interactions between the legislature and the executive branch in the context of the budget 
decision-making process. Although there are some loopholes in the budget process that 
enable political elites to influence resource allocation, institutional constraints and the cartel-
like behaviour of individuals within the committee system mean that there is little 
opportunity for oligarchs to influence the budget decision-making process within the 
legislature. This is the case even when budget measures have a direct and deleterious effect 
on oligarchic interests, as occurred when the legislature rejected proposed capital injections 
into state-owned enterprises.  
The study also identifies some limitations in the application of cartel theory to the 
behaviour of political parties in Indonesia by Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2008). Cartel 
theory, as it applies to Indonesia, has three main characteristics, namely the absence of an 
opposition party, the existence of oversized coalitions, and the blurriness of distinctions 
between parties in terms of their ideology and programs (Ambardi, 2008; Slater, 2004). The 
lack of programmatic and ideological distinctiveness among parties is confirmed by 
observations of three rounds of budget discussions. Indeed, party ideology and programs are 
irrelevant to the standpoints taken by their members in budget discussions. However, as noted 
above, there was no evidence of collusion between political parties in the budget-making 
process. Instead, cartel-like behaviour is observable between individuals in each of the 
various committees responsible for the budget. In other words, as a consequence of the failure 
of political parties to coordinate or direct legislators, there is no party-based cartel effect in 
the budgetary arena. There is, however, collusion between legislators for their individual 
benefit, rather than the benefit of the parties they represent.  
                                                
35 See for example Mietzner (2015, p. 58) and Muhtadi (2015, p. 360); Mieztner observes the 
influence of oligarchic forces in both candidates’ campaigns and Muhtadi illustrates how oligarchs 
pushed Jokowi to inaugurate Budi Gunawan as police chief.  
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 In relation to the exercise of constitutional power in Indonesia’s multiparty 
presidential system, the findings of this study are in line with other studies that point to the 
role the President’s budget-making powers play in maintaining the parliamentary support 
needed to move his or her policy agenda forward (Pereira & Mueller, 2004; Pereira & 
Orellana, 2009). However, the use of the Indonesian President’s budget-making powers in 
this way comes at a particularly high political cost, for four reasons. First, allocations are not 
only dispensed among the members in the governing coalition but to all legislators regardless 
of their party affiliation. In other words, members of the opposition coalition potentially have 
equal access to the budget as members of the governing coalition, since budget amendments 
are made in the committee system, in which individual members of each committee act 
collectively and collusively as a cartel. Second, the Indonesian President lacks the power to 
veto the whole budget or a single line item to provide rewards to individuals or parties. Third, 
while a president’s budgetary power can be used to reach compromises on other items on the 
legislative agenda in some contexts, in Indonesia the ‘political currency’ of the legislature’s 
power to amend the budget is limited to moving the Budget Bill forward. Fourth, since 
budget amendments are negotiated in committees that have no obligation to be transparent, 
there is significant opportunity for inefficient resource allocation, but also rent-seeking and 
corruption.  
By contrast, the study’s findings challenge many of the assumptions that underpin the 
literature on partisan power in multiparty presidential systems. Coalitions are widely seen as 
a panacea for presidents with minority support in in the legislature (Chaisty et al., 2015; Raile 
et al., 2011). Indeed, many scholars have suggested that they can operate in the same way as 
parliamentary systems, if presidents succeed in building stable multiparty coalitions to win 
the support of the legislature, for example, through the strategic distribution of cabinet 
portfolios and the exercise of budgetary power (Chaisty et al., 2014; Pereira & Acosta, 2010; 
Pereira & Mueller, 2004; Raile et al., 2011). However, this study has demonstrated that in the 
Indonesian case, the presence or absence of a governing coalition is not the determining 
factor in providing stability in the budget decision-making process. This is the case for three 
reasons. First, since parties in a governing coalition are not bound by the principle of loyalty 
to the coalition, nominal majority support in the legislature may not translate into support for 
government policy. Second, although the political party law gives parties the power to recall 
legislators who violate party rules, party discipline is seldom enforced in the legislature, in 
part because of the widespread use of consensus-based decision-making 
(musyawarah/mufakat) rather than voting. Third, individuals have a pronounced role in 
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decision-making, reflecting a lack of programmatic distinctiveness among parties and the 
incentives provided by the open-list proportional system for legislators to seek to secure 
additional funding for their constituencies. When combined, these factors encourage 
legislators to act in a cartel-like manner within particular committees in pursuit of individual 
interests rather than according to party affiliation. 
Significance for Future Work 
There is a large body of literature on the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in the policy arena, but the study of the impact of informal institutions on those 
relationships is still in its infancy. By taking into account both formal and informal 
institutions, this study has provided new insights into the political imperatives and incentives 
that drive Indonesia’s national budget-making process. These insights shed light on 
parliamentary behaviour at the national level by revealing that—in the budget-making 
process, at least— legislators prioritise access to patronage resources over party affiliation. 
Further study of the impact of other informal institutions, such as populism, are an obvious 
focus for further research on the causal mechanisms that determine the interplay between 
different kinds of institutions, their impact on relations between the executive and legislature, 
and the political outcomes they produce.  
In Indonesia’s decentralised system, it is also necessary to look beyond the national 
level. It is clear from the number of budget-related cases investigated by the Corruption 
Eradication Commission—all involving the local executive and members of the local 
legislature from a number of political parties—that cartel-like practices of the kind found at 
the national level are likely to found also at the local level.36 However, further research is 
required to understand their exact workings, since coalitions exist only temporarily during 
election campaigns and the local government head does not have the same kinds of resources, 
for example cabinet seats, to distribute to supporters from different parties at this level. As a 
consequence, it is likely that the budget’s value as ‘political currency’ is even more 
important. Systematic studies at the local and provincial levels are thus needed to improve 
our understanding of their budget decision-making processes and, at the same time, the 
relationships between the executive and the legislature in Indonesia. 
                                                
36 The KPK investigated four cases of the budget-related corruption at the local level in the second 
half of 2017 alone. These cases involved Mojokerto City (Ihsanuddin, 2017), Malang City 
(Belarminus, 2017), West Sulawesi Province (Junaedi, 2017) and Jambi Province (Gabrillin, 2017). 
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